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INTRODUCTION 
There are some philosophers who claim that they 
appreciate the existential thought of Soren Kierkegaard but 
that they reject his religious thought. They justify such 
a claim by saying that for Kierkegaard the existential 
refers to the ethical and that the religious is something 
other. The purpose of this thesis is to show that such a 
claim is a contradiction in terms. I will argue that the 
religious and the existential are equivalent for Kierkegaard 
and that the ethical 1st therefore, not existential except 
in so far as it is religious. 
In order to defend my thesis that the religious and 
the existential are equivalent, I shall focus my attention 
upon Kierkegaard's concept of the leap. For, upon considera-
tion, it is obvious that the leap plays a key role in 
Kierkegaard's philosophy. It is the leap which relates'the 
ethical and the religious for Kierkegaard. If one wanted to 
see the differences between the ethical and the religious, 
he would do well to consider the leap. If he interpreted 
the existential in relation to the leap, he would then be 
able to locate the exi~tent1al in its relation to the ethical 
and the religious. Thus, I will examine these notions and 
argue that the religious is equivalent to the existential 
by showing that they are both equivalent to the leap. 
pt .uu .. 
From the beginning a distinction will be made 
between two moments of the leap. For, the leap according 
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to Kierkegaard is a double movement leap. Grounded in this 
double movement leap are two moments of the religi.ous and 
tw.o .. moments of the existential. Upon clarifying this 
distinction. the confusion by which one might come to see 
the existential as the mere ethical will be wiped· away. 
For sometimes Kierkegaard refers to the first movement of 
the religious or religiousness A as the ethico-religious 
.and sometimes merely as the ethical. But, upon seeing that 
this "ethical" is really one form of the religious, we shall 
see that if one wants to retain the existential of Kierke-
gaard he cannot reject the religious. 
The argument for my thesis will proceed by an 
analysis of ten different structures of the leap. First, 
the basic pattern of the double movement leap will be 
explicated in terms of the stages on life's way. Then such 
religious themes as love and sin will be interpreted in· 
terms or· the leap. Reason and Fa1 th will be related to the 
leap. The existential and the leap will be related. The 
leap will be analyzed even in relation to the incarnation, 
temporality and Kierkegaard's style. By such a procedure 
the ehief nuances of t~e religious and the existential will 
be brought into focus. 
In the conclusion I shall shift my attention from 
the evidence for my thesis to the kind of evidence which 
•• 
Kierkegaard uses for supporting his position. I shall make 
clear just what sort of justification he appeals to. 
Finally, in Appendix A I shall clarify my interpre-
tation of Kierkegaard even more by considering some other 
prominent interpretations of Kierkegaard. In Appendix B. 
I shall answer an objection to my thesis which might be 
raised from what Kierkegaard writes concerning marriage in 
his later writings. In Appendix C I will voice a critical 
question which I have concerning Kierkegaard's notion of 
the double movement leap. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE STAGE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
It is in Fear and Trembling that Soren Kierkegaard 
describes the double movement leap.1 He does this under 
the image of the two Knights. The Knight of Infinite 
Resignation represents what he will come to call religious-
ness A or natural religion. The Knight of Faith represents 
religiousness B or Christianity. 2 However, in spite of the 
detail with which Kierkegaard describes these two Knights, 
we only see them in their leap. We do not see the paths 
from which they made the leap. It is in The Concept of 
Dread that Kierkegaard gives us an important clue concerning 
the interpretation of Fear and Trembling and so also the 
image of the two Knights. He writes of Fear and Trembling: 
"There the author several times allows the wishful 
1deality of the aesthetical to founder upon the 
exacting ideality of the ethical, in order by 
these c@llisions to let the religious ideality 
come to evidence which is precisely the ideality 
of reality, and therefore is just as desirable as 
'I' 
that of aesthetics and not impossible like that 
of ethics, yet to let it come to evidence in such 
a way that it breaks out in the dialectical leap 
p:: . I 
and with the positive feeling "'Sehold, all.things 
have become new!" and in the negative feeling which 
is the passion of the absurd to which the concept 
of "repetition" corresponds."3 
What is this collision of the aesthetic and the 
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ethical out of which arises the .Knight of Infinite Resigna-
tion? How does the aesthetic founder upon the ethical so 
as to result in the first movement of the leap? What is 
this way of the aesthetic and this way of the ethical? 
The aesthetic represents for Kierkegaard a way of 
life or a stage on life's way, depending on whether or not 
it has been renewed by the leap. It is a way or a stage 
that has to do with the immediate, the beautiful, and the 
artistic. But it is very complex and contains within it 
several essentially distinct ways or stages. Thus, in 
The Banquet dialogue of Stages on Life's Way, Kierkegaard 
allows five aesthetic characters to speak their philosophy 
l~ 
of life. In the first volume of Either/Or Kierkegaard 
distinguishes three stages of the erotic, which, in effect, 
means at least three stages within the aesthetic stage.5 
In the introduction to The Concept of Dread Kierkegaard 
argues that for the Greeks even the ethical was within the 
aesthetic perspective.' And, of course, religiousness A is 
aesthetic religion. 
But, Kierkegaard's concept of the ethical stage is 
no less complex. First, we should notice that the ethical 
µ: .. L ... " 
as such is never a way, it 1s only a stage. Because· it 
refers to action and never mere conceptualization it 
never, as ethical, claims to be a way and thus it is not 
a way. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard distinguishes three very 
important types of the ethical. First, he clarifies what 
he means by improper ethics. 6 This is ethics on the back-
ground of the aesthetic. Its criterion is never merely 
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the exacting but for it there is always a predominant 
longing for the beautiful. Next, Kierkegaard distinguishes 
two types of proper ethics.7 The first of these claims to 
rest upon metaphysics. That is, it claims that reason is 
self-sufficient to produce and accomplish the exacting 
ideal. The second type of proper ethics claims to rest 
upon dogmatics. It thinks that reason can never by itself 
arrive at a notion of sin and that only faith can ground a 
true ethics where sin is a possibility. 
The vast complexity of the aesthetic and the ethical 
will clarify itself only as we slowly follow Kierkegaard on 
his reflective path. The perfect symmetry, the prodigious 
applicability, the fertile simplicity of Soren Kierkegaard's 
fundamental philosophic insight will reveal itself only as 
we patiently examine it layer by layer, chapter by chapter. 
In this opening pictu~e of the two Knights we see only the 
most general and yet most basic structures of this way of 
the leap. In the Way of Abraham, the Knight of Faith, we 
see five essential moments: (1) He receives the promise, 
.. J L a ' 
(2) He endures the threats against that promise, (J)·He 
receives Isaac, (4) He endures the threat against Isaac, 
and (5) He receives Isaac a second time. The Knight of 
Infinite Resignation is like Abraham in the first four 
moments but he is lacking in the ftf'th. If we examine 
7 
these five moments in terms of the interpretative clue which 
we received from The Concept of Dread, we shall be on the 
way with Kierkegaard at least in reflection. 
Kierkegaard speaks of the aesthetic as the wishful 
·ideality that is desirable. He exemplifies the first moment 
of this wishful ideality in Abraham as Abraham received the 
Promise in Ur of the Chaldees. Kierkegaard will often refer 
to this first moment of the aesthetic as the first immediacy. 8 
Abraham hears that the promised land will be his. He hears 
that he will be the father of many nations. He hears that 
through him all the world will be blessed. He longs that 
this might be. It is for him as a dream. In the first 
blush of his childlike enthusiasm he feels as if it already 
were. This is the wish of the aesthete in its first and 
si~plest form. It is a beautiful wish for the beautiful. 
It is desirable that all men should at one time be such 
aesthetes. The immediacy of the fir~t dream entices one on 
his way. Abraham set~ out alone leaYing his family behind 
that the beautiful promise might be fulfilled. 
But what.did he experience as he separated himself 
from the protective im~ediacy of his family? He slowly and 
pt .. 
; ' .~ ' . . 
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painfully discovered that he was also separated from·the 
object of .his desire. Threat after threat seemed to tell 
him that the promise would not be fulfilled. Now Abraham 
began to experience the ethical, that exactin.~ ideality. 
With effort he was faithful to the promise even though it 
was threatened. He began to reflect. Will I really be 
the father of many nations? I am not even the fa·ther of 
8 
one child. Will I really receive the Promised Land? Lot 
got the best part of the land. How will the world be 
·blessed through me? I will die and be forgotten. 3ut he 
did not give up his longin~. In spite of the collision 
between his longing and the brute facts of temporal reality 
he persevered. Many men would give in to the threat. Many 
would not even have left the first immediacy. But Abraham 
was seeking and he endured the threats. It began to seem 
impossible that the exacting ideal of hiR dream could be 
achieved and yet he continued faithfully on the way. Even 
though it seemed that the path of his longing and the path 
which he was treading could never be the same, even though 
it seemed that the aesthetic and the ethical could never be 
one, he lived as if they were. 
And then, when the trial of collision seemed hope-
less he received Isaa~. Just out of the blue he was 
released from the threats and taken up into the second 
immediacy. His long endurance was a preparation that 
renewed for him the wishful ideality of tbe aesthetic. 
9 
once again through the small voice which said to him, 
•sara shall bear you a child" the vision of old was 
renewed for him. And now he saw the direction of the way 
even more clearly than he had before the trial. The exact-
tng ideality of the ethical had strengthened his eyes and 
now the vision was so bright that it seemed it would last 
:forever. This was for him the beginning of the r'irst move-
ment o~ the leap. In his exaltation he rose above the 
separated paths of aesthetic longing and ethical demands. 
·He saw them as necessary to one another that this new_ and 
greater longing might be. 
But then, as Abraham trod this path of bliss, a new 
threat appeared on the horizon. God demanded Isaac in 
sacrifice. At this point the Knight of Infinite Resignation 
~nd the Knight of Faith begin to be distinguished. As this 
threat appears they are both in the bliss of the second 
immediacy. They are one with the promise through Isaac. 
Now we must look carefully, for what happens as they approach 
the horizon distinguishes the two Knights. This distinction 
ls the main focus of attention which Kierkegaard portrays in 
his painting of the two Knights. 
A~ain neither Kni~ht succumbs to the trial. Both 
see this as a new three.t to the promise. Both of them are 
willing to teleologically suspend the ethical. That is, 
both are willing to sacrifice Isaac. Notice, this ls another 
and even greater level of the collision between the aesthetic 
r 
.. 
' 
. 
. 
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,, 
<. 
- t..: 
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and the ethicar. And because of this collision both Knights 
leap higher into the air even to the point of infinity. 
once again it seems that the longing after the promise will 
be frustrated by the exacting demands of the ethical situa-
tion. But that does not hinder our Knights. They are still 
1n the ascent of the second immediacy and it carries them to 
the point of infinite resignation. But if we watch them as 
the paths of the·aesthetic and the ethical are united by the 
leap, we see that their leaps are very different. The 
Knight of Infinite Resignation ceases to believe that the 
promise will be fulfilled in time. He thinks that the 
ethical demands are really impossible and so he feels that 
he will receive Isaac again only in eternity. He does not 
perform the second movement of the leap. Abraham, the Knight 
of Faith, leaps up infinitely resigned, but always, by virtue 
of the absurd, he believes that the promise will be fulfilled 
even on earth and in time. He does not lose the ethical as 
does the other Knight. Once again he preserves both the way 
of the aesthetic and the way of the ethical. 
Kierkegaard. distinguishes these two leaps as the 
leap of love and the leap of faith. Ee has his pseudonym, 
Johan.~es de Silentio, who represents the Knight of Infinite 
Resignation write: 
"I am convinced that God is love, this thoUJ?;ht has 
for me a primitive lyrical validity. When it is 
present to me, I am unspeakably blissful; when it 
r ~~: 11 
•i,J< ;.. ·. 
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is absent I long for it more vehemently than does 
the lover for his object; but I do not believe, 
this courage I lack. For me the love of God is, 
both in a direct and in an inverse sense, 
incommensurable with the ~hole of reality. I am 
not cowardly enough to whimper and complain, but 
neither am I deceitful enough to deny that faith 
is something much higher. I can well endure living 
in my way, I am joyful and content, but my joy ls 
not that of faith, and 1n comparison with that I 
am unhappy."9 
In this beautiful pas.sage Kierkegaard distinguishes the 
religion of the mystic from the religion of the believer. 
He distinguishes religiousness A from religiousness B. He 
distinguishes the single movement leap of the Knight of 
Infinite Resignation from the double movement leap of the 
Knight of Faith. 
Notice what happens in the second movement of the 
leap. Abraham receives Isaac a second time and he ls 
happy. The Knight of Infinite Resignation would have been 
unhappy at the second reception of Isaac. In his mystical 
flight he was totally content with the infinite and wanted 
no more to be bothered' with the finite. But it was not just 
the reception of Isaac a second time that distinguished the 
two Knights. Abraham had faith, by virtue of the absurd, 
that the promise would be fulfilled in time. It is this 
·:. 
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faith which renews for him the ethical. Just as the first 
movement of the leap gave the Knights the aesthetic a 
second time, so the second movement gives Abraham the ethical 
a second time. Just as he received the aesthetic in double 
measure in the first leap, so he now receives the ethical 
in double measure by the second leap. Before the leap the 
way of longing was always incomplete as was the way of the 
exacting. They both were in collision. By the double move-
ment leap they become complete. They move from being just 
·partial paths to being a whole way. They are no longer just 
half sufficient. They are whole. They are double.10 
Such then are the stage structures of the leap. 
The aesthetic refers to a longing which is immediate and is 
related to the perfect or infinite or eternal. It is a 
).onging for the beautiful ideal. The ethical refers to the 
exacting demands of the finite and temporal situation. 
These collide. It seems that the factual situation makes it 
impossible for the ideal to be attained. But through 
perseverance in one's longing the collision is overcome and 
a new immediacy arises which renews one's enthusiasm for 
·his ideals. However, the temporal or ethical situation once 
again makes its challenge and threatens the ideal. One can, 
1n infinite resignatian, freeze himself in a blissful dis-
regard for this new threat and consider only the eternal. 
Or he can, by virtue of the absurd, that is through faith, 
continue to believe that his ideals can be reached in time. 
~~~'' ',: 
t;' 
....... 
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If he so be11:ves then he has received his ideal in time. 
In this way Soren Kierkegaard seeks to show that 
the either/or of the aesthetic can be overcome by the both -
and of faith. By this double movement leap he seeks to 
~llow all ways to open into one another. Thus he seeks to 
1ove away the scandal of love. Now we must turn to his 
concentration upon that love as such. 
' 
..,._,. 
" ~ . 
CHAPTER II 
THE LOVE STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
A~ a genius of reflective love, Soren Kierkegaard 
ranks ~1th Plato, Augustine, Pascal and Scheler. As with 
them his world view was forged in the fires of love. He 
stood alone and longing in that criss-cross of unnamed 
14 
paths. And then that lightning flash of first love lit his 
way so that he could never forget the direction. As he trod 
on through the darkness, which was even blacker after that 
flash, the light of love within him, clearer even than the 
noon day sun, revealed to him even other mysteries of love. 
His very double movement leap is simply the leap of love. 
It is no wonder then that immediately following 
that painting of the two Knights we see in Fear and 
Trembling the painting of the young swain and his princess.1 
It is·with·this picture that we are introduced to the love 
structures of the leap. By means of the stage structures 
of the lecp Kierkegaard might make his appeal to philosophers, 
but by means of the love structures he makes his appeal to 
all men. He reaches out with his stories of eros even to 
' seducers and psychoanalysts. With his beautiful descriptions 
of marriage he might touch any man or wife. With his auto-
biographical descriptions of erotic inspiration he can 
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loosen the deepest well springs of youthful idealisn even 
after the manner of a Dante or a Petrach. His insight into 
Christian love is as earth embracing as that of St. Francis 
.; and as profound as that of Scheler. How shall we begin to 
understand then this beautiful but haunting and mysterious 
picture of the young swain and his princess? 
The elements which Kierkegaard presents to us are 
only five: (1) The young swain meets the princess and loves 
ner with all of his concentration. (2) Through his love for 
·her he comes to love the infinite and the eternal, that is, 
God. (3) But he cannot marry her. (4) Yet he continues to 
love her with all of his concentration but with a great 
suffering. (5) Until finally through faith he sees that he 
can marry her. But the questions are as many as the elements: 
.(1) What was that concentration with which he loved her? 
(2) How did he come to love God by loving her? (3) Why 
could he not marry her? {4) Why did he continue to love her 
and to suffer so even when he knew he could not marry? 
(5) How did he finally become able to marry her? 
This love which the young swain has for his princess 
ls no ordinary love. We are told how he lets it permeate 
every fibre of his body and of his mind. B:e has the power 
"to concentrate the wl'\ole content of life and the whole 
significance of reality in one si11,csle wish."2 But how did 
he get such an aesthetic power, such a power of lon~ing? 
To be such an extraordinary young man the young swain must 
16 
have had an extraordinary upbringing. What could this have 
been like? 
In the first volume of Either/Or the young man 
interprets the three operas of Mozart in such a way as to 
suggest how a person goes through three stages of the 
immediate erot1c.3 For the pre-puberty child, the aesthetic 
longing is as a dream. The masculine and.the feminine are 
still united within him. Hence, the boy longs for the 
feminine but not as an external object. However, at puberty 
·and through his teens the feminine is separated from him and 
his longing for the beautiful ideal becomes a seeking. But 
he does not seek the feminine in a particular person, he 
just seeks the feminine as such. Finally, his longing 
becomes concentrated in a definite desire. He desires the 
feminine in a particular woman. 
These first three stages of the aesthetic are erotic 
e~pressions of the same three stages through which Abraham 
passed. ·when the ideal of the'promise first presented 
itself to him it was with the immediacy of a dream. Then 
through many years he went through that period of seeking 
the vague ideal which was distant from him. Finally, that 
ideal became particularized for him as he desired it through 
the person of Isaac. ' 
In asking ourselves what the concentration of the 
young swain means we are asking about the quality of his 
particularization process. Kierkegaard shows us several 
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ways in which a person can enter this third sta~e of the 
erotic. ~e might enter it·as a Judge William who would 
~arry the girl. He might enter it as a Johannes who would 
seduce the girl. He might enter 1 t as a Victor Eremi ta who 
through gallantry would not marry the girl but would pre-
serv'e her as his muse. Our question is - how might a young 
man, who is in the second stage of erotic seeking, enter 
into the third stage of erotic desire with the concentration 
of the young swain? Kierkegaard takes great pains to 
·describe all the possible nuances of this transition. 
First, Kierkegaard describes for us the young man 
in that second stage of erotic longing as seeking. We find 
. 4 
him in that condition as he gives his speech at The Banquet. 
He is one who has never been in love but he is highly inter-
ested in it. It appears to him contradictory and comic. He 
cannot understand how a man and a woman could express their 
love for each other in time and space. For that would be 
to reduce the loftiest ideals to the mundane. It ls in' this 
very mixture of the ideal and the mundane that he sees the 
ground of the contradiction and the comedy. He does not 
yet concentrate his desire on a particular person. Therefore, 
he is open to the ways of the other pseudonyms. 
Judge Willlam,represents the ethical way in which the 
young man might put an end to hi_s erotic seeking and become 
mature in the desire of one woman. Marriage is the univer-
sally accepted way for a young man to settle down and attain 
18 
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his goals 1n the finite and temporal. Through a decision 
of positlve resolution, the young man will eventually be 
\.' able to end his seeking and become happy. Thus, the second 
~ . 
• 
part of Stages on Life's Way and the second volume of 
Either/Or are appeals to the young man from the Judge, so 
that when he finally meets the right girl he might. become 
an ethically solid citizen of the earth. 
· H°"ever, there are other appeals. Johannes the 
Seducer, in his speech at the end of The Banquet and in his 
·diary at the end of the first volume of Either/Or, presents 
the beauties of his way of desiring the beautiful. His way 
is an exception to the universal order but it is interesting. 
He will not allow the gods to catch him on the fish hook of 
marriage whereby they sap him of his creative energy. No, 
.he will just suck the delicious bait, which is the sweet and 
tender virgin, off of each hook and then in glee leave the 
hook dangling there bare. 
So, the young man is faced, as he goes seeking on 
his way, with the two conflicting paths of the ethical and 
the aesthetic. They seem again to be locked in the utter 
contradiction of the Either/or. But like Abraham he pursues 
his goal with perseverance. When we meet him once again he 
has finally fallen in,love. And, oh, what a love it isl 
It is the very love of the young swain for his princess. 
It is in Repetition that Kierkegaard tells us of the detail 
~f this story of his love, 
19 
In Repetition we see that the young man is not 
following the way of Judge William or the way of the seducer. 
Rather he is following the way of Victor Eremita, the 
victorious hermit. Victor appears explicitly as the editor 
of Either/Cr and as the third orator at The Banquet. How-
ever, the way of life which he symbolizes is that of the 
young swain or Knight of Infinite Resignation in Fear and 
Trembling and that of Quidam in Stages on Life's Way. Even 
Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus keep quiet his 
·secret and have climbed up by his leap. It is into the 
position of Victor Eremita that the young man is taken up 
in Repetition. Thus, this one aesthetic position appears in 
all the early works of Kierkegaard's aesthetic authorship 
and it is the central position which he there seeks to 
~larify. For, it is precisely the position of the religious 
aesthete. 
we might assume that Victor, as editor of Either/or, 
has some sympathy for both the way of the aesthete and the 
way of the ethical man. If we look carefully at his philo-
sophy of life as it is manifest in his Banquet oration, we 
see that this is so. He is one of the aesthetes. He is 
fully accepted as an aesthete by the other four. And yet 
he is very different f~om the others. In his gallantry he 
always stay::; at a distance from the one whom he loves that 
she might be his muse. In short, he has made a resolution 
to marry. This is a very ethical undertaking. As Judge Lnot 
20 
w1111am explains 1n the ethical section of StaQ:;es on .Life'·s 
war. it ls precisely resolution which characterizes the 
ethlcal.5- That resolution can be of two types, either the 
positive or the negative. Victor Eremita is the personifi-
cation of negative resolution. So it is with our young 
swain. He loves 'W'ith such a concentration that he cannot 
even marry. And· how did that concentration arise? AR we 
look at what is common to Victor Erem1ta and the young man 
we can finally answer that question. 
In short, we can account for the intensity or the 
concentration of the young swain by two factors: immersion 
in the tradition of eros and immersion in himself through 
chastity. As we listen to the young man in his Banquet 
oration and in Repetition and in the first volume of 
Either/or, we see that he has read and tholight through the 
whole of the literature on Eros. And just as Victor was 
very careful to protect his ideal through celibacy, so the 
young man sought his ideal by striving for purest chastity. 
He even says such things of himself as the following: 
"I have never, because it was smart, challenged a 
woman by a glance, but I have cast my eyes down, 
unwilling to abandon myself to an impression 
before I have clearly made out what is the sign1-
' f!cance of that power under the dominion of which 
I am about to let myself fall. "6 
During this period of longing as seeking he sought to feel 
' i 
l 
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and express the ideal love. He sought to be chaste until 
the right moment came that it might·be the greatest of all 
moments. He sought to be a poet that he might express it 
in the most beautiful of WDrds. In this way our young man 
prepared himself to become a Victor Eremita •. Without such 
immersion in tradition and with~ut such chastity such a 
love would not be possible. And what was this love? It 
was a love of prodigious concentration. Through his reading 
and his thought and his striving for purity, the young man 
·had opened within himself the capabilities for all that 
intensity of feeling which we see in the young swain. But 
what did that intensity imply? It implied that through his 
love for the princess the young swain would even come to 
love God. What does that mean? 
In Reoetition we see that the young man did not suck 
the bait off the hook as did the seducer, but rather the girl 
was for him the fishing fly by which God caught the young man 
for himself.? In The '9anguet Victor tells us that by loving 
with gallantry a man could become a genius, or a poet, or a ". 
knight or a saint. This gallantry is another word for con-
centration. It was made possible for Victor by the tradition 
of chivalry and by his chastity. And we know that our young 
swain comes to love God as he loves his princess. Why and 
how does erotic inspiration open a man to God so that with 
Johannes de Silentio he can say those beautiful wordss 
"I am convinced that God is love, this thought has 
for me a primitive lyrical validity. 118 
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It is the young swain's love for the princess that gives 
him this conviction. What is the structural force of that 
pri,mitive lyrical validity? 
This phenomenon of discovering God in erotic love 
is the phenomenon of platonic love, which Socrates describes 
in his second speech of the Phaedrus. It is the same 
phenomenon which Dante experienced when he fell in love with 
-Beatrice and which Petrarch experienced when he fell in love 
, with Laura. It is the phenomenon which Soren Kierkegaard 
describes again and again showing now these nuances now 
those. It is the central phenomenon of his aesthetic 
literature and especially of Repetition. In short, this 
J. falling in love with a girl so as to fall in love with God, 
t even to the point of becoming a poet and a saint, is the 
~-
~ first movement of the leap. 
f. 
The young swain loved the princess with such concen-
tration that he discovered within his relationship to her 
the infinite and the eternal. During this period of trial 
he sought to be in the company of the holy ones who lived 
as chastely, of the poets who sang as purely. He tried to 
immerse himself in the, tradition and in the chastity to 
which it admonished him. But while he knew these so as to 
seek them, he could not bend himself to them so as to live 
Lthem. He was not concentrated. His energies were dispersed 
1-' 
t 
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in distraction. The goal which he sought with so much 
longing seemed that it could never be his. He must have 
prayed, as did the holy ones whom he read about, but without 
their total abandon. That abandon was his one and only wish. 
He must have struggled in his idealistic moments for purest 
chastity just as did his heroes, but he was without their 
constancy. That constancy wa~ his one and only wish. He 
must have tried to express himself with "the rhyme, the 
rhythm, the carol, the creation"9 of his idols but he was 
without their poetry. That poetry was his one and only wish. 
And then, when it seemed that he could never attain his goal, 
when it seemed that the ethical demands of time and space 
would always make impossible his aesthetic ideals, there 
appeared the princess. Just as Isaac came to Abraham, so 
the princess came to the young swain and he entered into 
that new immediacy.10 Before it had always seemed to him 
that a particular woman would be a temptation. He had 
always cast down his eyes. But now he looked into her eyes 
and he found that she was his saving angel. She was not an 
occasion of sin. She was his sacramenta1. 11 She was his 
way to the divine. From her streamed out the eternal and 
the infinite. 
All of a sudden chastity was no longer difficult. 
' He never even felt it as.a problem. He was so concentrated 
upon her beauty that there could not enter his mind the 
I 
Lightest temptation to impurity. All of a sudden he loved 
.. 
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God with total fervor. He felt her in all that he exper-
ienced. How he praised that God of Beauty who shone forth 
-· 
in splendour out of all beings. How he thanked that 
gracious God who had fulfilled his farthest longings. 
Through the princess there came to the young swain a new 
mood of euphoric glory and power. She was to him infinitely 
perfect. Through her he saw the whole world as perfect. In 
every~hlng in the world he experienced the infinite per-
fection of God.. He knew that his love for her was eternal. 
·There could never be an end to this absolute bliss as long 
as he loved her. He felt this with that primitive lyrical 
validity.12 Now he experienced first hand the eternal 
itself. Thus, in praise and thanksgiving, in glory and in 
power, the young swain, with his every breath, lived and 
~oved and had his being in the infinite and the eternal. 
No wonder then that pure poetry came rushing forth from 
within him. Now through her he was all that he ever wanted 
to be. God had revealed himself through his goddess. 
So, our young man has reached the threshold. He has 
fallen in love and upon leaving that aesthetic stage of 
longing as seeking he has now passed into the path of desire. 
But, before he knows it, new· problems arise. There is not 
only one way here. There is the path of the judge or 
marriage. There is the path of Johannes or seduction. 
There is the path of Victor or gallant celibacy. We know 
that the young swain chooses the path of Victor. Johannes 
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de s11entio writes of him: 
_, 
"Love for that princess becane for him the expression 
tor an eternal love, assumed a religious character, 
was transfigured into a love for the Eternal Being, 
which did, to be sure, deny him the fulfillment of 
his love yet reconciled him again by the eternal 
consciousness of its validity in the form of eternity, 
which no reality can take from him."13 
we know that Victor thinks that marriage is fudge, that 
·seduction 1s fudge, and that even the way of the ladies' 
tailor is fudge. 14 To him only one way is heroic and that 
is the way of celibacy. What is Soren Kierkegaard's 
argument for celibacy? Even to the end of his life he saw 
celibacy as of great value and as a vital need of his times. 
In the satirical writings of his last years he even condemned 
marriage in order to show the necessity of celibacy. 15 
Why was he so concerned about this matter? 
Soren Kierkegaard's answer to this great question is 
quite simple and it must not be blurred over with excessive 
words. He thought that celibacy and chastity are so impor-
tant because it is through them that the majesty of God 
reveals itself •16 Of course, he does admit that there might 
be other ways that are,just as effective.1 7 But for 
Kierkegaard the majesty of God became real for a man most 
oft~n in chastity and celibacy. That is not to say that 
this happens often. 
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This majesty of God refers to H1s infinity and 
eternity,, to :r1s power and glory, which one experiences in 
erotic 1nsp1rat1on. Through the ideality which the beloved 
. 18 brings the lover, he ls convinced of immortality and 
exalted to 1nf1nity.1 9 He experiences the divine power in 
poetic creativity and the divine glory in all that exists. 
Victor knew that chastity made this erotic inspiration 
possible and he knew that celibacy would preserve it. He 
wanted this ldeallty as his highest value and, therefore, 
. celibacy became for him a necessity, even an easy necessity. 
The peculiarity of Kierkegaard's notion of chastity 
is that. it is not only compatible with erotic love but fully 
possible only through it. Of course, this notion would not 
have been peculiar to Plato or Dante or Petrarch but it is 
to most other people. The detail of the dialectic is as 
follows: the young man through the tradition in which he 
was steeped sought to be a pure and poetic lover of infinite 
perfection. This was his greatest longing. But he could 
not attain it. Then he fell in love with a girl. She 
became a princess and he the young swain. Through his 
1; 
f chaste love for her he had all he wanted. She brought him 
f 
~:. love of God and ascetic victory. Through her he became the 
~: 
r 
'· victorious hermit. H~ knew that if he wanted he could live 
. 
~ forever in this state of erotic God intoxication. All he 
L 
' would have to do would be to preserve his erotic love for 
the princess. That he would do through celibacy. His very 
love for her gave him the energy and concentration which 
made this celibacy easy. Thus he became a Knight of 
Infinite Resignation. 
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The young swain is now at that point of the new 
immediacy in its fullest bloom as was Abraham when he 
possessed Isaac without threat. But then as he is leaping 
blissfully along his way it again begins at times to appear 
like the path toward marriage. This impression becomes 
stronger and stronger. And before long a new threat has 
·arisen. Just as Abraham was challenged, so is the young 
swain. It seemed that the sacrifice would take Isaac from 
Abraham. Now 1 t seems that marriage must take away the 
princess and make of her a housewife. Victor knows the 
necessity of celibacy and. it is even easy. Why does the 
.temptation of marriage with all of its suffering even arise? 
Again, Kierkegaard is very clear in his answer to 
this question. Something arises in his love relationship 
for which the young swain had not bargained. The girl falls 
in love with him and even though it is possible that she too 
might enter the order of knighthood20 it seems to the young 
swain that she will want to marry. He comes to think that 
she suffers because of unfulfilled love and his sympathy for 
her suffering becomes,for him a momentous torture. 21 It is 
primarily because of sympathy that the erotic love is first 
led in the direction of marriage. 22 
There seems to be a natural tendency within the 
f 
aesthetic which again and again brings it into collision 
with the ethical. His new suffering aggravates the young 
swain to even greater and greater poetic expression, It 
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ls as if the only way he can express his love to his lady 
is through poetry. But, of course, this only causes her to 
love him the more and, hence, him to suffer the more. In 
his sympathetic imaginings he even begins to consider the 
joys of married life. The· beautiful descriptions of 
marriage 1n the second volume of Either/Or and the second 
·part of Stages on Life's Way are such poetic overflows. 
The judge, as he claimed, was really showing the aesthetic 
beauties of marriage. A fully ethical man could not separate 
himself from marriage in poetic rhapsody, he would just fully 
live in the temporal and the finite, 
And so it is that the· young swain again comes to 
suffer. Even the most noble of aesthetic paths becomes 
trapped in the circle of the unhappy search for beauty. 
Two ways split the heart of the young swain. Shall he 
sacrifice his muse and marry, or shall he sacrifice his wife 
f· and remain a Knight of Infinite Resignation? It seems that 
;' 
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he will be guilty in either decision. To marry would be to 
follow the ethical way of universal order but it would be to 
betray the higher law '\qithin him. Not to marry would be 
unfair to the princess and would deprive him of his natural 
happiness in the finite and temporal world, This new 
suffering of his conscience only aggravates him the more. 
Kierkegaard's thought;;1s that when this decision 
presents itself to a man he should choose the aesthetic 
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way and teleologically suspend the ethical. That is, a man 
should become a Knight of Infinite Resignation. He must 
fully make the first movement of the leap by saying no to 
the universal. Kierkegaard. argues for this with great skill. 
·.· 
In Stages on~Life's Way he shows the values of negative 
resolution23 and even has the judge argue for a higher way 
than that ~t marriage. 2·4 This way is the way of the 
·justified· exception. And not just any exception to the 
ethical order is justified. ·The way of the ladies' tailor 
and the way of the seducer are not justified. Kierkegaard 
works out a set of very_ rigid and exact criteria whereby he 
will allow one to follow the higher way and rebel against 
_the universal order. The last half of Fear and Trembling 
shows the nature of such a rebellion. But it is at the end 
of Repetition that Kierkegaard gives us the most succinct 
and picturesque summary of his criteria for the justified 
exception. 25 In this beautiful image of the wrestling match 
Kierkegaard shows us how the individual arises in his 
struggle with the universal order and how even the universal 
profits thereby. 
So then, Kier~gaard demands that one suspend the 
ethical in terms of his criteria. !3ut there are two ways in 
which this can be done. The young swain can choose not to 
marry just as a Knight of Infinite Resignation or also as a 
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.Knight of Faith. In either case he must choose not to marry. 
For even if he is to be a Knight of Faith, he must first be 
a Knight of Infinite Resignation. Kierkegaard always 
insists that religiousness A ls necessary for religiousness B 
and he insists with special emphasis in the story of the 
·-. 26 young swain. This means, if one is making the leap 
. 
through love of a woman, that if one is to enter into 
Christian marriage, .he must first have decided to be a 
ceil-.bate. In short, Kierkegaard sees it as necessary for 
.the,: fught of' ~Falth that he must first experience the divine 
majesty. 
But now a new problem arises. The young swain 
"· . decides to be a cell bate and yet he gets married. How does 
.i~· 
> 
that happen? What ls this leap of faith by which he first 
renounces earthly marriage and then at the same time has it? 
Does Kierkegaard think that one can be in a state of erotic 
inspiration and be married at the same time even to the 
same woman? From what he tells us in Fear and Trembling 
his answer seems to be in the affirmative. But it is only 
in The Works of Love that he begins to explain the inner 
structures of' this Christian love which can retain both the 
aesthetic and ethical at once. 
In Fear and T~embling we see that the second move-
ment of the leap is made by virtue of the absurd. It seems 
that one will decide for celibacy knowing all the while, 
through faith, that he will be able to marry his love. 
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This is a contradiction introduced and overcome only by 
faith. N'o human calculation can see how the marriage will 
come about but one trusts that it will through a power 
greater than human calculation. That power, therefore, is 
a gift of God. The Knight can make the first movement of 
the leap completely by his own power. 'Sut all of his energy 
is concentrated on giving the girl up. It is through a gift 
of grace that he believes he will receive her. 27. As long as 
he believes he will receive her he still lives in time and 
'fin1tude. He is not just a Knight of Infinite Resignation. 
When examining the stage structures. of the dialecti-
cal leap with the example of Abraham, we saw how the 
aesthetic and the ethical became new. We saw how something 
of each was preserved even to the extent that·it became 
~oubled. But that is only part of the dialectic for there 
is also a cancellation. When one makes the second movement 
of faith, it is not as if he has erotic inspiration and 
married love joined together without any change at all 
taking place within them. No, certain elements of each are 
cancelled and certain elements are preserved. This cance-
llation and elevation takes place in the leap of Christian 
love which is a new and higher love. It both cancels and 
preserves elements of 'he lower loves. How does this 
dialectic of love take place? 
In Works of Love Kierkegaard writes: 
•What is it that really binds the temporal and 
the eternal? What is it other than love, which 
therefore ls before everything else and remains 
when all else is past?28 
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We have seen that the temporal is connected with the ethical 
and the eternal with the aesthetic. 29 What is this love 
that is before them and which binds them and which remains 
when they are past? Once we have seen its nature and have 
seen how it differs from erotic and married love, then we 
can see how it cancels and preserves them • 
. Soren Kierkegaard's meditation upon Christian love 
centers on the commandment - "you shall love your neighbour." 
The essence of Christian love is shown in its contrast with 
erotic love, friendship, and married love. All of these 
1.oves are preferential. That is, my erotic feelings are 
directed only to one or a few as are my feelings of friend-
ship. Likewise I only marry one or a few. But neighbourly 
... 
love ls to be directed to all humans. No preference on the 
basis of neighbourly love is possible.3° One admires the 
beloved or the friend. But no admiration is necessary for 
neighbourly love. One has self love in his love for his 
beloved and his friend. They are truly the alter ego. But 
neighbourly love cast~ out this egoism. 
Love of neighbour also differs from these other loves 
in that it is God mediated. As Kierkegaard writes: 
"Worldly wisdom thinks that love is a relationship 
between man and man. Christianity teaches that 
love is a relationship between: mar. - God - man, 
that is that God is the middle term • .,31 
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Christian love is not merely love of all men but it is love 
··· of all men because God has commanded it. In order to be 
love of neighbour, Christian love must first be i'ove of God. 
Mere humanitarianism again is a preferential love, it is a 
group selfishness. In it one may prefer to love all men 
·but when·the motive is not rooted in the God command it can 
never be a true I-thou love.32 Altruism that is not God 
mediated will always be egoism even if it is the alter ego 
whom I love. 
It is the command that distinguishes Christian love 
:from all other loves. Those 1"7ords - "you shall" - indicate 
that Christian love is not preferential but ls instead God 
mediated. When one loves his neighbo~r because he ls 
motivated by this command, he is taken beyond egoism. When 
one is motivated by this command of God, God is always 
present in his action. But, how strange are those words -
"you shall love!" To eros and friendship this command 
would be an affront. No poet who sin;s the beauty of these 
loves would ever consider them as rooted in duty. They are 
beautiful precisely in their very spcntaneity. It is this 
command to love that makes Christian love different from 
all other loves. 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. 
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But just because it is different does not mean 
that 1 t is not related to the other loves. As ·we have 
seen, Kierkegaard thinks that eras can prepare the way for 
Christian love. We are now seeking to understand how 
Christian love cancels and yet preserves erotic and married 
love. But be:fore we do that, let us first recall how eros 
can prepare the way for this Christian love. 
Kierkegaard's theory was that one must first make 
the leap o:f the Knight of Infinite Resignation before he 
·can make the leap of the Knight of Faith. Cr, putting it 
more exactly, the leap of faith includes that of resignation. 
In terms of love, this means that Christian love first of 
all depends upon chastity even to the point that it results 
in erotic inspiration and its accompanying celibacy. This 
celibacy is a necessary condition, therefore, of Christian 
love but it is never a sufficient condition. It is merely 
human and could never bring one to an awareness of Christian 
love. That can only arise with faith which is a gift of 
God. Only if one believes will he know of that command -
"you shall love your neighbour." It is the collision of 
erotic inspiration, wherein one wants to marry but wants to 
be celibate, that opens a person to receive the gift of 
Christian love. And ~'lllhat does this gift do for him in his 
condition of collision? It enables him to receive both 
loves anew just as faith enabled Abraham to receive Isaac a 
second time. We are now ready to understand how this 
r 35 f'::;.. Christian love precedes the aesthetic and ethical 1 ove and 
~;;. 
~·-~ . ~~"·· .·. how 1 t binds them and how it remains even when they are 
(.:. 
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·1 past. 
For one living within the Christian tradition, 
there are two meanings in the idea that neighbourly love 
ls before everyth1ng·e1se. First, if one grows up in that 
tradition and learns of its ideals, then he will in some 
vague way seek after this ideal of neighbourly love. He 
may confuse it at first with the other loves but eventually 
his confusion will bring him to contradictions. The implicit 
goal will be first in his intention even though it is last 
for him in explicit execution. Secondly, this idea means 
that if one comes to understand the command, then his 
neighbourly love will be the foundation for his other loves. 
-It will be first in order of-importance. As Kierkegaard 
writes: 
"Everyone as an individual, before he relates 
himself in love to a beloved, to a friend, to 
lovers, to contemporaries, must first relate 
himself to God and to God-demand • .,33 
If he does this, then the eternal and the temporal 
will become something new for him even in such a way that 
they can be compatibl~. Erotic inspiration made the 
eternal meaningful to our young swain as he discovered the 
majesty of God in his chaste love. But then through 
sympathy he needed to marry and possess her temporally. 
But that would take from him his constant awareness of 
eternity. However, if he loves out of duty he will also 
1ove eternally. For, 
•only when it is a duty to love, only then is 
love eternally secured against every change, 
eternally made free in blessed independence, 
eternally and happily secured against despafr."34 
Neighbourly love reveals the eternal even in a new and. 
fUller way. The eternity of erotic love can easily pass. 
·But 1f one loves out of duty, he will love forever. But 
J6 
love of neighbour is also very temporal. It is accomplished 
only in the works of love whereby I love my brother right 
here and now. Thus neighbourly love is both eternal and 
temporal. The aesthetic and ethical are united within 1t. 
When neighbourly love is seen as the most important 
love, that is as the first love, then it will offer the 
chief values of the other loves, that is, an awareness of 
eternity and the ability to love in time. Once a man•s· most 
fundamental needs are satisfied by this love, then he is 
free to love erotically and in marriage without fear that 
one will destroy the others. The point is - if neighbourly 
love is placed first, then it can unite the most important 
elements of the other,two loves and preserve them. 
Neighbourly love, thus, cancels out the selfishness of 
erotic and married love. But it preserves the awareness 
of the eternal, that is God's majesty, and the ability to 
appreciate the temporal and the finite. 
Thus, while Kierkegaard demands celibacy for all 
Christians, he does not at all condemn erotic love or 
marriage. He even writes of the Middle Ages as having 
created a "cleft between body and spirit" and as having 
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"despised love as sensuality." But he saw this as "a mis-
understanding, an extravagance of spirituality."J5 Because 
of the double movement leap, Kierkegaard can write: 
••You shall love your neighbour•. Just as this 
command will teach every man how he ought to love 
himself, likewise will it also teach erotic love 
and friendship what genuine love is: in love 
towards yourself preserYe love to your neighbour, 
in erotic love and friendship preserve love to 
your neighbour ... 36 
In loving away the scandal of love he does not have to say 
that there are many contrary ways. He can, through his 
synthesis, bind them all together. His philosophy allows 
him that beautiful harmony whereby he can write: 
"Love your beloved faithfully and tenderly, but 
let love to your neighbour be the sanctifier in 
your covenant of union with God; love your friend 
honestly and dev6tedly, but let love to your 
neighbour be what you learn from each other in 
the intimacy of friendship with Godt"37 
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I will not even comment upon those words of Kierkegaard 
lest I take something from them. I say only - amen, 
' 
;. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE !'.::XPERIENTIAL STRUCTutES OF THE LEAP 
. In the great gallery of Fear and Tremb1in~ there i~ 
·the painting of the two Knights making the leap. This 
. . 
painting reveals the s·tage structures of the leap. 
Immediately after it, there is the: painting of the young 
swain and his princess which reveals the love structures of 
the leap. But preceding both of these and at the very 
beginning of the gallery we see the fourfold painting of 
1 Abraham and Isaac at the sacrifice. This painting right-
fully comes first for it reveals the experiential structures 
of the leap. Soren Kierkegaard did not arrive at his central 
insight only through philosophical speculation and historical 
analysis. First and before all else, he acquired his vision 
through a reflection upon his own life. By interpreting the 
double movement leap in terms of his life and his life in 
terms of the leap, perhaps same further light can be cast 
upon each. 
In the fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac, we see 
four possible ways in which -the sacrifice could have been 
made. If The first and the fourth possibilities show two 
possible results for Isaac. The second and the third 
possibilities treat of two possible results for Abraham. 
In the first of the four pictures, we see ~hat we might call 
"the noble 11e." At first the father tries to explain to 
the child why the child must be sacrificed. But the child 
cannot understand. So then the father pretends to be an 
idolater· and the child, while not understanding his father, 
at least has faith in the God of Abraham. In the fourth 
picture Isaac loses his faith because he sees that his 
father hes1ta tes _just for ~ moment in doubt. In ·the second 
picture, the father becomes disillusioned because God has 
demanded this sacrifice of him and he can no longer live 
-with joy. In the third picture, the father thinks that he 
is guilty of a great sin in being willing to sacrifice his 
son. Thus, in the painting we see how reason presents 
contradictory sets of possibilities. Isaac's faith might be 
lost if the father does not carry out the sacrifice with 
absolute obedience. But, on -the other hand, the whole 
sacrifice might only be a temptation which would plunge 
Abraham into greatest sin. Such is the collision. And it 
might. be so great that it will ruin Abraham no matter what 
the outcome. 
This witch's cauldron of writhing snakes is not just 
a product of Kierkegaard's imagination for it was his way of 
life day after day and hour after hour. Here in these four 
pictures he paints th~ great collision of the aesthetic and 
the ethical as he does in the picture of the two Knights and 
in the picture of the young swain anc hi~ princess. But, in 
this fourfold painting of Abraham and Isaac one can feel the 
l -
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suffering and magnificence of Kierkegaard's own life even 
more than_ in those other two palntin.~s. _ For in this painting 
of Abraham and Isaac we have a double symbolism which brings 
to mind not only his relationship with Regina but also his 
relationship with his father. His relationship with Regina 
and with his father were the main events of his life. All 
of his other relationships were greatly influenced by them. 
His very notion of the double movement leap grew out of these 
two relationships. 
Kierkegaard had five kinds of human love relationships 
which were all interconnected. There was parental love, 
erotic love,- married love, friendship, and neighbourly love. 
Throughout all of these loves developed his love for God and 
his love· for God influenced all of these loves. Why were 
his love for his father and his love for Regina so important 
for all of these love relations? Can one describe in detail 
the interconnections of his loves? Perhaps with the aid of 
his concept of the double movement leap this can be done. 
Perhaps the central insight of his philosophy will clarify 
some of the enigmas of his life. And, of course, while this 
clarification is being made, the very notion of the double 
movement leap might become more meaningful. Our task is not 
that of the biographer"° Lowrie has written two wonderful 
biographies of Kierkep;aard. 2 Our task _is to better understand 
Kierkegaard's basic philosophical insight; and in so doing to 
perhaps clarify some of the· mysteries which a biographer of 
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Kierkegaard must face. 
It is the fourth picture of the painting that most 
brings to mind Soren's relationship with his father. :aere 
we see the great influence which the father has upon the 
faith of the so~. Abraham was very calm and serene in 
preparing the sacrifice but as he raised the knife he 
clenched his left hand in despair and a tremor passed 
through his body. Isaac saw it and that was enough. In 
spite of all the rest of his father's shining example, Isaac 
.lost his faith. 
The only pa.rental love which Kierkegaard discusses 
is that of his father for himself. He does not seem to take 
up his relationship with his mother at all, One can find a 
good summary of the chief elements of Kierkegaard's relation 
with his father in Lowrie's Short Life. There are three 
phases of this relationship: unity, separation and reconcil-
iation. The pertinent elements in the early phase of the 
relation seem to be the following: (1) Kierkegaard was·a 
very serious and religious man who, because of success in 
busines~ could retire early and devote himself to philosophy 
and theolcgy. (2) The father instilled an ethical punctua-
lity and discipline in Soren so that the young boy would 
study as if it were hi~ sacred duty. (3) The father was a 
source of shame for the boy so that he never invited anyone 
to his strange home. (4) The father contributed toward the 
.. 
development of a prodigious dialectical imagination in the 
boy. (5) The father inculcated within the boy a great 
religious idealism. (6) The father was concerned about 
se~l purity. How do these details further clarify the 
stage and the love structures of the leap? What do they 
indicate concerning Kierkegaard's further development? 
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r11 thin the context of this paternal 1 ove, Soren was, 
from the beginning, introduced to the religious and the 
ethical. Of course, he was a child and could relate to it 
only with aesthetic immediacy. But for a clear understanding 
·of the relation between the stages, it ls important to note 
that the religious and the ethical were there in an implicit 
way from the beginning. In fact, they even precede an out 
and out aesthetic life which would come along in his late 
youth. Thus, his father introduced him to a certain severe 
.interpretation of the Christlan tradition and was the source 
of a great discipline and idealism within the boy. From his 
earliest years, the boy immediately followed ethical demands 
and admired religious heroism. He greatly admired his 
father's piety and his father's thoughts. He wanted to 
l please his father and to imitate him. And yet still there 
~: ... ··~· '· 
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was an ambivalent mixture of shame in this child's pious 
admiration. The father was not like other father~ and he 
dressed and treated the boy unlike other boys. Already in 
the child some collision was starting to brew, a collision 
that was handed down from the father. 
L 
When treating the love structures of the leap, •-re 
saw how one could make the transition from immediate erotic 
love to full erotic inspiration only if he were introduced 
to the ideals of a tradition and only if, because of these 
.ideals, he strove for chastity.3 How this concretely takes 
place one can see 1n the details of Kierkegaard's own life. 
Through the example and co!lstant teaching of his father, 
Kierkegaard was early introduced to a religious and ethical 
tradition and to some desire for purity. His imagination 
.was quickened and all of this prepared him for that great 
concentration which the young swain must have if he is to 
love as Kierkegaard. loved. 
Thus, the father gave the boy a clear direction in 
life. He set the little one going on that path which was 
!eligious. He gave the boy a· great strength of concentration 
and imagination. The boy was interested in the ideal and the 
heroic. He could not see the end of the path. It was far 
beyond him. The father even gave the boy a great energy by 
which he sought that God which his imagination set so high. 
And yet, at the same time the boy was different and ashamed. 
So it was that he entered the world outside of his home and 
began to make his friends. His friendships and all of his 
lmres would be forever, marked by his relationship with his 
father. 
The father had carried the boy in his strong arms of 
piety and ima~ination and idealism but the boy felt some 
l 
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sli~ht trembling of weakness, But ~radually the boy. started 
to walk on his own, to stand side by side with other boys 
and with other teachers and to appreciate the world withe 
them. As he jo1ne4 arms with others the more firmly, the 
more certainly did he feel the weakness of his father's arms. 
Finally, when he was seventeen, Soren entered the university 
and for the first time pursued the study of liberal arts and 
he was truly liberated toward the aesthetic. With his new 
friends he now came to appreciate music and poetry and 
mathematics and science. But this only separated him from 
his father's way the more. Two paths were growing out of 
the one and the collision was becoming more and more explicit. 
Friendship and erotic love were beginning to make their 
appeal. He was awakening from the dream of the child to the 
seeking of youth. 
Finally, the split with his father became complete. 
Kierkegaard came to a crossroads and he abandoned the path 
of the religious and followed the path of the aesthetic. 
He calls this occasion the great earthquake and writes about 
it in Quidam 's Diary in Sta5es on Lit"e • s ~-lay. 4 There he 
points out how horrible it is to have to be ashamed of one's 
father whom one loves so deeply, Under the image of David, 
the father, and Solo~on, his son, Kierkegaard paints another 
' of those magnificent pictures and this time he shows how a 
son can lose his faith because of the sin of his father, 
Her·e we see the very same sentiment that we saw expressed in 
L 
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the fourth of the Abraham Isaac pictures. Isaac lo~t his 
faith because of the tremor in Abraham's body. Solomon 
lost hls faith because of. the sobbing in David's repentant 
body. Kierkegaard at the age of 22 explicitly and clearly 
faced the guilt of his father and, in disillusionment, he 
left his former hero and followed the aesthetic path with 
Solomon. 
Thus, for three years, from his twenty-second birth-
day 1n May of 1835 until he was twenty-five.did he follow 
.the path of longing as desire. He abandoned not only his 
father but also his father's religion. He immersed himself 
in the aesthetic tradition of Don Juan and Faust and the 
Wandering Jew. He asserted that philosophy and Christianity 
were not compatible and he chose philosophy. However, as 
much as he tried to abandon himself to the aesthetic, he 
could not forget his father and religion. Christianity kept 
tempting him back. In leaving his father, Kierkegaard did 
not escape the collision. It only became greater and greater. 
As could be expected with Kierkegaard, the collision 
centered around the problem of sexuality. Lowrie points out 
how Kierkegaard considered himself to be uncommonly erotic.5 
Then Lowrie writes that this must be taken with a'grain of 
salt for those who knef him best thought of him as an 
uncommonly pure man. 6 But, there is no reason to speak of a 
grain of salt here. As in the case of Plato and Augustine, 
a great eroticism and a great purity are by no means contra-
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dictory but rather it ls possible that they can even. foster 
each other. Lowrie keeps buzzing around Kierkegaard's 
se}.."Uali ty like a bee around a flower but he never does quite 
draw out the honey. 7 Lowrie even mentions that .Kierkegaard 
saw himself as "an extraordinary combination of purity and 
8 impurity." But then, Lowrie dilutes this by saying that 
Kierkegaard. has a rare sense of shame. Undoubtedly that is 
true. But that need not· imply, as Lowrie seems to imply, 
that he was not very erotic • 
. ·So Kierkegaard went further than did Abraham and 
further than did the young man. Abraham left his father and 
went seeking. But he did it for a new faith that he never 
abandoned. The young man left the dreaming immediacy that 
he displayed at The Banquet and sought the feminine by 
.falling in love. But he never lost his purity. Kierkegaard, 
however, as his biographers agree, not only suffered the 
guilt of his father but the dread which arose from his 
father's guilt precipitated his own fall into sin.9 
As a result of his momentous tension between purity 
and impurity, Kierkegaard went through a nightmare of 
struggling and falling. Time after time he made resolutions 
to sin no more but as Lowrie so nicely puts it "so many 
resolutions would notichave been needed if he had not been 
continually relapsing."lO This does not mean, of course, 
that Kierkegaard was a frequent fornicator or adulterer. 
~  No, his falling must have been of a more secret and shameful 
type. A Don Juan mi~ht boast of his escapades and Faust 
would not mind if others knew that he seduced Margaret. 
But I(lerkegaard could only hide hi~ sin in lonely shame. 
Kierkegaard himself even writes about: 
"visiting one of those places where, strangely 
enough, one gives money for a woman's 
despicableness. ,.11 
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But he could never write about the cause of his many renewed 
resolutions. That is, unless he hid it under the symbol of 
·"thorn in the rlesh." 
In any case, the problem was no light one. 
Kierkegaard even thought of suicide. But precisely at this 
moment he experienced a new and partially saving love. In 
June of 18J6, his friend, Paul Miller, must have given 
Kierkegaard some boost. For,· as Lowrie points out, 
Kierkegaard refers to MszS'ller as "the mighty trumpet of my 
awakenlng."12 In September of 1836 Kierkegaard discovered 
George Hamann who, although he lived before Kierkegaard, 
became one of Kierkegaard's great dead friends. As Lowrie 
puts it - these friends planted seed thoughts in 
Kierkegaard's mind. 1 3 Through them K1erkegaard began to 
become intellectually convinced that Christianity was the 
right way of life. On~e again as a result of these friends, 
Kierkegaard began turning toward the relieion of his father. 
But the path back was not easy. Though he was intellectually 
free, he could still not morally free himself. His despair 
even became the greater. 3efore the trumpet blast of his 
:rrtend.s,14 he was at least wholly on the aesthetic path 
even though he was ashamed of it. But with the sound of 
the trumpet, his mind and his heart were now split asunder. 
Now he did not even believe in the aesthetic way but help-
lessly he could not abandon it. 
In the summer of 1837 when he was twenty-four and 
1n the midst of his despair, he fell in love at first sight 
with Regina Olson, a girl of fourteen years. Less than one 
year later he became reconciled to his father and to his 
religion. The great question is - was there a relationship 
between his erotic love and the renewal of his love for his 
father and for God? Lowrie is aware that some great 
religious experience took place on May 19, 1838, at 10:30. 
/ 
He is aware that on July 6 Kierkegaard went to confession. 
Lowrie wonders about what happened in this experience of. 
indescribable joy and he thinks that Kierkegaard never 
revealed what happened. But is that true? Is it not very 
probable that it was Kierkegaard's love .. for Regina that 
occasioned his reconciliation with his father and with God? 
As we pointed out in the last chapter, Kierkegaard frequently 
writes of the poetic and religious inspiration that can come 
from eros. The first'movement of the leap can be made 
through erotic inspiration. This was the case with Victor 
Eremita, the young man in Renetition, the young swain in 
Trembling and Quidam in Stages on Life's Way. 
Would 1 t not be very strange indeed if 1 t ·were not 
Kierkegaard•s love for Regina that occasioned this great 
religious experience? 
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What must have happened is this. He fell in love 
with Regina in 1837. Slowly this began to have its effect 
upon him. His love for her and her love for him must have 
given him a new euphoria. He must have begun to recognize 
with that primitive lyrical certitude as he says in Fear 
and Trembling that God is love. Re must have warmed not 
·only towards God but also toward his father. Finally, it 
must have all become explicit in that double forgiveness of 
father and son on May 19 of 18J8. This was the first move-
ment of the leap. Kierkegaard now experienced the joy and 
the power of the eternal. He even had strength to go to 
.confession. In all likelihood, he was now so snatched out 
of boredom and dread that impurity was not even a problem 
for him. Regina was truly his Regina. She was his princess 
who saved him from that which he hated most, his impurity. 
She was the occasion of his reconciliation with his father 
and with God. Friendship had occasioned his intellectual 
conviction of the rightness of the path of religion. But 
only eros could convince him emotionally, as it did. An 
aesthetic love had made possible religious love. They were 
not conflicting paths after all. 
Of course, like his pseudonyms, Kierkeeaard did not 
only b~come a religious man as a result of his love for 
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Regina. He also became a poet. Ee 'l':rote his dissertation 
with as much ease as he loved God and with as m.1.rnh ease as 
he was morally pure. Regina enabled him to be the perfect 
aesthete, the perfect ethical man and the pe~feet religious 
man. Or so it seemed for a while - for, just as Abraham 
received his Isaac and was then called upon to sacrifice 
him, so was Soren called upon to sacrifice his Regina. 
Now we cast our eyes upon the first of the four 
pictures. There we see Abraham gazing down upon his son 
·with wildness and horror in his face and in his body. He 
grabs the boy by the throat and flings him to the ground 
screaming to his son that he himself is an idolater. In a 
few brief months, Soren will find it necessary to do this 
to his tender and loving darling, to his princess and his 
~ife to be. What happened to bring about this new and even 
more dreadful collision of the aesthetic and the ethical? 
Why could Kierkegaard not marry Regina? Why did he break 
his engagement? 
Kierkegaard thought his way into the love of marriage 
as one who did not marry. 15 Just why he did not marry can 
be seen through a careful analysis of Quidam's Diary. 16 
Here we can see how the second great collision between the 
aesthetic and the ethical arose. Basically there are five 
interconnected reasons which Quidam gives for not marrying. 
They have to do with: melancholy, the meaning of life, the 
divine counter order, the apex of desire, and the inspiration 
~-· 
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of his erotic love. 
Melancholy is a tremendously complex and technical 
term for 'iUerl<:egaard. He sees 1t as arising out of his 
relationship with his father. 1 7 It is a faithful mistress 
to whom he must be faithfu1. 18 It can bring a man to 
resolve not to marry because he must always battle with his 
melancholy and therefore could not be properly attentive to 
his wife.19 It gave him a heaviness which did not fit with 
Regina's lightness. In some way he feared that he would 
-lose his melancholy if he married. He was his melancholy 
and he wanted to be faithful to it and to himself and to his 
father. Marriage would make him unfaithful. 
He connected this melancholy with the meaning of his 
life. He thought that if he did not suffer in this melan-
choly way, the meaning of his- existence would disappear. 20 
He could not stand t.o have his life become empty and have no 
21 
meaning at all. His love for Regina had filled his life 
with meaning. But he was afraid that in marrying her, he 
would become too content and the meaning would flee. The 
meaning that came from eros seemed to depend upon the 
mystery and distance of celibate love. It seemed to come 
from sublimation, He seemed to believe that sexual fulfill-
ment would mean a los~ of the fulfillment of his life's 
meaning. 
But this not marrying was not just a plan of hi::: own 
device. He connected it with what he called a divine counter 
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order. This divine counter order did not come in a dream or 
22 1n a vision. It had to do with a collision between repent-
ance and existence. While he was in this collision, he was 
~, in a suspended state and could not marry. But as soon as 
¥•, 
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the divine counter order would be lifted, he would be able 
to marry. Thus, he felt that he would possibly be able to 
marry some day. 23 
This divine counter order was clear and specific in 
his mind by means of what he called "the apex of desire." 
·The meaning of his life came through a melancholy longing 
for the infinite. As long as he needed Regina at a celibate 
distance in order to bring this about, the divine counter 
order was dear. He could not marry. She was the source of 
what he called the elasticity of passion. She stretched out 
his mind so that he longed for the eterna1. 24 He knew that 
another way of keeping himself at the apex of desire might 
come and when it did, he could marry her. But, until then 
he must preserve her as his muse. 
So the whole reason that he could not marry her at 
the ti::ne was that he could not afford to lose her as his 
source of inspiration. She was the source of all that he 
held dear - his aesthetic and ethical and religious 
excellence - and he v:ranted this even more than he wanted 
her as a wife. For years he had struggled for this in near 
~- despair and now through her it was his. He did not want to l lose it by entering the contented state of mere ethical 
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hanoiness. ·However, he knew that in some way both could be 
... 
his. He knew that the divine counter order could be lifted 
and that he could still be in cont.act with the magnificence 
of God. 3ut now was not the time for that and so - he had 
to break his engagement. The terrible scene of Abraha~ 
pretending to be an idolater shows us what that break meant 
to Kierkegaard. 
As he began to consider the break, his sympathetic· 
feelings opened out to Regina and he could scarcely bear her 
·suffering. He thought he could spare her by this noble lie. 
He tried to appear to her as a sadistic and fickle rogue. 
But still she believed in him. Now we can cast our eyes 
upon the second and third pictures. Would he be able to 
bear this new and unexpected collision of the aesthetic and 
.ethical? Would he not be gui"l ty even before God by not 
marrying her? Gull ty or not guilty? He could not know· 
through reason where he stood. On the one hand there was 
the divine counter order which bade him preserve his infinite 
resignation. On the other hand, there was the feeling of 
his dearly beloved, her family, and the universal ethical 
order. He was torn between them in a way he had never been 
torn even in his previous days 0f impure isolation and weak-
ness. Now in his strength he suffered more than he had in 
his impotence. Would he collapse under the burden of this 
collision and come again to disillusionment? Was he now 
even a more terrible sinner? He did not know. Such were 
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the. poss1b111t1es of his new found aesthetic religion. 
In such a state Kierkegaard contemplated the meaning 
of marriage. He knew full well that some day perhaps he 
could marry. He knew the way of the Knight of Faith and he 
at least knew that the divine counter order could be lifted 
even if one would not want to say that he believed that it 
would be lifted. In Repetition we see him grasping after 
that belief as he waited for the lifting of the ban in the 
thunderstorm. But then Regina became engaged to someone 
-else. At this moment we can feel the full significance of 
the four Abraham-Isaac sacrifice pictures. Kierkegaard not 
only lived through the horrors of sacrificing Regina and 
being sacrificed by his ·own father, he even felt himself as 
a sacrifice which God offered up for mankind. A~ he puts 
it in Point of View: 
"The thought goes very far back in my recollection 
that in every generation there are two or three who 
are sacrificed for the others, are led by frightful 
sufferings to discover what redounds to the good of 
others. So it was that 1n my melancholy I under-
stood myself as singled out for such a fate." 25 
Such is the meaning of the four pictures of the sacrifice. 
Perhaps KierkE\S'aard was just approaching the moment 
when he could marry and he discovered that Regina would 
marry another. In any event, the meaning of the rest of 
his life in its key events is clear when we see it in the 
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~: light of the double movement leap. In a general way, 
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:':.,'.:· ;;;.- Kierkegaard knew that the divine counter order could be 
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lifted as early as Fear and Trembling in 184). I'his is the 
whole point of the double movement leap and as a result he 
wrote in his diary of this time - If I only had faith I 
could marry her."26 It is certain that by 1847 he knew 
concretely that· it was.neighbourly.love that could permit 
one to marry. As we have seen, neighbourly love is the 
synthesis of the eternal and the tempora1. 27 One can stay 
in contact with the eternal as long as he has neighbourly 
love. And yet, at the same time he can marry, he can live 
in the temporal. 
But did Kierkegaard make the double movement leap? 
Of course, his answer to this would have been - no. It is 
.not something one can make, it ls something one, with the 
grace of God, must always be making. This he and God did. 
In Point of View he writes about the role that divine 
governance played in his life and there he discusses his 
authorship and the Corsair Affair. There are two events, 
together with his belief that he could marry, that are 
evidence of his making the second movement of the leap. 
"Sut the whole movement became explicit in his second great 
religious experience ~f 1848. Just as the first movement 
of the leap was focused in the experience of May 19, 18)8, 
so the second movement was focused in the experience of 
Soly Week of 1848. Finally, there was his attack upon 
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Christendom which 1'ras a further deYelopment of this second 
movement of the leap. So our question is - what do his 
authorship, the Corsair Affair, the experience of 1848 and 
the attack have to do with the second movement of the leap? 
As we have said, the second movement of the leap is 
a return to the earth which is made possible by neighbourly 
love. This is a God given gift that ls possible only if 
one has made the first movement of the leap. Soren 
Kierkegaard did that through his erotic love for Regina 
which brought him to the point of infinite resignation. 
The second movement is a reclaimin,g of the ethical after it 
has been suspended even so that it is doubled. He began to 
do this by his eventual belief that he could marry. But he 
continued the burial of himself in the earth through his 
·authorship. This was a work of neighbourly love that bound 
him to men in time and space. As his authorship progressed 
through the aesthetic to the religious, it became more and 
more temporal. He moved from an aesthetic indirect 
communication to a more ethical and Christian form of 
direct communication. 
In the Affair of the Corsair he became even more 
bound in the temporal and the earthly. He learned the 
!C 
meaning of witness and martyr and saw how this was demanded 
by neighbourly love. By the time he finished the Post~crint 
he thought that he could fully enter the earth by becoming a 
country pastor. But this was not for him as he was snatched 
l 
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up by the Corsair Affair. 
Then there was that enigma.tic .. thorn in the flesh" 
which kept Kierkegaard bound to the earth. The great 
experience of Easter Week 1848, wherein he felt that God 
not only forgave his sin but forgot it, had to do with this 
thorn in the flesh and with poverty. Just as the experience 
of •38 had to do with "the thorn in the flesh" and poverty. 
He lost his money and he came to be able to live with 
himself, even his thorn in the flesh. This .. thorn in the 
· nesh" has something to do with his melancholy and probably 
his shame. In any event, 1848 marks the full return of 
Kierkegaard to the earth. He even started using direct 
communication. 
Finally, in his attack he continued to make the 
·second movement of the leap even more magnificently. That 
is, just as one could not tell the Knight of Faith from the 
ordinary man of the street, so it was hard to distinguish 
Kierkegaard from an enemy of the church. Through his satire 
he was more fully a witness. In the last years of his life, 
Kierkegaard became a witness to the necessity of the first 
movement of the leap and thereby made the second movement 
of the leap. 
In such a way'did Soren Kierkegaard develop through 
five stages of love. As a child with his father, he longed 
for the infinite as in a dream. 3ut then he left his father 
and went seeking the infinite with friends. At first these 
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r:· friends led him along paths contrary to that of his father jl," r:lr ?r and his father's God. But .then other friends came a.nd with 
L 
a trumpet blast intellectually recall~dhim to his former 
way. But morally he could not abandon the new found 
aesthetic way of seeking. However, on this very way he 
discovered erotic inspiration and as he came to desire one 
girl infinitely, he even became reconciled with his father 
and his father's God. But, then in not being able at once 
to marry he faced a new collision wherein he had to teleo-
·logically suspend the ethical and he did not know whether 
he was guilty or not guilty. Finally, he discovered neigh-
bourly love by which he was able to reconcile the aesthetic 
love of eros and the ethical love of marriage. In dethron-
ing both of these loves, neighbourly love could even preserve 
them both together. 
Thus, in Kierkegaard's own life we see an example 
of the double movement leap. Through the collision of his 
aesthetic and ethical loves, he discovered that love which 
transcended and cancelled both and yet at the same time 
preserved them even to the extent that it doubled them. 
But, we have only bei;un to see into the intricacies and the 
all embracing potentiality of this central insight of Soren 
Kierkegaard. So far w~ have emphasized his treatment of the 
leap as it appears in his early aesthetic literature, now 
we are ready to move on and see how he analyzes this leap in 
his predominantly philosophical literature. Here we shall 
analyze the leap with Kierkegaard in its sin, reason, and 
existential structures. 
' 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SIN STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
As one studies the life and thought of Kierkegaard 
it becomes evident that for him there are different levels 
or gradations of guilt. When he was in the mere aesthetic 
stage he felt guilty about his impurity. After he fell in 
love with Regina he felt guilty about his teleological sus-
pension of the ethical when he broke his engagement with her. 
Even as he made the second movement of the leap, he always 
felt guilty and needed not only that God forgive him his 
sin but that God forget it. What is guilt and what are its 
various gradations? How does one make the transition from 
one gradation to the other? 
As one begins to peer into this very complex and 
interesting problem 1n the life and thought of Kierkegaard, 
he immediately sees that it has to do with the leap. 
Kierkegaard first begins discussing guilt in a thematic way 
in The Concept of Dread, and the~e he constantly affirms 
that sin comes into the world only through the qualitative 
leap. We must not avoid the obvious question. We must ask 
' and try to answer that puzzling and awkward question - ls 
the fall into sin the same as the leap of faith? Surely 
~L;.. there are not two different leaps are there? Can the leap 
\ whereby one sins be different from the leap whereby he 
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believes? 
As one tries to answer the above questions he will 
find that it is necessary to raise another - how does 
Kierkegaard define and distinguish original sin and personal 
sin? His whole discussion of the gradations of sin and the 
transition between them involves a treatment of original 
sin. When he examines the leap whereby one makes the 
transit1o.n, he again is involved in the problem of original 
sin as well as that of personal sin. These three questions 
·concerning the gradations of guilt, the transition from one 
grade to the other through the leap, and the distinction 
between original sin and personal sin are so intimately 
bound together that Kierkegaard does not unravel them one 
by one but rather all together. We, too, while trying to 
be ever clear, shall take this approach. 
once again as we wander through the gallery of Fear 
and Trembling we find another painting that will suitably 
launch us on our way into a meditation upon sin. In the 
sketch of Agnes and the Merman,1 Kierkegaard begins to 
suggest to us the sin structures of the leap which he will 
discuss in The Concent of Dread and in the second part of 
Sickness Unto Death. A~ we begin to look at this picture 
we shall pay attentio~ only to the footnote version. 2 
Merman is a seducer but an unhappy one. He feels guilty 
and wants to be saved. He thinks that only a beautiful 
i maiden can save him. He spies on Agnes, then arises up 
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out of the swamp to take her in his arms only to be saved. 
But, she looks down into the violent sea and longs for him 
to seduce her and take her to the bottom. Now a variety of 
paths lie open to him. Many new levels of guilt beckon to 
him. · Now we must carefully examine his first guilt that 
brought him to Agnes. We must question each nuance of 
these new possible guilts. We must even ask about the 
guilt of Agnes as she wished to be seduced. 
We have seen how in the first volume of Either/Or 
·Kierkegaard distinguished three stages of the immediate 
concentrated in desire only for his son. So it was with 
the young swain. In his childhood the masculine and 
feminine were united within him in the immediate longing 
of a dream. Then as the young man he began to seek the 
meaning of love. Fin~lly, his longing became concentrated 
in the desire for his princess. In Kierkegaard's own 
experience it was the same. In his childhood with his 
father, the aesthetic and ethical were united for him the 
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immediacy of a dream. But then he separated himself slowly 
:from his father and. religion and ethics and his aesthetic 
longing became that of seeking. Through this period he was 
constantly tempted and was miserable in his guilt. Finally, 
he :fell in love with Regina and he gained the second 
immediacy of love. He desired only her and was beyond his 
old guilt. And, so it is in this picture of Agnes and the 
Merman. Agnes represents the innocence of childhood's 
dream just as it makes its transition to the guilt of 
·seeking. In the Merman's arms she looks down into the 
depths and longs to be seduced. That is the beginning of 
her loss of innocence. But Merman has fallen prey to the 
temptations of seeking relief through a new and innocent 
r love for A$z:nes. We first see him on the verge of his second 
immediacy. What is this first collision of the aesthetic 
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and ethical that leaves a man guilty? What is the nature 
of the guilt in the stages of first immediacy? How does 
one succumb to it? 
Agnes gazes down into the depths and longs to be 
taken there and seduced. This is Kierkegaard's image of 
Dread. In the Concept of Dread he writes: 
"One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye 
chances to look dbwn into the yawning abyss becomes 
dizzy. But the reason for it is just as much his 
eye as it is the precipice. For suppose he had 
not looked down. 
.;: ·~ 
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"Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom which occurs 
when the spirit would posit the synthesis, and 
freedom then gazes down into its own possibility, 
grasping at finiteness to sustain itself. In this 
dizziness freedom succumbs. Further than this 
psychology cannot go and will not. That very 
instant everything is changed, and when freedom 
rises again it sees that it is guilty. Between 
these two instants lies the leap, which no science 
has explained or can explain. He who becomes guilty 
in dread becomes as ambiguously guilty as it is 
possible to be."4 
Kierkegaard. explains the transition from innocence 
to guilt in terms of dread and he thinks that it is only 
through dread that one becomes guilty. So the first 
collision of the aesthetic and ethical is an experience of 
sinking into one's dread. And what happens in this 
succumbing is that one gains a certain knowledge of the 
distinction between good and evil. Innocence is ignorance.5 
In perfect innocence there is that dreamlike blending of 
good and evil. The movement into dread separates them and 
brings one to the state of seeking•':.w' Bttt ·w!!at is this dread 
which entices one to t,ha t guilt· ridden knowledge of the 
distinction between good.and evil? 
This dread arises because of the commandment. It 
arises because of tradition. Kierkegaard. thought that if 
~.'" 
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from childhood one were commanded not to do something, 
then he would be in dread of it and this dread would 
entice him to do it. 6 Adam was told not to eat of the fruit 
of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But this 
commandment, through the presence of Eve, preyed on his 
mind and he succumbed. Kierkegaard's Christian tradition 
commanded him to be pure and thus it was possible that 
sensuality could be for him sinful.7 The Greek tradition 
too had its commands and thus one could succumb even there 
·1nto a kind of guilt. 
Thus, a distinction emerges between two kinds of 
guilt which are possible within the spheres of the immediate 
erotic. Within the natural tradition which Kierkegaard calls 
the Greek, there is a different kind of dread and guilt than 
there is in the Christian tradition. Agnes and Merman 
could not have existed within the Greek context just as a 
Don Juan or Faust could not have appeared in a non-Christian 
8 tradition. The two different traditions give rise to two 
different kinds of guilt. But before we clarify this 
distinction we should first pay attention to the next level 
of guilt which we see in the sketch of Agnes and the Merman. 
For the same distinction applies at this second level of 
guilt. 
' 
So Agnes loses her childhood innocence by succumbing 
~· to dread. She does this w1 thin 
i. 
the commands of her tradition 
Land thus her gunt would differ from that of the Greek at the 
L 
same level. Such is the first level of guilt. But then we 
see the Merman at even another level of aesthetic guilt. 
As a seducer he had been guilty. This guilt was the same 
as that into which we see A~nes stepping. But then he comes 
to be cleansed. He is cleansed. He enters into the new 
immediacy of love. However, a new level of dread comes. 
He has a new guilt to bear.9 He makes Agnes unhappy. He 
cannot take her to the bottom of the opean, to that place 
for which his temptation had occasioned her to seek. Here 
-we see the teleological suspension of the ethical. Just as 
Kierkegaard felt guilty in breaking his engagement, so the 
Merman experiences the horror of a new and greater guilt. 
Here we see the second coll1s1on of the aesthetic and the 
ethical. 
Both of these collisions take place within a pre-
dominantly aesthetic context. Both of them take place 
before the second movement of the leap begins. The first 
leve_l. of guilt is there before the first movement of the 
le~p~. - rt···-arose out of the collision which called forth the 
need for the first movement of the leap. The second level 
of guilt arose as a result of the first movement of the 
leap. Within the Christian tradition it calls forth the 
second movement of th~ leap. But it is the second movement 
of the leap which is of vital importance here. Only through 
it does guilt become true sin. The second movement of the 
leap is the transition from mere aesthetic guilt to true 
L 
Christian sin. It is the transl ti on between the two 
different traditions. We must now take great care to 
clarify this leap which is the fall into sin. 
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So far we have pointed out that there are two 
different kinds or dread which are rooted in the Greek and 
the Christian tradition. Kierkegaard refers to these as 
objective and subjective dread. 10 In the Greek context 
one is in dread but he is not aware of it as an 1ndi vi dual. 
Thus he can be guilty but never a sinner. For this reason 
·Kierkegaard refers to Greek ethics as improper ethics. The 
Greek can be either a sophist or a Socrates. He can be 
totally unaware of ethics or he can be a profoundly ethical 
man. He can live before or after the first movement of the 
leap. But in either case he is primarily an aesthete.11 
Even his religion is an aesthetic religion. Of course, the 
aesthetic exists within the Christian tradition too. But 
it has different possibilities. One can become aware of 
his dread as an individual and thus sin can become a possi-
bility. The subjective dread of Christianity is a possi-
bility for Agnes and the Merman. Thus, their earliest 
moments of aesthetic or objective dread are already touched 
by a glimmer of subjective dread. Hence, there are two 
levels of guilt possible in the Greek context and three 
levels possible in the Christian context. Because of the 
level of sin within Christianity, even the first two levels 
differ between the two contexts. So.what is the meaning of 
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the great distinction between objective and subjective 
dread? 
Between the levels of mere guilt there is only a 
quantitative difference, but between mere guilt and sin 
there ls a qualitative difference.12 Thus, real.sin has 
two important elements, namely, both a quantitative and a 
qualitative increase over mere guilt. Real sin involves 
both a temptation, the quantity, and a free giving into it, 
the new quality. In order to understand the difference 
·between mere guilt and sin, we must nol'r explicate both the 
quantitative and the qualitative increase. 
Kierkegaard's meditation upon original sin reveals 
to us three important aspects of the quantitative increase. 
First, he points out that sin can come into the world only 
through sin. That is, there cannot first be innocence and 
then some gradual development of a flaw within innocence 
until it reaches the point that it is sin. That would be 
a mere quantitative increase. No, original sin could come 
into the world only if Ad.am really sinned. That is, he had 
to make a real qualitative leap beyond innocence. Sin can 
enter the world only through a qualitative leap. The 
quantitative element is a necessary condition of sin but 
it is not a sufficien~ condition.13 
But, the second point is, men inherit the effects of 
original sin and this can contribute to their sinfulness. 
From their fathers and from their tradition men receive 
r
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those commands which bring them to the .edge of the precipice 
. . 
wherefrom they gaze into dread. Hence, original sin can be 
inherited in greater quantity by one man than it is by 
another. The quantity of sin refers to the tempting power 
of inherited dread. Some men inherit far more tradition 
and far more dread than others. Some men even inherit the 
Christian tradition which can give even a different kind of 
dread. The Christian tradition can make possible not only 
an objective dread but also a subjective dread. Thus, men 
inherit the quantitative determinants of sin either with 
the Christian or a non-Christian context and within those 
contexts in greater or lesser amounts. 14 
And, the third point is, that in some strange way 
original sin had the effect that it rendered man incapable 
of true sin unless he was given some special new grace that 
would make him capable of sin. This idea follows from the 
fact that those in the Greek tradition cannot sin while 
those in the Christian tradition can sin. Because of the 
command of God, Adam could sin. But then the effects of 
his sin brought a loss of this ability to sin to his off-
spring. They were no longer before God to the extent that 
they could sin. Thus the Greek could not sin. But the 
Christian through his tradition becomes again like Adam. 
' He can stand once more before God and thus be capable of sin. 
So the quantitative effects of original sin are different 
tor the Greek and for the Christian. The Greek stands in 
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a tradition of innocence. The Christian, through the 
atonement of Christ, once again stands in a tradition where 
he can leap beyond innocence into sin. For this reason, 
Don Juan and Merman can exist in the Christian tradition 
but not in the Greek. The Greek context is too innocent to 
produce the idea of a Don Juan or a Merman. 
So this brings us to the clear insight that the 
qualitative leap is the only sufficient condition to account 
tor sin. The quantitative condition of tempting dread is 
.necessary but it cannot alone account for sin. It is certain 
that one needs the special grace of Christ in order to sin. 
One must make the second movement of the leap in order to 
sin. Or, shall we say in sinning one makes the second 
movement of the leap? In answering this question we must 
be very careful for as Kierkegaard points out in the Merman 
sketch - "it was not by sin that Abraham became an 
ind1vidual."l5 What is the difference between the leap of 
faith and the qualitative leap that is necessary that one 
might sin? Our answer which we shall now go on to explicate 
is - there is no difference in the beginning of the leap, 
but there is a difference between what Abraham and the 
sizmer do after they start to leap. It is that difference 
that needs ~larificatipn. 
After Merman is saved by the innocent Agnes, he 
begins sympathetically to feel the unhappiness he has 
brought her. Kierkegaard describes three paths that now 
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open out before him. He can try to save her by hfs 
deceit as did the Abraham of the first picture. But to do 
this would be to fall into the sin of the demoniacal. He 
can cease to worry about her and let God save her. He can 
sta7 1n his .state of infinite resignation. But by this he 
would sin in such a way that he would be lost for the world. 
Or he could believe that God will save both himself and 
Agnes. In this way he would not sin. Toward the end of 
Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard labels these two sins as 
.the sin .or despairing over one's sin and the sin of despair-
ing of the forgiveness of sin.17 Thus, as we think our way 
into Kierkegaard's concept of sin, we must from the beginning 
realize that there is more than one kind of sin. 
So, sin is despair before God. Despair is Kierke-
gaard's technical tem for guilt. Any guilt that is be'fore 
God ls sin. And what is despair or guilt? It is a break in 
the relationship which is man. Kierkegaard defines man as a 
relationship which is related to himself and to God. 18 That 
is, in his 'fullest capability he is aesthetic - he is a 
relation, he is related to the other. But he is also 
ethical - he is related to himself. And he is religious -
he is related to God. If he should be so aesthetic that he 
is not ethical then ht\ is guilty. He is in despair. If he 
sho111.d be so ethical that he is not aesthetic, then he is 
in despair. If he should be so religious that he is not 
both aesthetic and ethical, then he is in despair. So guilt 
is a failure to live up to one's full potentialities. 
Guilt is an emphasis of one of man's relations to the 
extinguishing of another relation. 
But in order for guilt or despair to become sin, 
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it must be possessed in the presence of God. Despair is 
possible for all men but sin is possible only if one is 
before God. Thus, ·being in the presence of God is the 
decisive determinant by which one leaps into the conscious-· 
ness of his sin. l 9 Thus, the man who has only made the ·, 
.first movement of the leap cannot really sin. This man of 
religiousness A ls not before God, he ls God. The mystic 
qua mystic is so united with the divine that he cannot even 
sin. It is as a man of faith and not merely as a mystic 
that one stands apart from God but still before God and 
thus becomes capable of sin. 2.0 
But when one is in the presence of God, how can he 
d~spair? Kierkegaard's answer to this question is to be 
found in his notion of dread. We have seen how Adam was 
issued a command and how he looked down into his freedom 
and succumbed. In such a way did the fascinated Agnes look 
down from the arms of Merman into the depths of the ocean. 
But what ts it that happens when one passes from objective 
dread to subjective dr~ad? For it is this movement which 
constitutes sin. The aspect of dread which makes this 
possible is scandal or the offence. This is the great con-
cept which Kierkegaard has worked out in such detail and by 
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which he shows how the leap of sin can take place. Jesus 
Christ and his tradition can be offensive either in a lofty 
or in a lowly way. Just as the Pharisees were scandalized 
by Jesus because he looked like a mere.man but claimed to 
be God, so can·any man be offended by Christ's promise. 21 
One can be afraid to take the risk and believe that Christ 
will really give him the Kingdom of Heaven. This promise 
ls too lofty for his understanding. He can be offended by 
1t and turn away. But, on the other hand, of one believes 
in the loftiness of Christ, he can be offended by his lowli-
ness. Just as Peter denied Christ thrice before the cock 
crew, so one who believes in Christ's divinity can be 
offended by his humanity. He can refuse to accept the 
earthly. 22 The two kinds of sin-despair over one's sin and 
despair over the :forgiveness .of one's sin - are rooted in 
the two types of offence. If God ls too lofty then the 
sinner sees himself as too lowly. He despairs over his 
lowliness. But if God appears as lowly and one ls offended 
by the lowly so that one will not admit it, then no for-
giveness of his own lowliness ls possible. 
It is at this point that we can begin to see the 
difference between the leap of sin and the leap of faith. 
Notice, grace is necessary both for sin and for faith. 
' One could not be in the presence of God without grace; at 
most he could be one with God. But grace makes it possible 
for one to stand before G~ in such a way that God can be 
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offensive. Sin is possible only before the offence and 
taith is possible only before the possibility of the offence. 
So by the qualitative leap one stands before the offensive 
Christ. If he succumbs to the offence he sins. If he 
believes in spite of the offence and thereby is not offended, 
he is a man of fa1 th. Both men start making the second 
movement of the leap but then all of a sudden the sinner 
plunges into the abyss of subjective dread. But how does 
this happen? 
Kierkegaard clarifies this plunge into sin through 
his notion of procrastination. 23 One receives the revelation 
that he is in sin. That is, through grace he begins to make 
the leap. In short, he hears the call of conscience and 
becomes convinced that he should change his life's way, 
that he should not sin. He knows that he can change through 
God's grace. The man of faith acts on the revelation 
immediately. But the sinner? Well, he procrastinates. He 
r does not act immediately. He puts off the action and thinks 
I 
~- and slowly his will begins to cloud his intellect. At first 
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he sees clearly what he should and should not do. But he 
does not want to do what is right. Then he willfully clouds 
his intellect. This is sin. 
At this point ~e can begin to understand what 
Kierkegaard means when he writes that "sin grows every 
instant one does not get rid of it."24 Because sin is 
essentially a mind clouding procrastination whereby one 
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despairs in the presence of God who offends him, he 
continues to sin with every moment of procrastination. One 
just keeps destroying the relationship which he is. But, 
of course, not all of.this sinning need be subjective 
sinning. One can lapse off again into objective guilt and 
\. not be in subjective sin. But he is responsible for this 
lapse. He may so deaden himself to revelation that he will 
i 
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forget about sin until he receives another special grace in 
that call of conscience. 
But what happens when one receives this revelation? 
Insofar as sin is concerned, he sees himself as a sinner. 
Yes, every man, even Abraham, has objective guilt, and when 
he sees himself as he is through revelation then he sees 
that he is a sinner. Thus, Kierkegaard speaks of sin as a 
despair over one's sin or as a despair over being forgiven. 
The man of faith sees himself as a sinner but does not 
despair .over it. Bather he is always repentant because he 
sees himself as never completely being the full relationship 
that he could be. So he is conscious of his guilt as sin 
through the leap but he posits no new sin. He does not sin 
by succumbing to his sinfulness. But the sinner sins by 
succumbing to his sin. . . . . ... 
.. ?·~ ~ ..... "" 
So, the leap of faith is always a fall into sin. 
By the leap one becomes conscious of himself as a sinner 
before God. But the leap need not be a fall into sin in 
the sense that it itself becomes a new sin. This happens 
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only if one leaps in such a way as to despair over his sin 
or over the forgiveness of his sin. As one makes the leap 
his dread becomes different. He moves from objective to 
subjective dread. With this leap new possibilities of sin 
open out that were not previously there. Kierkegaard 
begins to clarify these new possibilities of sin by his 
consideration of Socrates• concept of sin. 25 Because 
Socrates did not live within the tradition of revelation 
he could not, even in an implicit way, know of genuine sin. 
"Socrates defined sin as ignorance."26 "But if sin 
is ignorance, then it does not properly exist."27 With 
these two notions Kierkegaard indicates his position con-
cerning the possibility of sin for a Socratic. If guilt 
arises because of ignorance, then one is not responsible 
for it. If one is truly ignorant, then he cannot choose 
[;, one alternative instead of another. Ignorance removes the 
~y,. 
to• 
~· ; factor of will. But Christianity makes sin possible by 
; 
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affirming individual will and thus the possibility of 
defiance. Christianity places the blame directly upon the 
individual man and thus does away with the all determining 
role of fate. But what are the implications of this great 
distinction? What are the characteristics of the man who 
lives within the tradi~ion of the leap, and how do they 
differ from the characteristics of man who lives within the 
tradition of fate? Kierkegaard singles out for considera-
tion three of these characteristics& individuality, 
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hi story and sexuality •. 
Only within the context of the leap is it possible 
for a man to exist as an individual. When fate rules, the 
intellect and the will of the individual do not have the 
ability to be responsible for sin. Individuals are 
extensions of fate and thus not true individuals. They 
have no power of defiance. But within the context of the 
leap, one can, even if it is through a gift, go beyond 
ignorance and see alternatives. He can choose. And above 
.all, he can choose to make himself ignorant or not. The 
great difference between the Socratic and the Christian 
context is that in the Christian context the individual can 
be free to be ignorant or not. In the Socratic context he 
cannot be free to be ignorant or not. He is always ruled 
by and is an extension of fate. There are not many free 
individuals. There are only extensions of one great 
individua1. 28 
As a result, history has a very different meaning 
within the two contexts. Within the context of fate the 
individual temporal moment has no importance of its own. 
The temporal is just an extension of the eternal. Here we 
see the temporal implications of the aesthetic context. 
The true ethical, that, is, the temporal and the historical, 
is an impossibility. Because there can be no free individ-
ual resolution and because there can be no decisive temporal 
moment, there can be no true ethics. There is no such thing 
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as a creative event in time for individuals. Thus, history 
is only an explication of the fated flow of the eternal 
succession. But within the Chris,tian context there is the 
possibility of many free individuals and ·the possibility of 
decisive temporal moments. An individual can create or 
destroy within time. Thus, history is the explication of 
individual creative activity. 29 
And fUrthermore, sexuality differs in the two 
{ contexts.JO In the mere aesthetic context sensuality is 
.only psychically determined. But in Christianity it is 
spiritually determined. Spirit for Kierkegaard means 
individual freedom. It refers to the creative power of 
each individual person. This brings us back to the 
difference between eros within the Greek and Christian 
contexts. Greek sensuality was in harmony and accord. 
Christian sensuality is in opposition and exclusion. Only 
when the spiritual is posited in language, that is, in 
tradition, does it gain its power.31 For the Greek there 
is no individual rebellion against sensuality. For the 
Christian there is. Spirit is the synthesizing medium of 
body and of psyche.32 Thus, it seeks to keep both in 
balance and it is opposed to an over-emphasis of either. 
It is from this that t~e new and heavy burden of Christian 
dread arises. 
And so, if one considers man only in his natural 
state, that is, after the fall into original sin, he will 
L 
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see that no concept of sin is possible and that man ·cannot 
sin. Thus, as Kierkegaard. shows in his sketch of Agnes and 
the Merman: 
"An ethics which disregards sin is a perfectly 
idle ethics; but if it asserts sin, it is so 
ipso well beyond itself."33 
Ethics is dependent on either an aesthetic or a revealed 
tradition. No true ethics is possible in the aesthetic or 
Greek tradition. But once one makes the second movement 
of the leap he, through grace, can become an individual. 
At that moment he sees himself as a sinner and he can 
succumb to this sinfulness by despairing over his sin or 
the forgiveness of his sin. So, the Christian is a sinner 
but at the same time he is a free individual with sensuality 
and history. Thus, the very.concept of man has two vastly 
different meanings within these two contexts. This is so 
because reason in the Christian context belongs to free 
individuals. But in the Greek context there is at root 
only one great reason and not several individual reasoning 
beings. But what are the reason structures of the leap? 
How does philosophy itself, an activity of reason, differ 
in the two contexts? 
' 
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CHAPTER V 
THE REASON STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
A~ we enter the great gallery of Fear and Trembling 
there stands at the threshold, in the preface, the painting 
of Descartes. We see him with his distinction between the 
natural light of reason and faith. His reason comes to 
collision and he must doubt. But out of his doubt grows a 
new and stronger reason. However, he never doubts his 
faith. Faith is higher than reason. Descartes is a hero 
who stands alone and does not try to lead others into his 
doubt. Together with Descartes there appear in the painting 
two other sets of figures. There are the Greek skeptics 
who also were heroes. They spent their life with the diffi-
culties of reason. They doubted and remained in that doubt 
and never went beyond it. They did not have faith to aid 
them but nevertheless they were not disloyal to reason. 
Also within the painting there are the Hegelians of 
Kierkegaard's own day. They have doubted all, both reason 
and faith, and they have quickly gone beyond them to the 
system. Kierkegaard ridicules them in their hasty and 
careless arrogance. Are they real thinkers who feel the 
paradox of reason? Do they understand doubt or faith? 
These who claim to know all, appear as superficial in 
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comparison with the Greek skeptics and Descartes. What is 
the meaning of the painting? What is the relation between 
reason and doubt and faith in the philosophy of Kierkegaard? 
It is in the Philosophical Fragments1 that we find 
a full explication of this painting of Descartes with all 
of its philosophical overtones. Here Kierkegaard clarifies 
three different levels of the collision between reason and 
the paradox. Even the Hegelians can get a glimpse of the· 
first collision. This epistemological collision has to do 
with the Socratic knowledge paradox. It becomes manifest 
before one makes the first movement of the leap and calls 
forth that leap. The second collision is that which the 
Greek skeptics were able to experience. It is the meta-
physical collision whereby reason becomes embroiled in its 
great proofs, especially the proofs for the existence of 
God. This collision is possible only after one makes the 
first movement of the leap and it is such that it is incom-
plete without the second movement. Finally, there is the 
~: paradox with which Descartes is capable of colliding. This 
~· r collision is possible only after one makes the second move-
ment of the leap and it has to do ~1th the theological 
paradox concerning our knowledge of the God-man. Hence, 
the pattern of the double movement leap can once again be 
' 
seen as the foundation of this Descartes painting and the 
philosophical text which explicates it. Just as the three 
levels of collision formed the foundation for the three 
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levels of guilt, so now they can be seen as the foundation 
tor the three levels of .the paradox. 
Kierkegaard begins to reason about reason with a 
consideration of the Socratic knowledge paradox. 2 This 
paradox has to do with seeking after knowledge. How can 
one seek the truth? He cannot seek something that he does 
not know. ·If he already knows it, how can he seek it? If 
one sought to understand a triangle, he would have to 
alread7 know to some degree what a triangle was or he 
. cou1d not even begin to consider it. But if he did really 
know it. then seeking to know it would not be possible. 
How could the teacher impart knowledge if there were not 
already some foundation for that knowledge within the 
learner? Learning to Socrates seemed to be a quantitative 
development of that foundation of knowledge. Thus it was 
natural for Socrates to solve the knowledge paradox with 
his theory of recollection. He thought that each person 
already had the foundation of knowledge within him and that 
learning was just a development of this foundation. Thus 
he saw the role of the teacher as that of the midwife. 
The teacher could never impart new knowledge, he could only 
bring to birth that which was already within the learner. 
To seek knowledge is possible because one already possesses 
" in a fundamental sense that which he seemingly seeks. Yes, 
only seemingly seeks, for in reality he already has it. 
But what are the implications of this answer to the 
~: 
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paradox? What does 1t mean to hold this recollection 
theory? First, it is evident that the recollection theory 
does solve the paradox. It does away with the paradox by 
doing away with the seeking.3 The truth is something that 
one already possesses. It is within him and, therefore, he 
need not seek it without. But it is no great thing just to 
get beyond the paradox. For, "the thinker without a paradox 
is like a lover without feelings a paltry mediocrity."4 
However, that ls exactly what the Hegelians in our painting 
do. They doubt everything - reason and faith. But they 
quickly go beyond this doubt to the system. Once they reach 
the system they have swallowed up doubt forever. They have 
explained all paradox by explaining contradiction. Hence, 
they become thinkers without passion. In the hands of 
Socrates the recollection theory overcame the knowledge 
paradox but at the same time discovered even a greater para-
dox. That was the paradox of all Greek skepticism. But the 
Hegel1ans are such great reconc1lers that they come to no 
higher and lasting paradox. 
But, the overcoming of the paradox is not the only 
result of the recollection theory. If one says that man has 
always known the truth even from eternity, then he destroys 
the significance of the temporal moment. The temporal 
' moment becomes only an occasion wherein the truth ls 
recalled. It is not a decisive moment wherein new truth is 
really acquired. The recollection theory is a kind of 
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eterna11sm which robs the temporal of any ultimate signifi-
cance. It even makes it impossible that there be any 
personal freedom. For truth is within one from eternity 
and it thereby determines him. He cannot acquire any new 
truth by himself and thus the foundation for any creative 
act is denied the individual. The moment is swallowed up 
in the eternal and the many are swallowed up in the one. 
These two implications of the recollection theory 
indicate the?Ja3essity for the two movements of the leap. 
-The first movement of the leap enables one to regain the 
paradox. Even within the context of the recollection 
theory, Socrates was able to recover the paradox. But the 
mediation theory of the Hegelians does not permit a recovery 
of the paradox. They cannot be left in perpetual doubt. 
But Socrates and the Greek skeptics were. The first move-
ment of the leap enabled them to recover the passion of 
thought. However, only the philosophy which Descartes 
represents is able to respond to the second implication of 
the recollection theory. Because there is room for faith 
in Descarte's philosophy there can be a significant 
temporal moment. The second movement of the leap can give 
the temporal moment an eternal significance. 
But, just how,is the second movement of the leap an 
adequate answer to the Socratic knowledge paradox? 
Together with Socrates, Kierkegaard approaches the paradox 
by agreeing that man does not really seek the truth, But, 
while Socrates thinks that man has the truth in a hidden 
wa7, Kterkegaard thinks that man is fleeing the truth. 
K1erkegaard is intent upon preserving the freedom of the 
individual and thus he does not maintain that man lost 
tull awareness of the truth through an accident or that 
God cast him from the truth.5 .He holds that man freely 
forfeited the truth. Thus, through his own will,· man is 
beyond the pale of truth. He does not seek truth. He 
fiees truth. 
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This means that if man is ever to receive the truth, 
the relation between teacher and learner must be very 
different in the Kierkegaardian context from what it was in 
the Socratic context. And so it is. In the context of 
recollection, the teacher .could give neither the truth nor 
~he condition for receiving the truth. The teacher could 
be only a midwife. The learner had the truth within him 
and the only sufficient condition for his finding the truth 
was his own turning inward. But in the context of the ieap, 
the teacher must give both the truth and the condition for 
receiving the truth. If one is really beyond the pale of 
truth and fleeing truth, the only way he will really get 
truth is to receive it as a gift. He will not be ·able to 
acquire truth through his own efforts. But, as strange as 
it may seem, it is only in the latter context that one can 
freely and as an individual arrive at the truth. We have 
seen that if the truth is in one from eternity, then the 
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temporal moment will not be significant. Also, the lndivid-
ual will not be free for as he moves inward and discovers 
the truth, he will see that he is not one individual dis-
tinct from others. He will see that he is but an extension 
of the eternal knower. He will see that he is not free as 
an individual who can create something new, Rather, he will 
see that when time is but the eternal and souls are but 
Soul, then creation is but illusion, But, if one is really 
apart from the truth, then the temporal moment can be s1gni-
. f1cant. one can acquire the truth in time and that moment 
of acquisition will be as important as truth is important, 
And how can that acquisition be an act of freedom? It is 
free because man can reject the truth and the condition for 
receiving the truth at the moment that they are offered to 
~1m. He ls not forced to receive the truth even though it 
is given to him as a gift. He is free to accept or reject 
in the moment. Thus, by allowing man to freely accept or 
reject truth in the moment Kierkegaard's theory preserves 
the significance of the temporal moment and the freedom of 
the individual. The theory of Socrates permits neither, 
So, just how does this free acquisition of truth 
take place? What is the condition which the learner must 
receive that he might,receive the truth? That condition 
is precisely the consciousness of oneself as a sinner. 6 
As soon as one becomes aware that he is guilty before God 
. 
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of having fled the truth, then he becomes capable again of 
receiving the truth. One becomes aware of his individual 
freedom at the moment that he becomes aware of his sinful-
ness. The fall into sin is the leap of faith which reveals 
the truth of the distinction between good.and evil and the 
human freedom to choose between these alternatives. 
But, who must the teacher be who can give both the 
truth and the condition for receiving it? Clearly, it can 
be none other than the God. No man could be such a teacher. 
·In this Socrates was right. But this brings us to a new 
paradox. How can we know that there is such a God? If the 
God is truly other, how can man know Him? Is not the wholly 
other, by definition, beyond the knowledge of man? In such 
a way, the theory of the leap preserves the passion of the 
paradox. But how does this paradox arise to the meta-
physical level for the Greek skeptic and for the Christian 
such as Descartes? Why does it fail to arise for the 
Hegelian? 
Socrates lives within the context of the recollection 
theory and therein he finds a solution to the knowledge para-
dox. He does not seek truth without but he comes to know 
himself and therein finds truth. But as he finds this truth 
within a new paradox arises. He discovers within himself 
the Divine as such. His soul is Soul. As a man he is Man. 
With his new discovery, he is like Abraham with the young 
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Isaac. He is satisfied with his new acquisition. The old 
struggle is gone. But then the new paradox arises. Reason 
seeks and finds a new collision. As Socrates looks within 
he begins to wonder whether he is •a stranger monster than 
Typhon or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, par-
taking of something Divine.•? Kierkegaard. even compares 
this dialectic o'f' reason to the dialectic of love., after one 
enters the bliss o'f' the first movement of the leap, his 
reason too experiences that new collisions 
"But now the Reason stands still, just as Socrates 
did; 'f'or the paradoxical passion of the Reason is 
aroused and seeks a collision; without rightly 
understanding itsel'f', it is bent upon its own 
down'f'all. This is like what happens in connection 
with the paradox o'f' love.. Man lives undisturbed a 
self-centered li'f'e, until there awakens within him 
the paradox o'f' self-love, in the 'f'orm of love for 
another, the object o'f' his longing, Self-love 
lies as the ground o'f' all love or is the ground in 
which all love perishes."8 
Thus, reason goes through the same dialectical pattern as 
did self-love. Like erotic love, reason too is a manifesta-
tion of the aesthetic. It collides with the ethical both 
' before the first movement of the leap and after the first 
movement o'f' the leap. Of course, the ethical at these first 
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two levels is the fruit of its own production. And what 
is this ethical pre-figuration which the reason produces 
and with which it collides? It is the paradox. Before 
the first movement of the leap, it was the knowledge para-
dox. After the second movement of the leap, it is the 
paradox of the unknown. Socrates becomes baffled by that 
which he discovers within himself. There not only seems 
to be something within him which is less than man, there 
';: · seems to be something that ls more than man. This more 
:-
·than man which he has discovered is the unknown. 
Like the Greek skeptics, Socrates stands paralyzed 
before the paradox, unable to move. He finds himself and 
he seems like the Divine, and yet unlike the Divine. His 
reason surmises the existence of the unlike. But his 
reason is confounded by the different, by the other. It 
must posit it and yet it cannot conceive it. Socrates and 
the skeptics can only waver here before the other in silence. 
But within the Christian context reason's collision 
with the second paradox differs from the second collision 
within the Greek context. Just as the epistemological 
collision differed, so does the metaphysical. Within the 
context of recollection it seems that reason produces the 
idea of the unknown. 'But, within the context of the double 
movement leap, Kierkegaard argues that this idea of the 
unlmown will have to be given to reason by the unknown.9 
,. 
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This is the whole point of the second chapter wherein he 
paints the picture of the king who marries the humble girl. 
i 
The ways of the king are unknown to the girl. She will be 
unhappy if she is married but cannot share his life with 
hill. .The king knows this and wonders how they might come 
to an understanding. He knows if she is raised to his level 
she will be changed. He will not be able to love her as he 
now does for he loves her in her simplicity. How can she 
know him and yet be herself? That is, how can her 
·individuality and freedom be preserved when she knows the 
king? The king thinks that in order to bring this about, 
he will have to descend to her level. But then she would 
no longer be able to love him as king. So he has to remain 
the king and yet communicate. He can do this if he becomes 
her servant. As her servant,· he can preserve her individ-
. uality. And yet, if she believes him, she will still know 
him as king. He will be to her servant and king. So it is 
with God and man in the Christian context. Man does not 
get the idea of the unknown through recollection and reason. 
But his reason receives the idea through a gift.10 
.....___ 
At this point a serious question arises. When 
treating the previous structures of the leap, we saw that 
man could make the firEt movement of the leap by his own 
power. The young swain and Kierkegaard could reach the 
teleological suspension of the ethical through their own 
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willing. Abraham and the Knight of Infinite Resignation 
could reach infinite resignation through the strength of 
their own will. Is Kierkegaard now contradicting his own 
dialectic by saying that one can reach the second paradox 
only through a gift of the unknown? No, he is not. Only 
through the gift he argues, can the freedom of the individ-
ual be preserved. Within the Greek context there can be no 
individual will which reaches infinite resignation. The 
first movement of the leap is made when one abandons 
·individuality and becomes resigned to fate. So Kierkegaard 
now reveals a new subtlety within his dialectic. If one 
is really to freely do something, grace is necessary.· 
And, just how is this grace given? At this meta-
physical level one also sees through the paradox by the 
gift wherein he recognizes himself as a sinner. How does 
the Christian come to realize that God is absolutely unlike 
him? He sees this when he sees that he is a sinner.11 For 
the sinner is absolutely unlike the God. But, even more 
than this, he comes to realize that it was his sin that 
brought about this complete unlikeness between God and 
himself. We saw when treating reason's first paradox that 
it was by man's sin that he fled the truth. So now we see 
that it is by man's s1cn that he separates himself from God. 
Both of these separations he brought about freely and thereby 
laid the foundation for the two paradoxes. If he freely 
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accepts himself as a sinner, he sees through the paradoxes. 
He sees the truth even though he did not seek it and he 
comes to_know the unknown just as he freely created the 
un}mown aspect of the God. He becomes united with them 
rather than separated from them. 
In such ways then do Socrates and the Christian 
come to know of the existence of the unknown. When Socrates 
thinks that reason produces the paradox, he forfeits 
individual freedom and again the significance of the temporal 
~oment. For the difference has been there from eternity and 
the individual has nothing to do with it. But Kierkegaard 
preserves individual freedom and the temporal moment. He 
thinks that the individual man brings about the difference 
by sin in time and he thinks that man freely comes to 
realize this in time when he accepts the insight that he is 
responsible for the difference. But both Socrates and 
Kierkegaard while knowing the unknown do not claim to know 
it by a proof of reason. In this they differ from the 
Hegelians. 
Thus, in his detailed analysis of the proofs for 
the existence of God, Kierkegaard continues to distinguish 
between these three positions which we find in the Descartes 
painting.12 It is true that for Socrates the paradox of 
' . 
knowing the unknown is produced by reason. But, Kierkegaard 
is very clear in stating that reason does not produce the 
~\ ..:· ·' ' ' ii'-;" 
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unimown t"or Socrates through proof. Even though Socrates 
1s credited with the physico-teleological proof Kierkegaard 
thinks that Socrates 
•always presupposes the God's existence, and under 
this presupposition seeks to interpenetrate·nature 
with the idea of purpose.•13 
'thus, reason has a role in bringing Socrates to the notion 
ot the unknown but he did not understand how. He was truly 
hung up in the metaphysical dimension of the paradox. Like 
.the skeptics in our picture and especially like the 
Corneades. "he could not get it into his head when the new 
quality actually emerged."14 Socrates did not know how he 
came to know of the unknown. 
But, the Hegelians in our.painting do not reason to 
the limit of reason as do the Greek skeptics. They think 
that they can prove the existence of God. However, they 
express themselves unfortunately for they blur the important 
distinction between the ideal and the factual. The onto-
logical aspect of their proof fails: 
"For the difficulty is to lay hold of God's factual 
being and to introduce God's ideal essence 
dialectically into the sphere of factual being."15 
And so the causal aspert of their argwnent too must fall for 
one always reasons from existence, not toward existence. I 
do not first discover the existence of Napoleon by observing 
his deeds. No, as an historian I must first assume his 
existence and then I can say that such and such deeds 
belong to him. 
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Thus, Kierkegaard thinks that the Hegelians are 
wrong in their exaggerated use of reason and he thinks that 
Socrates respects the limits of reason but is baffled before 
1 t. But, what does Kierke~rd think about the role of 
reason in knowing God? How does he approach the proofs for 
the existence of God? He ls not just a mere fedeist. Just 
· as the double movement leap always includes the aesthetic 
but dethrones it, so too does his faith always use reason. 
Reason uses the proofs but of themselves they must fail. 
Beason cannot by itself know the unknown. So when I use 
the proofs and then drop them because of their inadequacy, 
.I demonstrate that I know of ·the unknown. Thus, the proofs 
have an important demonstrative power. Kierkegaard writes: 
"When I let the proof go, the existence is there. 
But this act of letting go is surely also something; 
it is indeed a contribution of mine. Must not this 
also be taken into the account, this little moment, 
brief as it may be - it need not be long, for it is 
a leap. n16 
Thus, the lea~ enables Kierkegaard to go beyond 
Socrates. Kierkegaard sees the importance of the moment 
and of his own contribution in overcoming the metaphysical 
l 
paradox. He can abandon the proof beca.use of the gi.ft 
whereby he clearly sees himself and the unknown. Socrates 
never gets this clarity. But does this mean that 
Kierkegaard loses the passion of thought after all? Does 
he become like the Hegel1ans who are beyond the paradox? 
No, for once Kierkegaard sees through the meta-
physical dimensions of the paradox there arises for him 
the theological dimension. Fa.1th has come to the aid of 
reason for Kterkegaard but now faith presents its own 
paradox. What is this new paradox? How does it arise? 
How does reason relate to it? 
In abandoning the recollection theory, Kierkegaard 
argued that the learner had to receive both the truth and 
the condition for the truth from the teacher. In this way 
he sought to preserve the eternal importance of the moment 
and the freedom of the individual. But the truth which the 
? 
learner receives is a new paradox. The condition for 
receiving the truth which the learner likewise receives is 
also a new paradox. That is this new paradoxical truth and 
what is this new paradoxical condition? 
Within the context of the eternally important 
moment the dialectic of the paradox proceeds as follows. 
First, the epistemological paradox of learning what one 
" does not know presents itself. It is assumed that one 
freely comes to know a new truth. That is, it is a new 
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truth o'f the moment which was not his from eternity. But, 
this assumption implies that both the truth and the con-
di t1on for learning the truth have to be presented to the 
learner by the teacher. A learner without the truth could 
not find it simply by himself. But, this gift gives rise 
to a seco!li paradox. For the one who gives the truth and 
the condition for the truth must be other than man. This 
other must have the truth and the condition for the truth. 
But, how can this being who is wholly other communicate this 
.gift to man? How can man know this wholly other even enough 
to receive from Him a gift? But, one does know of Him and 
he shows this by letting go of the proofs for the existence 
of the other. But, if one does know the wholly other and 
has· not always known Him a new paradox arises. The wholly·· 
other cannot be wholly other •. He must in some way be like 
man if he is understood by man. The new paradox is the 
likeness of the unlike. It is that the eternal God is also 
temporal. 
But, now we see that the paradox is the teacher 
himself. As one looks at the Socratic knowledge paradox, 
he discovers the paradox of knowing the wholly other. 
Socrates saw both of these paradoxes. But, if one is to 
solve them sp as to permit individual freedom, then the 
" 
wholly other must at the-same time be the same as man. The 
teacher who truly teaches must be eternal and yet also 
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temporal in order that the lea.rner might truly learn. The 
new paradox is the eternal God who is also a temporal man. 
The teacher is at the same time the teaching. The paradox 
gives the condition by which the paradox can be understood. 
Only with such a theory can the eternal importance of the 
temporal moment be preserved. 
So, to be free the individual learner must receive 
not only the truth but also the condition for receiving the 
truth. The condition which enables the learner to know the 
truth must·be a knowledge which is not a knowledge. If the 
condition for receiving the truth were simply knowledge, 
then it would not be a condition, it would be truth itself. 
Again, man would not be free to bring about truth in the 
moment he would simply receive it. But, if the condition 
were not at the same time a knowing~ then it would not aid 
man in knowing. This condition is faith. Faith is the 
paradoxical knowing-not knowing that conditions man's know-
ing the known-unknownable. When man freely accepts the 
condition and the truth, he stands in a paradoxical 
relationship to the paradoxical. 
But, just how does the God-man give this double 
gift? Just how does man receive it? The God-man gives 
the gift of faith by becoming the God-man. When God walks 
' 
as a man among men, he makes it possible for them to believe. 
But, God walked among men only once. In becoming temporal 
God became truly temporal. That is, he lived and died in a 
,. 
,«·, 
,·. 
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certain time as do all men. So there are two problems. 
How did the contemporaries of the God-man come to believe 
in Him and how do discipies at second hand come to believe 
in Him? 
Of course, the contemporary of the God-man could not 
simply know the God-man. He too had to believe in the God-
man. The contemporary might see the historical man and he 
might reason to the eternal God. But, he could not simply 
know the absurdity that the eternal God was the historical 
·man. Many who saw the God-man did not believe Him to be 
the God-man. How did those who did believe in Him come to 
believe in Him? In The Fragments Kierkegaard gives two 
aspects of his answer to this question. In order that the 
contemporary might believe, it was necessary that he see a 
sign and that he look inward even to the extent that he 
might discover himself as a sinner. 
As the God-man went among men, the very loftiness 
of his mission would attract the crowds. But, the masses 
cannot believe. Even if one became extremely interested in 
him and watched him day and night, that would not mean that 
he believed. In order that one believe, it is necessary 
that he pay attention but the mere attention which the sign 
might call forth is n~t yet belief. If one is to believe, 
he must also look inward. As he looks both at the God-man 
and himself, he must come to see that he is a sinner. If 
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he comes to see that the God-man is also his judge even to 
the extent that be can be scandalized by the God-man, then 
he ls on the threshold of belief. If he then accepts him-
self as a sinner and accepts the God-man as his saviour, 
then he is a believer. To believe is to repent. 
The way in which the di.sciple at second hand 
. -
receives the gift of faith is exactly the same. ·For in 
reality. there is no such person as a disciple at second 
hand. The God-man ls not merely eternal and He is not 
. merely historical. He is an absolute fact and thus can be 
co~temporary to every generation.17 He has the power to 
force a decision for anyone who will believe in Him in any 
age •. The God-man must always supply the condition for 
truth to each individual directly. Only if one pays atten-
tion to the-sign and then steps out of the crowd as an 
individual.sinner is he a believer. One can look at the 
sign and be.aroused to repentance equally well in any genera-
tion. There is only a quantitative difference between the 
strict historical contemporary of the God-man and the 
believer of a later generation. What a man of one generation 
can do for a man of another generation is to pass on the 
testimony of his belier.18 In this way, the testimony of 
one believer can arou~e the attention of another potential 
believer. But, this arousal of the attention through the 
tradition of believers is not a sufficient condition for 
r ' ' ~{· 
~­
r 
• ~ ' 
;, 
101 
faith. It is only a quantitative occasion that cannot in 
itself bring about the new quality of belief. 
So it is that one receives the gift of faith whereby 
he stands in a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical. 
In the God-man he sees the judge and by looking inward he 
sees himself as a sinner. If he accepts himself as a sinner, 
he believes. But this is possible only through the gift of 
the witness who arouses his attention. In order to believe, 
a man has to receive the gift of the absplute witness. But 
·then only some believe. That is, only some will exercise 
their freedom as an individual. The accepting of oneself 
as a sinner is the free act of the individual. But, what 
is the role of reason in this act of accepting the gift of 
faith? What happens to reason as one places himself within 
the paradoxical relation to the paradoxical? 
First of all, as we have seen when treating the 
proofs for the existence of God,19 the paradox bestows 
itself when reason sets itself aside. But, the act of 
setting itself aside is an act of reason. So reason must 
first reason to its limit and in so doing realize that the 
limit exists. Faith is thus occasioned by reason. But, 
faith is the third entity which permits reason and the 
20 paradox to encounter one another happily in the moment. 
Thus, reason not only has the role of setting itself aside 
but it can be preserved within the context of faith. Just 
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as religiousness B dethroned the aesthetic but still 
preserved it and just as love of neighbour dethroned the 
erotic love but still permitted it, so does faith dethrone 
reason but still preserve it. 
If one is to be a philosopher within the context of 
faith, then his reason is necessary for his faith. Just as 
religiousness A was absolutely necessari for religiousness B, 
so is reason absolutely necessary for the philosopher if he 
is to have faith. And reason can still exist even within 
·faith, just as the aesthetic could exist even though 
dethroned. Reason is dethroned when it recognizes that it 
cannot produce the awareness of sin and when it admits 
nevertheless that sin exists. 
Thus, we have seen the new paradox of faith, its 
genesis and reason's relation to it. But before leaving 
this painting of Descartes with his firm distinction between 
reason and faith, we should clearly summarize the relation 
of the dialectics of reason to the double movement leap. 
Kierkegaard presents three paradoxes that stand in a 
temporal relation to one another. First, one encounters 
the paradox of knowledge. As he works his way through this 
there arises the paradox of the unlimited God being known. 
Then he sees that if he is to know the God, the God must 
also be human. The humanity of God is thus the third para-
dox. The first collision of reason and the paradox has 
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. therefore to do with knowing something external. This is the 
problem of the mere aesthete before he makes the first move-
ment of the leap. He solves this paradox by moving inward 
and discovering his unity with the Divine, This solution to 
the second paradox ls the first movement of the leap. But 
then·he discovers that he 1.s not only God. He discovers 
...... '• . 
tfuit he is also a sinner. This discovery is revealed to him 
when the God-man reveals himself. This takes place in the 
second» movement of the leap. 
Thus, if a man ls a Christian philosopher he will 
proceed according to the same basic pattern as the Christian 
lover. He will move from the first collision to the first 
movement of the leap·and from there to the second collision. 
From the second collision of the aesthetic and ethical he 
will then move on.to the second movement of the leap. In 
such a way does Descartes differ both from the Greek philo-
sophers and from the philosophers of C~ristendom. But, this 
distinction can be even further clarified if we now consider 
the existential structures of the leap. For the Christian 
~~·. [ philosopher lives his philosophy in a way :that both the 
...,,. 
~. Greeks and the Hegelians do not. The existential structures 
r. 
~' t of the leap will further clarify both the love and reason 
structures of the leaJlr. They will also prepare us to examine 
the faith structures of the leap which will in turn further 
clarify the sin structures. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
At the very end of Fear and Trembling, we find the 
painting wherein Kierkegaard contrasts Socrates and 
Abraham as they break their silence at the moment of death.1 
This issue of death and of silence plunges us at once into 
what Kierkegaard means by the existential. How do these 
· two men approach death in such a way that they are both 
existential? How do they maintain silence and yet speak 
that last word as existentialists? What does Kierkegaard 
mean by the existential? But then again, Socrates and 
Abra.ham are contrasted. They are existentialists in very 
different ways. How is the existential distinguished in 
its two basic kinds? 
It is in The Postscript that Kierkegaard clarifies 
the existential structures of the leap. Here he shows how 
the leap is always a leaping, that is, a becoming subjective. 
This becoming subjective or, as he calls it, this subjective 
truth, is what he means by the existential. But, ~ 
Postscrint does not only clarify the leap by explicating 
its existential structfures. The Postscript is also a kind 
of commentary upon all of Kierkegaard's previous aesthetic 
lit~ra.ture. Thus, in this book he not only introduces us 
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to the existential structures of the leap but he then 
relates these structures of the leap to the previous 
structures which we have examined. Hence, The Postscript 
marks the great turning point in Kierkegaard's authorship. 
Here he firmly distinguishes between aesthetic religion and 
Christian religion even in its existential dimensions. He 
completes and summarizes all he has to say about the leap 
from the aesthetic viewpoint. He paves the way for his 
purely Christian development of the leap. 
In its fundamental meaning,. existence refers to the 
kind of being which a particular, thinking, human entity 
possesses. 2 Thus, Kierkegaard considers the being of an 
idea to be non-existential. It is abstract and not particu-
lar. Also, he contrasts the being of a human with the being 
of a potato. The human can p~ssess an idea in a way that the 
potato cannot. By the existential, Kierkegaard refers to 
that particular entity which can have ideas. Thus, ~either 
an idea nor a potato ls existential ln the strictest sense. 
But, Kierkegaard goes even further in defining the existential. 
He declares that "God does not think, he creates; God does 
not exist, He ls eternal."3 Thus, according to Kierkegaard 
there are at least four levels of being: God, idea, human, 
and partlculae entitles without ideas. Existence in lts 
. . ' . .. ' 
strictest .. sense Kierkegaard predicates only of the human. 
But, then Kierkegaard clarifies the existential ln 
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man even further. For man can have both exlstentlal·and 
non-existential aspect·s. He refers to thought within 
existence as a foreign medium. 4 Because of abstract thought 
one can live outside the realm of existence. He can live in 
the realm of possibility instead of reality. This poetic or 
intellectual standpoint which sees only possibility and is 
disinterested in the particular is the foundation for a non-
exlstential way of life and for degrees of the existential 
within ways of life. Because of his thought, 1~ is possible 
·for man to escape the existential. But again, it ls .because 
of his finite thought that man can be existential. The 
potato which lacks thought cannot be existential. So man 
is existential. insofar as he is a mixture of the ideal and 
the particular, of the finite and the lnfinite.5 But 
:through thought he can escape the existential predicament 
and li~e,only in the ideal, that is, in the non-existential. 
Hence, there ls only a certain kind of issue which 
is truly existential. If one can attain objective certainty 
about some issue, then it ls not existential. It can become 
purely ideal. Thus, one can wonder about whether or not a 
scientist can bring life out of non-life. But this is not 
an existential issue, for all the scientist has to do is 
produce life and the Rroblem ls solved. However, eth1co-
rel1gious issues like the existence of God, my life after 
death, my prayer life, and the issue of whether I should 
marry this woman or not are .existent1a1.issues.6 They 
'-··· 
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cannot be solved by means of objective evidence. They can 
onl7 be entered into by a subjective decision. Thus, that 
" question of death and how to approach it, which we encounter 
1n our Socrates-Abraham painting, is an existential question. 
For these two men do not convert it into an objective matter. 
They preserve its subjectivity in silence and in their ironic 
last word. 
So, the existential has to do with human existence. 
But the human can escape his existential dimension. He can 
. flee into the objective. But why would he want to do that 
and how would he do it? The answer to this question begins 
to emerge as we further clarify the meaning of the exist-
ential especially in its relationship to the leap. 
In The Fragments we saw that the leap was the moment, 
the instant. But, in The Postscript, Kierkegaard. develops 
another aspect of the leap. Here he writes: 
•The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the 
understanding) is not a martyrdom of the instant 
but precisely the martyrdom of endurance."? 
So the leap begins with the suddenness of the instant but 
it endures through a lifetime. Death for Socrates was not 
something he faced only as he departed life. He was always 
dying that philosopher's death. So also the sacrifice of 
' 
Isaac did not just end for Abraham as he lay down the knife. 
That event endured through his life. But, what is the nature 
of this leaping? Kierkegaard refers to it as becoming 
subjective and as subjective truth. 
108 
In the theses attributable to Lessing8 Kierkegaard 
points out how the subjective thinker "is constantly in the 
process or becoming, 1.e., he is always striving~"9 He 
agrees with Lessing that "if God held all truth in His right 
hand. and in His left the lifelong pursuit of it, he would 
choose the left hand."lO Man must constantly be striving 
for truth and can never completely attain it because of his 
·finl te and temporal nature. He can be 1n contact with truth 
because of his infinite and eternal nature but this is 
limited by his other side. Because man is existential, 
because he is that mixture, he can only continue to strive 
after truth and if he does not continue to strive he 
~estroys himself as existential. A logical system wherein 
one is concerned only with the abstract and ideal is 
possible for man. But an existential system for man is 
impossible. God can know of all reality in a final and 
11 perfect way but man cannot. 
Hence, Kierkegaard. defines truth for man as: "an 
objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process 
of the most passionate inward.ness. 1112 Man can never have 
objective certitude about the existence of God, about his 
own immortality, about whether he should now marry this 
woman. In ethico-religious matters, objective evidence can 
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never completely convince him. And yet, these are the most 
important matters of his life. Therefore, he can be con-
cerned about them with the greatest possible inwardness. 
To be so concerned and yet always to.realize that objective 
evidence will never occur ls to be 1n subjectlve·truth. It 
is to be constantly striving. It is to be leaping. So it 
was with Socrates. He always concerned himself with all of 
his energy about eth1co-rel1gious matters. He never forgot 
of immortality. As a philosopher, he was always concerned 
·with death even so that he could say, philosophy is a dying. 
So also with Abraham. The sacrifice would not cease to 
haunt him. Its paradox could never leave him as long as 
he was man. Both of these men were making the existential 
leap. But what are the characteristics of this leap even 
more specifically? 
The characteristic of the existential leap which 
Kierkegaard refers to most often is that 1t is the most 
difficult of all tasks. He writes: 
"To strive to become what one already is--is a.very 
difficult task, the most difficult of all tasks, in 
fact, precisely because every human being has a 
strong natural bent and passion to become something 
more and differe~t."1 3 
One 1s constantly tempted to get rid of his passionate 
lnlorardness and either cease caring about ethico-religious 
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matters or to convert them into matters of objective· 
certitude. Not to give in to the temptation is the most 
difficult of .all tasks. Hegelian1sm gave in to the tempta-
tion. The people of K1erkegaard•s day were constantly in 
danger of givtrg in to it especially because of the increased 
knowledge of the day. They could easily forget that 
Christianity was not ~matter of mere knowledge. Kierkegaard 
saw it as his vocation to make things difficult for people. 
To stem the tide of ease was his quest. 
The existential leap is very deceitful in its diffi-
culty. It can even appear to the observer as an easy task. 
But, as Kierkegaard puts it: 
•tt is as if one were to recommend being put to 
death by the guillotine, saying: it is a very 
easy matter, forsooth; you simply lay your head 
down on a block, somebody pulls a string, the axe 
falls - and the thing is done. But suppose that 
being executed was precisely what one did not wish; 
and so also the leap. When one is indisposed to 
make the leap, so indisposed that this passion 
makes the chasm infinitely wide, then the most 
ingenious contrivance for the purpose will not 
help at all ... l 4 
' The leap is difficult because it is a lifelong task. One is 
constantly tempted to be finished with life before it is 
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finished. with him. 15 Thus, 1 t ls prec·isely illusion and 
c{~celt that lay at the bottom of the difficulty. One thinks 
..;;·is finished once he has made the decision. But the leap 
is a leaping throughout all of one's life. One must 
constantly renew the decision. 
"It is easier to become a Christian when I am not 
a Christian than to become a Christian when I am 
one. 1116 
Becoming subjective is the most difficult of all tasks 
because it is so easy to think that I have become subjective • 
. · - But that is precisely to become objective. 
~ 
An immediate implication of this difficulty is the 
second characteristic of the existential leap, namely, that 
the leap is a suffering of inwardness. 
"While aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment, 
and ethical existence is essentially struggle and 
victory, religious existence is essentially suffering, 
and that not as a transitional moment, but as a 
persisting. The suffering is, to recall the Frater•s 
words, the seventy thousand fathoms deep on which the 
religious man constantly lies. But suffering is 
precisely inwardness, and it is an inwardness which 
marks itself off 'from the aesthetic and the ethical 
types of existential inwardness."17 
The suffering of the leap is a suffering that arises from 
from within because of the paradox. As long as the par~ 
is there one is over the seventy thousand fathoms. This 
suffering grows out of the collision which is manifest in 
subjective truth. There is always the tension of objective 
uncertainty and passionate inwardness. One wants certainty 
more than anything else but he knows he cannot attain it. 
However, he still persists in his concern. This is the 
suffering of inwardness. 
A third characteristic of the existential leap which 
.runs through Kierkegaard's authorship is that of scandal or 
the ·offence. We have already had occasion to treat this 
characteristic when we were clarifying the sin and the 
reason structures of the leap. It will arise again when we 
treat the incarnational structures of the leap. At present 
we need merely to point out that two of Kierkegaard's most 
frequent adjectives by which he describes the religious are 
suffering and offence. Both Socrates and Abraham are 
offensive. Socrates was so offensive that they put him to 
death. Abraham looks like the murderer of his own child. 
Both of these men appeared as offensive and both suffered 
~he offence of the paradox. The paradox which founds 
subjective truth is offensive. 
Then there is,the fourth characteristic of 
individuality. The individual is one of Kierkegaard's most 
fundamental concepts. It refers to the man who is making 
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the existential leap. Socrates could only go inward.alone. 
No teacher could really help him. Even he· could only be a 
midwife. And Abraham had an absolute relation to the 
absolute. His relationship to God was not mediated by any 
, ~:::~;'. relative means. He alone could face the full meaning of 
·f·· 
Isaac's death. Both Socrates and Abraham stood alone as 
individuals before death. No man could share their secret 
with them. Both stood as lonely rebels against the 
established order. They were offensive because they were 
so different. They suffered the most difficult of all 
sufferings because they were alone over the seventy thousand 
fathoms. 
But what did all this mean? It meant that they were 
locked in utter silence. No one could understand them even 
if they were to speak. They were beyond the limits of 
language in their existential leap. Kierkegaard puts it 
nicely when he writes .that Jacobi: 
"is not dialectically clear about the leap, so as 
to understand that it cannot be taught or communi-
cated directly, precisely because it is an act of 
isolation, which leaves it to the individual to 
decide. 018 
By the existential leap one enters the realm of the paradox 
beyond und.erstand1ng and beyond language, Thus, Socrates 
and Abraham are silent about their death except for that 
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last ironical word whereby they both point to the necessity 
of silence. The leap can only be commun:tca ted indirectly. 
Such are the characteristics of the existential 
leap. Socrates and Abraham both made that leap. They were 
both existentialists. But Kierkegaard's main point is one 
of contrast. They participated in the characteristics of 
the existential leap in very different ways. What is the 
distinction between the two levels of the existential which 
Kierkegaard. is so intent upon showing? 
The difference between the existential leap of 
Socrates and that of Abraham is precisely the difference 
between religiousness A and religiousness B. Socrates only 
makes the first movement of the leap which takes him as far 
as natural or aesthetic religion. Abraham makes both move-
.ments of the leap which take him to the religion of faith. 1 9 
Kierkegaard contrasts the two as follows: 
"If the individual is inwardly defined by self-
annihilation before God, then we have religious-
ness A. If the individual is paradoxically 
dialectic, every vestige of original immanence 
\being annihilated and all connection cut off, the 
individual being brought to the utmost verge of 
existence, then we have the paradoxical religious-
. 
ness. This paradoxical inwardness is the greatest 
possible •••• "20 
Only Abraham lives at the utmost verge of existe.nce. He 
has a paradoxical relation to the paradoxical. Socrates 
relates only straightforwardly to the paradoxical. 
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Both men experience becoming subjective. Both live 
in subjective truth. Both of them avoid the flight into 
objectivity. Thus, Kierkegaard contrasts the Greek or 
existential dialectic with the Hegelian dialectic: 
"The Greek philosopher was an existing individual 
and did not permit himself to forget that fact. 
In order that he might devote himself wholly to 
.. ·thought, he therefore sought refuse in suicide, or 
in a pythagorean dying from the world, or in a 
Socratic form of philosopher's death •••• Existence 
involved him in a process of becoming. In order to 
think in very truth he took his own life. Modern 
philosophy from its lofty heights smiles at such 
childishness. 1121 
Socrates just as well as Abraham is involved in an existent-
ial dialectic. But there is a difference in kind between 
the two forms of the dialectic. As we have seen when treat-
ing the reason structures of the leap, Socrates does not 
abandon the paradox. He finds within himself something of 
Typhon and something of the Divine. However, through the 
infinite resignation of his recollection theory, he does not 
have what Kierkegaard calls a paradoxical relationship to 
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the paradoxical. His existential dialectic lacks this 
dimension which ls possible only by virtue-of the absurd. 
-~:~-- - Within his context of resignation, the last word of 
Socrates about death is a jest. His point is to show that 
through his philosopher's life he has already passed into 
the eternal and as a result he can approach physical death 
without fear and trembling. He relates to the paradox with 
reason. Abraham, on the other hand, approaches death very 
differently. He too has reached resignation and, therefore, 
.shares in the paradox of Socrates. But, by virtue of the 
absurd, he continues to believe in the temporal fulfillment 
of the promise and thus he relates paradoxically to the 
paradox. For Socrates life would come after death. That 
is not absurd. 
Because of this basic difference between the two 
leaps, there is also a difference in kind 1n the character-
istics of the existential leap for the two men. Socrates 
can approach death in jest but Abraham only in fear and· 
trembling. To make both leaps is difficult but, strictly 
speaking, only the double movement leap is the most diffi-
cult of all tasks. The first movement is only analogously 
difficult. The leap of Socrates whereby he abandoned 
physical science and spught knowledge within was an exist-
ential task which took great effort. But, once he made the 
leap he was beyond real difficulty, His immanent.relation 
:1. 
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to the divine, that is, his non-paradoxical relationship to 
the paradoxical grounded his jest. But, the absurdity of 
Aoraham's position could ground only fear and trembling. 
Abraham believed in the fulfillment of the promise with an 
aesthetic immediacy not unlike that of Socrates. But the 
promise was to be fulfilled in time, not in eternity. And 
the means whereby it was to be fulfilled was temp·oral. 
Abraham's difficulty was to destroy the means and yet still 
be convinced of the end. 
So also Socrates had a great inwardness. But when 
he.went inward he discovered that he was divine. Even if 
there were strong traces of Typhon within him, he still knew 
the bliss of the one and with reason held to that as the 
only reality. Abraham lived only for the fulfillment of 
the promise in time. With the conviction of Socrates he 
knew it would be fulfilled. That conviction he had with the 
first movement of the leap. But then in his inward dread he 
saw himself destroying the only means to the fulfillment of 
the_ promise. The means was infinitely important to Abraham 
whereas it was not to Socrates. The moment was lost for 
Socrates. But because it was there for Abraham, his inward 
suffering was even of a different kind from that of Socrates. 
This differencr of kind is clear in the character-
istic of scandal. Kierkegaard writes: 
"Christianity is the only power which is able 
truly to arouse offense; for hysterical and 
sentimental fits of offense at this or that can 
be simply dismissed and explained as lack of 
ethical seriousness which is coquettishly busy 
about complaining of the whole world instead of 
itself."22 
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Socrates was only capable of experiencing accidental scandal 
but Abraham was capable of facing the essential scanda1. 23 
So also as individuals, Socrates and Abraham were 
essentially different. Socrates relates to himself only 
within an improper ethical context. He never leaves the 
realm of the aesthetic even though he is a most ethical and 
religious man. Thus, he cannot sin. He cannot freely make 
himself fuilty. But Abraham is capable of individual 
creativity. He is capable of creating or destroying some-
thing of supreme importance within time. He discovers the 
infinitely important as did Socrates with absolute mystical 
conviction. But through constant faith he is not swallowed 
up ln the infinite. Through faith he is so able to empha-
size the '!"yphon aspect within himself that it always remains. 
Finally, as we have noticed, Socrates in his last 
word can jest about death. When he hears his death sentence 
' he can reveal his infinite resignation by "expressing 
surprise that he has been condemned by a majority of three 
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votes."24 But, the communication of Abraham's paradoxical 
relationship to the paradoxical calls for even more than 
Socratic irony. He cannot just utter a word that shows 
that Isaac is immortal. The promise cannot be fulfilled 
through a dead but immortal Isaac. It can be fulfilled 
only through an Isaac who lives in time. And now that Isaac 
is to die, what can Abraham say. There is his word: "God 
will provide Himself the lamb for the burnt offering, my 
son."25 In this communication, the double movement leap 
is manifest. He does not say: "you are to be sacrificed, 
Isaac." He does not say: "I know nothing." He does know 
that Isaac must be sacrificed. But, to say that would be 
an untruth for by faith he knows that it is not to be Isaac. 
So through his enigmatic last word, he manifests the double 
movement leap. 
Hence, Socrates and Abraham both qualify as existent-
ialists. Both retain passionate inwardness by refusing to 
abandon the paradox. But, between their existential leaps 
there is an essential difference. Socrates relates 
immediately to the paradox and does not contradict reason. 
Abraham relates paradoxically to the paradox through the 
absurd. So it is with the existential structures of the 
leap. At this point ~ can further clarify the structures 
-
of the leap we have so far studied by interpreting them in 
terms of subjective truth. Just as Kierkegaard finds it 
fitting to make a summary of his aesthetic literature in 
~e Postscrlnt, so it would be helpful if we would do 
1JJtew1se before moving on to the faith structures of the 
leap • 
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. So far we have seen that within Kierkegaard's 
dialectic there are three collisions of the aesthetic and 
ethical. The first takes place before the first movement 
of the leap; the second after the first movement of the 
leap; and the third after the second movement of the leap • 
. Kierkegaard refers to the three contexts within which these 
col11s1ons take place as the aesthetic, the ethical, and the 
religious, even though all three spheres penetrate each other 
at each moment. In our next chapter, it will be necessary 
to study this interpretation of the spheres. But for the 
moment we need to show that it is by the criterion of 
existence that Kierkegaard establishes his dialectical 
hierarchy of values. The aesthetic is most devoid of 
existence. The ethical has more. But the peak of the 
existential ls the religious. In fact, it is even accurate 
to say that the existential and the religious are equivalent. 
The hierarchy of the stages is determined by the 
criterion of existence, which refers to the synthesis of 
the aesthetic and the ethical. The immediate aesthetic has 
" 
three moments: yearning as dream, yearning as seeking and 
yearning as desire. When Abraham first received the promise 
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his existence was at the level of a plant. In the enthus-
iasm of his first 1mmed1acy, he salf no diffi.culties. The 
question of truth or certainty had not arisen for him. He 
did not reflect. But then he had to endure the threats to 
the promise. In his experience of the first collision he 
began to reflect. The ethical and the question of truth 
began to emerge for him. He experienced the imperfections 
of temporality and he became uncertain. But at least he 
attained the existential status of the butterfly. As he 
.experienced the either/or of this first collision, he did 
no~ go the way of mere objective truth. He chose the exist-
ential level of a Socrates rather than that of a Hegel. He 
made the first movement of the leap and received Isaac. In 
his second immediacy he was at rest, but only for a moment, 
for a new collision announced itself. Now he had to endure 
the threat to Isaac. Through his faith he made the second 
movement of the leap and thus attained the highest level of 
existential truth. In this dialectic of Abraham we see the 
existential hierarchy of the plant, the butterfly, a Hegel, 
a Socrates and finally that of the mature Abraham. Ea.ch of 
these levels is characterized by a higher synthesis of the 
aesthetic and ethical. 
The hierarchy ,of love also reveals the existential 
criterton. The erotic dreaming of the page is a perfect 
blend of the masculine and the feminine. There is no 
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reflection by which the page distinguishes himself from the 
object of his longing. But then with Papageno the distinct-
16n-between himself and the other is made. His longing is 
a seeking even if it is for the feminine in general. A~ain 
this first collision presents its various posslbilltles. 
But the young man does not go the way of Constantine or the 
ladies' tailor or the seducer. He does not choose the 
definite even to the forgetfulness of the mysterious. No, 
he follows the way of Victor Eremita and makes the leap of 
-erotic inspiration into the new immediacy. He makes a 
sy~thesis of the aesthetic and ethical in such a way that 
they are held together reflectively. However, the ethical 
ls subordinated to the aesthetic. But then a new collision 
arises. Sympathy rebels against the negative resolution 
and calls for equal status for the ethical in a positive 
resolution. Through this new collision, there is revealed 
the higher existential possibility of neighbourly love. 
This permits a balanced synthesis of aesthetic and ethical 
love. With its eternal demand for temporal love, it permits 
both erotic and married love. Thus, in the dialectic of 
love there is the existential hierarchy of the page, 
Papageno, the seducer, Victor Eremita, and neighbourly love. 
Even in Kierke~aard's own life there ls evidence of 
this existential development. As a child, he experienced 
the first immediacy of parental love. The aesthetic and 
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ethical were not distinguished for him. He performe~ his 
duties with the total energy of immediacy. But then with 
his friends, he began to seek other values than those he 
had found with his father. He experienced the new exist-
ential level of the distinction between the aesthetic and 
the ethical. He flirted with Hegelianism. He flirted with 
seduction. The first great collision became more and more 
violent. The trumpet blast of PaulM~ller called to him 
and he even thought of suicide. He abandoned intellect-
ually his search for the aesthetic particular. But morally 
abandon it he could not. Then he was caught by the fishing 
fly of Regina, and in 1838 he made the first movement of the 
leap. He returned to his father and to God with a new 
immediacy. The values of the aesthetic and ethical were 
now explicit in their new found harmony. But the ethical 
was subordinate to the aesthetic in this harmony. However, 
a new collision arose. Should he marry Regina? He knew 
that he could if he only had faith. He waited for the 
lifting of the divine counter order. He waited to return to 
the earth. He saw in the instant that he could marry. He 
began to make the second movement of the leap but· it was 
always only a beginning. His martyrdom was not that of the 
moment but that of endurance. He endured through the Corsair 
' Affair and the great experience of 1848 and even the years 
of the attack. He lived on in the absurdity of faith always 
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becoming subjective. Kierkegaard lived through those levels 
wherein the aesthetic and ethical at first-were not disting-
uished, then collided in friction, then were harmonized in 
the second immediacy, then were torn apart by sympathy and 
were finally separated but united·in the absurdity of faith. 
The sin structures of the leap also reveal the 
existential gradations. The aesthetic and ethical are so 
united for the child that there is no question of sin. He 
is just learning the meaning of the terms. He is in the 
·process of sorting out the aesthetic and the ethical. Once 
th~ distinction is made the Hegelian possibility can arise. 
Kierkegaard labels this as proper ethics of the first order. 
The Hegelians know of sin but in accounting for it by 
reason they rationalize it away. They have no existential 
possibility of sin because they have abandoned all existen-
tial possibility. However, at this point there is the 
possibility of improper ethics. Socrates roots sin in 
ignorance. But that is to put ethics on the background of 
aesthetics. It is to destroy the significance of the 
temporal moment wherein one can sin. Socrates preserves 
subjective evil in his improper ethics, whereas Hegel and 
Christendom fail to do so. But for Socrates there are no 
individual subjects, pence no personal sin. Finally, there 
is the ·possibility of sin within the context of proper 
ethics of the second order. Here, individual guilt is 
125 
possible because there are free individuals. At this· level 
the ethical ls not swallowed up in the. aesthetic as it was 
fo·r Socrates. The ethical is not subsummed under the cate-
gory or ideal rationality as it was for Hegel. 
Finally, we can see how the existential is the 
criterion which distinguishes the reason structures of the 
' 
leap. Reason arises with the paradox of kn?wledge which is 
its first collision. Reason can emerge out of the first 
collision in either the.Hegelian or the Socratic way. If 
it becomes Hegelian, then it will reduce all matters to 
objective certainty and thereby move into metaphysical 
disinterestedness and lack of passion. If reason makes the 
first movement of the leap by moving inward in ethical 
passion, then it will discover a new dimension of the para-
doxical. Reason will collide with the other. It will meet 
its limit. It can Socratically remain here or it can move 
on to even a higher existential possibility. By reason of 
faith, it can move from immanence to transcendence. It· can 
even collide with the limit-become-limited. This is the 
new paradox of the absurd wherein the ethical is no longer 
lost in the aesthetic. At this existential level, the 
aesthetic and ethical are related with equal importance. 
The ethical moment is 8'1-ven an eternal importance. 
-So, Socrates and Abraham are both existentialists. 
Hegel abandons the existential. Kierkegaard primarily 
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affirms the existential of the two movements of the leap 
and any dialectical stage besides that is :non-exis.tential. 
Btit; by the first movement of the l~ap one enters religious-
ness A and by the second movement of the leap he enters 
religiousness B. Therefore, the existential and the 
religious a~~ equivalent. Any other stage is non-existential. 
. 
The immediate aesthetic is non-existential. The collision 
of the aesthetic and.the ethical before the first movement 
of the leap. is non-existential. The flight into objectivity 
·out of the first collision is more existential. If one wants 
to.say that the ethical is existential, then he has to mean 
the ethico-religious. He has to mean the ethical as it is 
subordinated to the aesthetic immediacy of natural religion, 
or he has to mean the ethical as it has equal rights with 
.the aesthetic within Christianity. There is no such state 
as an existential ethical state without religion. 
But, this brings us to a new problem. If the 
existential is a synthesis of the aesthetic and ethical, 
then was it not there even in the pre-leap moments? There 
is some kind of synthesis even in the child and in the first 
collision. Does not one have to say that even the child and 
even the Hegelian can be religious? Is not faith present 
in some way even in t~e aesthete just as the aesthetic is 
present in the man of faith? Here we have the problem of 
the interpenetration of the spheres. This question brings 
us to the faith structures of the leap. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE FAITH STRUCTURES OF 'l'HE LEAP 
In Fear and Trembling it is perhaps Kierkegaard's 
beautiful little portrait of "that blessed woman, the mother 
of God, the Virgin Mary," which whispers to us most fruit-
fUlly of the faith structures of the leap.1 She was highly 
favored and yet what distress, what dread, what paradox were 
hersl She was God's mother and yet it was still her privil-
ege and her agony to believe in Him. How did Mary make the 
double movement leap? What were the elements of her faith? 
How were these elements related so as to be dynamic? What 
were the negative and positive aspects of her faith? 
All along, we have been saying that the double move-
ment leap is a synthesis of the aesthetic and the ethical. 
We have seen that existence is a synthesis of the temporal 
and the eternal. But what sort of synthesis is this? Did 
not Kierkegaard above all else teach the doctrine of the 
Either/Or? Did he not argue that one had to be either 
aesthetic or ethical and that one could not be both? In 
Works of Love, for example, he writes that erotic love 
always claims an Eithe~/Or~ If Christian love should strive 
a compromise thenr 
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"Both poetic and Christian love have become confused, 
and the replacement is neither the po~tlc nor the 
. . 
Chrlstian."3 
One must pay great attention to the either/or for in 
attempting a both-and it is easy to come up with a neither-
nor. 
But, on the other hand, there must be a valid form 
of the both-and, For at the very heart of Kierkegaard's 
philosophy lies the idea that: 
"The subjective thinker is not a man of science, 
but an artist. Existing is an art. The subjective 
thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life 
aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it 
and dialectical enough to interpenetrate it with 
thought,"4 
The highest form of the existential ls precisely a combina-
tion of the temporal and the eternal or the ethical and the 
aesthetic. Thus, we have to make a distinction between two 
kinds of both-and, one which is illegitimate and one which 
is absolutely necessary for the Kierkegaardian philosophy, 
Mary, in her faith, lived out precisely such a 
synthesis of aesthetic and ethical love. For her the 
eternal and the temporal were united in her child but like 
' any oth~r human she could only see the temporal. However, 
through faith, she knew of His eternal divinity. How were 
these elements of the eternal and temporal balanced .in her 
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faith? How did she accoDJ,plish the bo,th~and. of faith, and 
avoid the both-and of Christendom? By a c~ose analysis of 
i 
the forms of despair in Sickness unto Death, we shall be 
able to understand the elements of her faith and of all 
faith. Despair is the opposite of faith. Thus, in des-
cribing despair, Kierkegaard. gives us a negative description 
of faith. By showing us what faith is not he at the same 
time shows us what it is. By an analysis of faith's 
balance in Sickness unto Death we shall see both the proper 
and the improper senses of the both-and. 
As we have seen,5 Kierkegaard defines man in 
Sickness unto Death as a relationship, related to himself 
and to God. This means that man is aesthetic (he is 
related to the other) and ethical (he is related to himself) 
and religious (he is related to God'). Any break in the 
balance of this threefold relation constitutes despair. 
If a man should relate only to the other he would be in 
aesthetic despair. If he should relate only to himself he 
would be in ethical despair. If he should relate only to 
God he would be in the despair of infinite resignation. 
Thus, there are three basic kinds of despair or three ways 
in which a man can remain outside the both-and of faith. 
By aesthetic despair, we refer to a plunge into 
' infinity, eternity, and possibility. One becomes an 
aesthete by projecting an eternal value upon a temporal 
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object. This is a kind of worldliness whereby one attri-
6 Qutes "infinite value to the indifferent.". Aesthetic 
"' dftspair is always a swallowing up of the self in the object. 
It ignores the limits of finitude and actuality. 
"Possibility then appears to the self even greater 
and greater, more and more things become possible, 
because nothing becomes actual. At last it .is as 
if everything were possible - but this is precisely 
when the abyss has swallowed up the self."7 
Thus, it is evident that in aesthetic despair, we 
have an illegitimate kind of the both-and. Both elements 
are found here. There is aesthetic infinity, eternity and 
possibility. There is ethical finitude, temporality and 
actuality. But, the both-and is accomplished by a pre-
reflective transformation of .the finite into the infinite, 
the temporal into the eternal and the actual into the 
possible. The aesthete is in despair because he does not 
recognize the ethical aspect of reality. Through yearning 
or melancholy, he makes a dishonest projection of what he 
wants upon what is. 
Kierkegaard describes two types of this aesthetic 
despair. There is that of the young girl who eternalizes 
the present moment. This is pure non-reflective despair. 
' Then there is the despair of the old man who dreams dreams 
and the young man who sees visions. The old man eternalizes 
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the past and the young man the future. Neither has a full 
~~lationship to himself as he is in the present. In the 
io.ung girl, the young man and the old man, we see the three 
stages of the immediate aesthetic. The young girl is like 
the page who has the longing of the dream. The young man 
is like Papageno whose longing is an indefinite seeking. 
The old man is like Don Giovanni whose longing is a definite 
desire. 
Just as aesthetic despair converts all into the 
eternal, infinite, and possible so ethical despair converts 
all into the temporal, finite, and actual, This despair too 
takes two forms: that of weakness and that of defiance. 
In the despair of weakness: 
"A man finds it too venturesome a thing to be 
himself, far easier and.far safer to be like the 
others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher 
in the crowd •••• The despair which not only 
occasions no embarrassment but makes one's life 
easy and comfortable is naturally not regarded as 
despair."8 
lt is precisely this despair of weakness which 
seems to compromise the both-and and receives instead a 
neither-nor. This is the despair of Christendom which 
abandons both the passion of poetic love and the passion of 
Christian love, It seeks to be purely ethical, that is, to 
be at home in the temporal without any passion for the 
~ternal. But the ethical can never stand l?Y itself. It 
m~.st be rooted either in the background of the aesthetic 
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or the background of Christianity. This despair of weakness 
is made possible by Christianity which emphasizes the 
importance of the temporal. But, this form of despair will 
not admit the passion of the aesthetic which Christianity 
also demands and thus it falls into the weakness of comfort 
and security. It wants both the aesthetic lack of dread 
and the Christian earthly emphasis. But it receives neither 
aestbetic nor Christian passion. The philosophical express-
ion for this form of despair is Hegelianism. 
The second form of ethical despair is that of 
defiance wherein one chooses to remain in infinite resigna-
tion. This can be referred ~o as ethical despair even 
though it is still improperly ethical, that is, it is set 
in the context of the aesthetic. For it is an attitude of 
self reflection and even decision. But it is a decision 
wherein one wills not to be himself. He wills not to be 
free to make decisions. However, in this ethical despair 
one does not flee into the protective crowd as did the weak 
one. He does not seek relief by becoming anonymous. 
Rather, in his introversion he stands alone in proud 
' defianee against all others and against God. As Kierkegaard 
puts it: 
•The dialectic of resignation is commonly this: 
····· .• 
to will to be one's eternal self, and the:n with . 
.t:t ... respect to something positive wherein the self 
suffers, not to will to be oneself, contenting 
oneself with the thought that after all this·w111 
disappear in eternity, thinking itself therefore 
justified in not accepting it in time, so that, 
although suffering under it, the self will not 
make to it the concession that it properly belongs 
to the self, that is, it will not humble itself 
under it in faith ... 9 
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So, this despair of defiance is also made possible by the 
Christian context. One sees his weakness; but then flees 
from it in resignation. The Greek and especially the Stoic 
could flee resignation; but he did not see the weakness to 
be his own personal possession so clearly as does this 
defiant man. He has caught a glimpse of the possibility of 
the second movement of the leap. His individual sin has 
suggested itself to him but he chooses to be ignorant of 
it. In this way, he cancels out the finite and concentrates 
only on the infinite. Thus, here too is an unbalanced both-
and. 
In so describing aesthetic and ethical despair, 
' 
Kierkegaard. shows five instants where the both-and is not 
a satisfactory synthesis. The young girl has her nose 
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pressed so closely against the windm·:r of the world tt:ia t 
she cannot even see her own reflection. She longs within 
a· .. dream world. She feels that she can have, and do, and 
be, all that she wants. All these things are within her. 
Both the finite and the infinite ar·e united for her because 
she does not see the difference. This synthesis of naivete 
has not made the distinction between past, present and 
fUture; between possibility and actuality; between the 
finite and the infinite. The synthesis of the young man 
is a little more advanced in despair. He feels some kind 
of distinction between himself and the other and therefore 
he can seek his vision. The future singles itself out for 
him as distinct from the present, but it is not yet a 
fUture with definite finite objects. He still lives in the 
pre-reflective ignorance wherein he does not yet distinguish 
the particular finite thing from his vision of the infinite. 
The old man dreams dreams about definite events of his past 
life. He not only has made the distinction between the 
dimensions of time but he has made the distinction between 
many finite things. But, still he chases after each separ-
ate, finite individual as if it were the infinite. His 
synthesis of the finite and the infinite is still one wherein 
he fails to distinguish the two. The man of weakness finally 
" reaches the level of reflection wherein he can distinguish 
himself from the other finite thing and himself from the 
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infinite. He sees himself as a finite being needing· the 
1·nfini te. But in his weakness he despairs: of ever attain-
ing this infinite; so he forgets it and becomes lost in the 
comfortable world of finite individuals. His synthesis is 
not one of the both-ancL but rather one of the neither-nor. 
Finally, we have the man who has made the first movement of 
the leap. The man of weakness represents Don Giovanni or 
the ladies' tailor at the every day level and Hegel at the 
philosophical level. The man of defiance represents a man 
.who has gone as far as Victor Erem1ta or Socrates, but then 
wh~n given the gift of faith refuses to accept it. He ls 
one who has gone as far as the movement of faith but is so 
scandalized by evil that he refuses to face it. His 
synthesis is so existential that he faces the paradox of 
the infinite as finite but he will not face it paradoxically. 
He faces it immanently and then succumbs to it in objective 
dread. He chooses to forget the finite. 
Such then, are the contradictory and the inadequate 
synthesis of the both-and. At the aesthetic level the 
either/or must reign. But, at the Christian level the 
either/or of the aesthetic is overcome in a both-and which 
permits both the aesthetic and the ethical to dwell side by 
side as distinct and ~et as harmonized. Just how does this 
second movement of the leap take place wherein one fully 
recovers the ethical while retaining the eternal? What ·is 
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the dynamic force by which one moves back to the finl te? 
'- .. -
In his painting of Mary, Kierkegaard. tells us that 
:.;. 
sh_e ,became great by saying, "behold, the handmaid of the 
Lord." Through her acceptance of God's gift she made the 
leap of faith. By this faith she entered the realm of 
distress, dread, and. paradox. "What woman was so mortified 
as Mary?"lO So it is with all men who believe. In accept-
ing the gift of faith they become mortified even to the 
point of distress, dread and paradox. It is in his book 
Purity of Heart ls to Will one Th1ng11 that Kierkegaard 
clarifies the relation between this mortification and the 
movement of faith. One reaches that perfect synthesis of 
the both-and wherein he wills only one thing through the 
mortification of repentance. By this act he accepts himself 
as an individual who has sinned. 
The voice of conscience which calls a man from double 
mindedness to purity of heart is a two-fold voice. It is 
a voice which calls to him both from behind and from in 
front. out of the past it reminds him of his guilt, that 
ls, of the divided ways upon which he has dissipated his 
energy. From the future it puts before him the ideal of 
the one way wherein he wills only the good. If one is 
silent and listens to this voice of eternity which speaks 
" 
through-the past and the future, he will repent and become 
collected in the present with purity of heart.12 
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The voice of conscience reveals all those barriers 
to willing one thing which were described in Sickness unto 
neath as the forms of d·espair. These forms of double 
mindedness, wherein the false both-and of the aesthetic 
ways reign, are revealed in their falsity. The young girl 
might dream of variety and great moments. But this is not 
to will one thing. 13 Her mind mirrors its objects and it 
becomes split and is at odds with itself when it seeks many 
objects. Only when one wills one thing, which is the good, 
.does he have purl ty of heart. 
The young man too, who seeks his vision which 
beckons to him for the future, is also double minded. 14 
For even if he wills only the good and the reward that might 
come from willing it, he has not purity of heart. Ir he but 
listens to conscience he will· see that the reward is also 
something and that in willing it he is double minded. 
Repentance should not be motivated by the desire for reward 
for that, too, is but another form of despair. True faith 
does not seek the reward of heaven which lies off in the 
future like the young man's vision. No, the true synthesis 
of both heaven and earth, of both the eternal and the 
temporal, does not see heaven as a future reward. It sees· 
heaven and earth as on~. 
-The old man might not dream of variety and he might 
not seek after future reward, but he can still be double 
minded. If he looks into the past at his sins and then 
desires the good out of fear of punishment,- he is still 
di'.ksipated in the manifold of the false both-and.1 5 Man 
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should not fear punishment; he should fear to do the wrong. 
If one concentrates both upon punishment and upori the good, 
then he does not ~nly will the good. Even if one preserves 
a certain slavish blamelessness out of fear of punishment, 
he would still be double minded. 
Even if one becomes ethical and in his self 
reflection does not dream of the manifold or seek reward 
or-~ear punishment, he can still be double minded. It is 
possible that he might live in an egocentric service of 
the good.16 He might not seek only the good but the victory 
of the good. Thus, Victor Eremita, in his impatience for 
the victory of the good, might be scandalized by the slow-
ness of time which clothes the good. This man of defiant 
despair might, like Judas, treacherously wish to hasten the 
victory of the good. He does not perfectly harmonize time 
and eternity, for in his quest for victory he is impatient 
with time. Thus, even though he appears as ethical, he 
shows in reality that he is improperly ethical. He really 
misuses the temporal in his eternal quest. 
Finally, there, is the double mindedness of weakness. 
This other ethical attitude is a barrier to willing one 
thing because it will only become committed to a certain 
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degree •17 This man does not forsake the temporal bu·t he 
.. 
dwells in the tempo~al with busynes~. In his busyness, 
he.-lets time cut him off from contemplation and the eternal 
of contemplation - this man misuses the eternal in his 
temporal quest. With his ability and indefatigable industry, 
he might become well-to-do and respected, but he is busy 
with trivialities. He does not chart out a straight and 
clear course. He might even be busy only for the good but 
his very busyness is another goal. He does not live for 
_the victory of the good but he lives for busyness in service 
of:the good. This too is not purity of heart. It is a way 
of life that is without the passion of the eternal. It is 
neither Christian nor aesthetic. 
Despair then is double mindedness and faith ls the 
purity of heart which wills one thing. This double minded-
ness is always an unbalanced joining of both the aesthetic 
and the ethical. It is such a perfect balance that they 
become one thing, not one thing through a pre-reflective 
indistinctness, but one thing even in their clear distinct-
ness. How is it that one moves along the stages of life's 
way wherein he despairs to that stage of willing one thing? 
What is the dynamic force by which one moves from the 
collision of both the aesthetic and the ethical to their 
" 
harmony· in the double movement leap? 
It was in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard 
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began to spell out the dynamics of the double movement leap. 
There he showed how dread is that psychological phenomenon 
-> 
whereby one can plunge down into himself and rise up a new 
man. Dread had very much to do with·the attractive yet 
repelling powers of eros. We have seen how sympathy is one 
of the aspects of that dynamic force whereby one moves 
toward the second movement of the leap.18 In Purity of 
Heart, Kierkegaard again briefly refers to the dynamic 
power of eros and speaks _of how it can educate one toward 
the good.1 9 But, then he goes on to write that shame will 
help_ one "better than all human sympathy which easily leads 
to double mindedness."20 What is Kierkegaard's concept of 
shame? We have seen that shame played a great role in 
Kierkegaard's development. 21 How is shame related to 
repentance and to dread? How does it bring a man from 
double mindedness and despair to purity of heart and faith? 
Kierkegaard points out that one might be more 
serious ln his task when another is watching him than when 
he is alone. This shame before another which motivates one 
to efficiency is, however, the shame of the child. There is 
a higher sense of shame wherein one is most of all ashamed 
even before himself. This is the shame which strengthens 
one to will one thing. This self-shame can be developed 
by the sense of shame which one has before a revered 
person and before a transfigured person who is dead. A man 
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cannot get around the tran~·figured one. 'Fh1s ·transfigured 
one exists only in the sacredly still silence of shame. 
In this silence one is beyond the double mindedness of 
despair. Finally, there is the shame of the elder before 
the child even as there is shame of the child before the 
elder. This shame of the elder as he admonishes the child 
toward good also admonishes the elder toward good. 22 
Thus, Kierkegaard touches upon five levels of shame 
that might motivate one through the stages _on life's way. 
The child can begin to will one thing as he has shame 
before his elders. The youth can discover his double 
mindedness even more as he has shame before his revered 
hero. The older man can have even a deeper shame before, 
perhaps, his father who has died and thereby become trans-
figured. Then he can will the good even more purely as he 
is ashamed in admonishing his child toward the good. 
Through all of these stages of shame, there develops the· 
shame before oneself. As one becomes more and more an 
individual, he becomes more capable of being ashamed before 
the all seeing eye of the eternal which is within him. As 
he becomes more balanced and harmonized, his sense of shame 
becomes deeper. He can even make the qualitative leap to 
the shame of faith when he becomes so individualized that 
' he repentantly sees himself as a sinner. 
In The Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard poi~ts out how 
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shame is a manifestation of dread. 23 And, thus, just as 
dread moves one along toward the first and .toward the 
(. 
s~~o~d movements of the leap, so shame is an aspect of this 
motivating force. Shame can even bring one to the point of 
repentance. Through shame, one comes to feel himself as a 
sinner. It is this shame of repentance that moves one from 
double mindedness to purity of heart. When one feels shame 
deeply enough to repent, then he is a man of faith. It is 
in repentance that one sees the detail of the perfectly 
balanced syn~hesis of both the aesthetic and the ethical. 
In r~pentance, these two stages are distinguished yet one. 
In repentance, man can will only one thing. But, that one 
thing is both aesthetic and ethical. 
It is in The Gospel of our Sufferings24 that 
Kierkegaard spells out the detail of this synthesis of 
repentance. When treating the problem of suffering, 
Kierkegaard shows how the greatest suffering can be for the 
man of faith at the same time the greatest joy. He describes 
( several bonds which bring about this paradoxical unity of 
suffering and joy. But, the bond which is most pertinent 
to repentance appears in chapter two. 25 Here he shows how 
the burden of suffering, even though it is very heavy, can 
at the same time be light • 
.'.l'hrough an eternal perspective which faith.provides, 
a thought can arise which transforms suffering into joy. 
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If one believes his suffering to be a good, then he 0an 
bear it joyfully. He will not see how it 1s good through 
·-
hfu:n~n understanding, but he can believe through faith that 
it is good. Thus, faith takes one beyond the temporal 
insights of reason. It takes one beyond the ethical. It 
has an aesthetic aspect. And yet, at the same time, it 
gives one joy in his suffering right now. The true 
bel1e~er does not· think that his joy will come in a future 
and distant heaven. No, upon earth and in the ethical 
moment he can be joyful because of the thought that suffer-
ing 1s a good. When one suffers, he might suffer with 
courage, with generosity, with patience. But, none of these 
indicate that he suffers as a Christian, At most they show 
that he has made the first movement of the leap, They show 
infinite resignation. But, the true Christian suffers with 
meekness and in such a way that he inherits the earth. 
Meekness alone bears lightly the heavy burdens of time 
because it firmly and humbly believes that they are good. 
This meekness, as seen by Kierkegaard, is not at all what 
Nietzsche thinks Christian meekness to be. When one is meek 
he inherits the earth. He does not live for the world 
beyond. 
"Therefore is the faith that heavy suffering is 
" for our good more perfect far than the expectation 
of a happy ending. For the happy ending may not 
come about, .but a believer believes the suffering 
is for the good, hence good cannot fail to come 
about since it already ist"26 
When one turns the other cheek in meekness, he need not 
shame the other; but rather meekness alone can make the 
wrong less. 27 For meekness can see it as a good. 
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But, what is the heaviest burden of all? It is the 
burden of guilt. As Ni.etzsche. further pointed out, this is 
the basic burden which the Christian alone bears. But, the 
Christian bears it with joy; not with resentment as 
Nietzsche thought. The true Christian does not brood in his 
sin and wallow in his impotence. He does not become a man 
of revenge and create false values. No, with the idea that 
faith provides, he· can just as easily see that sin is for-
given as he can see that he is a sinner. When one is meek, 
he can bear lightly even the burden of sin. Jesus took 
upon Himself all the sins of the world and yet he was meek 
and humble of heart. And so also Mary, in showing her faith 
through those words: "Behold the handmaid of the Lord," 
took upon her shoulders the heavy burden. She suffered the 
paradox and distress and dread. And yet because of her 
meekness, she was blessed among women. 
So it is that faith is a perfect synthesis of the 
' eternal_ and the temporal. Because one has an insight that 
is not arrived at in time and that cannot be fully under-
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stood in time, he can live in time joyfl.llly. The man of 
~aith believes his temporal life to be a g9od even in its 
~qf~ering. In such a way is he different from the man of 
religiousness A. Hence, he need not live in fear of 
punishment. He need not live for some future reward. 
These are escapes into the past and the future. If he wills 
only the one thing, which is the good, then he inherits the 
earth in the present. He has all the values of the ethical 
and temporal earth in full. If one merely has that idea, 
which cannot be arrived at through time, that suffering is 
good., then the temporal can be accepted with joy. So it 
is that one leaps back to the earth. 
And yet, this leap can be made only through the gift 
of faith. If Jesus would not have revealed the way, then 
no man would have found it. So now it is time that we turn 
to the incarnational structures of the leap and see how it 
was that God Himself made the leap that man might make it. 
' 
'- ~ -· C:'1AP1'ER VIII 
THE.IlJCARNATIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE LEAP 
It is in the painting of the Duke of Glo~cester1 
that we are best introduced to what we might call the 
incarnatlonal structures of the leap. Here Kierkegaard 
puts before us Shakespeare's portrait of the wretched 
noble, Richard III. Feel the pathos of that mans 
"I. that am rudely stamped, and want love's majesty 
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph; 
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion, 
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature, 
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time 
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up, 
And that so lamely and unfashionable 2 That dogs bark at me as I halt by them," 
And what is the ground of all this suffering? It is the 
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human body. Richard III becomes a demon because he cannot 
bear the pity he had been subjected to since childhood. 
For many the body is a source of offence. But, Jesus Christ 
had just such a body, However, He did not bear the suffer-
ings of His body so as to become a demon. No, instead, 
through His body, He made the second movement of the leap. 
How.did Jesus make the leap? How does His leap make 
possible the leap of ~11 who believe? It was through His 
incarnation that God gave man the gift of faith. How does 
the double movement leap have its very source in the 
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incarnation of Jesus? 
... 
J:C1erkega.ard • s primary medi ta ti on upon the incarna-
t_i-onal structures of the leap is in his book TraininP.; in 
3 Christianity. Here he spells out the meaning of the 
incarnation in such a way that we can see it as the primary 
instance of the double movement leap. Here he shows in 
precisely what way the incarnation was a suffering that 
nevertheless was borne with joy. Here Kierkegaard enables 
us to see how the incarnation is the efficacious example 
that makes the leap of faith possible for all Christians. 
Of course, Jesus did not make the double movement 
leap in just the way that mere humans do. He did not begin 
in the collision of the aesthetic and the ethical and move 
from there to infinite resignation through the first move-
ment of the leap. No, as God. He be.gan in the infinite. 
He did not have to leap into that. But, He did make the 
second movement of the leap while at the same time preserv-
ing His infinity and eternity. He did come to the temporal 
earth even though it was not by way of return. Thus, 
through His incarnation, He became a perfect synthesis of 
the eternal and the temporal; of the infinite and the 
finite. Hence, in Him we see the perfect model of that 
balanced both-and which men strive for in faith. The 
' incarnation is the first and most perfect instance of the 
double movement leap. 
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Kterke~aard begins to show how the paradoxical 
nature of Jesus is manifest by an examination of qis words: 
".Come hither, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I 
will give you rest." It seems that such a consoling 
invitation would attract many. But that is not the case. 
Instead, most people look at the one offering the invita-
tion and flee. He offers such a lofty gift but He appears 
to be such a lowly man. That is the paradox. He speaks as 
if He were God and yet He is a man. Even His miracles and 
His resurrection and His ascension do not take the beholder 
beyond the paradox. His miracles are not a proof that He is 
divine. Rather they are signs by whi.ch He attracts atten-
tion to Himself just as He does by His words. It is easy 
to explain away the miracles. Many did it and do it. As 
the paradox He can only be known by_faith. His body and 
His words and His actions are temporal, And yet, He is 
also divine. But He is divine only for those who believe, 
So, Jesus Christ is the God-man and one can know 
Him only through faith. And what is faith? It is the 
double movement leap. Thus, Jesus, as the paradox, can only 
be known through the paradox. A~ we have seen, Christianity 
is a paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical. So what 
kind of God must this Jesus be to whom one relates in the 
" double movement leap? What are the implications of 
Kierkegaard• s theory concerning the nature of God? 
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It is evident that the God of Christianity, for 
Kierkegaard, is not merely the Divine of the Greeks or 
the God of the Hebrews, Kierkegaard would agree that Jesus 
.. 
Christ was a folly to the Greeks and a scandal to the Jews. 
The Greeks did not conceive of a monotheistic God separate 
from men and nature, The Hebrews did not conceive of God 
as a human person. The Greeks came to know of the divine 
in a natural way through their mystic experience, The 
Hebrews came to know of. their God as He revealed Himself 
in their hlstory, The God of the Greeks was an aesthetic 
God whom one experienced immediately, If there were 
ethical manifestations of the divine for the Greeks, it was 
always in an improper sense. The God of the Hebrews was an 
ethical God whom one knew in the reflection of covenant 
faith, But, what is the God of the Christians? He is a 
synthesis of the God of the Greeks and. of the God of the 
Hebrews. ·Therefore, one must know Him in the double move-
ment leap, Through the first movement of the leap one 
comes to know the aesthetic and Greek aspect of God, 
Through the second movement of the leap one comes to know 
the ethical and Hebrew aspect of God, Jesus Christ as God 
could be understood neither by the Greeks nor by the Jews. 
He was different from both of their Gods. He was different 
If because He was a synthesis of both the pantheistic and the 
monotheistic God, That is the fundamental paradox of the 
Christian God. 
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Such must be the im'!)lications of ~{1srkeo;aard' s 
thought even though he never spells it out-so clearly. 
'I'ne-first movement of the leap is always absolutely necessary 
if one ls to be a Christian. This means that one must first 
discover the divine majesty even as the saints of natural 
religion found it. Religiousness A is necessary before 
religiousness B becomes possible. If one is not ·first a 
pantheistic mystic according to Kierkegaard, he can never 
become a Christian. But, of course, that is not sufficient 
.for Christianity. He must then go on and make the second 
movement of the leap and discover the divine as the personal 
God of history. 
Because this God of Christianity is the paradox, 
one can know Him only through the paradox of faith. But, 
that very faith is a gift that the paradoxical God gave to 
man in "Sis incarnation. By making the leap to the earth, 
Jesus makes it possible for man to leap after Him and in 
their leaping to believe in Him. How is it that Jesus gives 
the gift of faith through His incarnation? 
Just as the Duke of Gloucester suffered because of 
his body, so Jesus suffered because of His. In His body He 
bore the burden of all mankind's sin. In taking upon Himself 
this guilt and dying because of it, He suffered. He was 
' 
mocked -and scourged and spat upon. He too was an outcast 
among men. But, the greatest suffering of Jesus came from 
the paradox of Divine Body. Just as the Duke of Gloucester 
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suffered because of friction between his desires and .the 
l.lmitations of his body, so Jesus suffered_because He was 
a-'.-scandal to men. He wanted all, literally all, to come 
- ·,. 
to Him and be refre~hed but when they saw Him in His human 
body they were offended by His divine invitation. It was 
through his incarnation and the suffering implied by it 
that Jesus gave to man the gift of faith. We are enabled 
to make the leap of faith because of his example. But, 
how do we come into contact with His example in such a way 
that it can be efficacious for us in making the double 
movement leap? 
Kierkegaard's answer to this question is hinted at 
in his words: 
"The relationship to Christ is not: either to doubt 
or to believe; but either to be offended or to 
believe. ,,4 -
Being offended or scandalized is the opposite of faith and 
yet faith is not possible for a person unless he overcomes 
the possibility of being offended. In order to see how 
Jesus gives the gift of faith through that incarnation 
according to Kierkegaard it is necessary to examine his 
concept of scandal. 
According to Kierkegaard, Jesus is capable of 
scandalizing others in three ways. The first of these ways 
is the accidental scandal that arises from his collision 
with the established order. He refers· to the other two 
ways as the essential scandal of loftiness and lowliness 
152 
which arise from the collision of His 1.ncarna.tion. 
~ccidental scandal is possible when the subjective individ-
Va.,1 _collides with the objective universal order. 
Kierkegaard shows how others besides Jesus, Socrates for 
example, are capable of offending i.n this way.5 . Socrates 
offended the Athenian establishment and Jesus offended the 
Pharisees. In each case it was the simply human kind of 
offense that any rebel can provoke. However, the essential 
scandal of Jesus was not possible for Socrates. Because He 
claimed to be the God-man Jesus could offend people in two 
unique ways. He could offend people by the loftiness of 
.... 
His claim that He was God. 6 People would look at Him and 
think: "an individual like us pretends to be God." 
However, if they did believe in Him as God and then saw Him 
acting as a mere man they could be offended by His lowli-
ness. 7 Thus it is that when Kierkegaard. thinks of. the 
incarnation he is first struck by the scandal of Jesus. 
"He would save all, but literally a118-and all were offended in Him, literally all." 
However, it is possible to look at Jesus and not 
even notice that He could be offensive. But, Kierkegaard 
thinks that this is to construe Him in a fantastic sense. 
If one would see Jesus as He is, the God-man would always 
appear as a possible ~tumbling stone. In opposition to 
seeing Christ in a fantastic sense Kierkegaard describes 
what he means by having a contemporary sense of Christ.9 
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The one who is contemporary with Christ is always capable 
of being scandalized in the strict essential sense. The 
meaning of this contemporaneity will be examined in the 
next chapter on the temporal structures of that leap. The 
way in which the christian witness can bring another to a 
sense of contemporaneity will be referred to in the last 
chapter on the style structures of the leap. 
When one beholds Jesus contemporaneously he sees 
Him as offensive. This is the decisive moment. The man 
.will either be offended by Jesus or he will believe in Jesus. 
If_,_he believes he will imitate Jesus in the suffering of 
His incarnation. A~ Kierkegaard writes: 
"Christ's life here upon earth is the paradigm; it 
is in likeness to it that I along with every 
Christian must strive to construct my life."10 
It is by imitating Jesus in His suffering that a man makes 
the double movement leap. The suffering of Jesus is the 
source of the gift of faith whereby a man makes the leap. 
This can be understood when we see that the primary suffer-
ing of Jesus is rooted in His incarnation. Christ suffered 
because by His incarnation He was a sign of contradiction. 
He was to be the saviour of the world and yet, men were 
scandalized and therefore condemned Him. Kierkegaard writes 
of christian suffering that: 
" 
"It ·is a whole muttcal tone deeper than common 
human suffering." 
Christian suffering is as different from common suffering 
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as the essential scandal ls from the ac:cidental. This 
sµffering is rooted in the paradox whereby-the eternal and 
the-temporal are one. When a man beholds Jesus, the 
temporal embodiment of the eternal, and believes, it means 
that he too suffers the christian paradox, he sacrifices 
his understanding for madness. The madness of Jesus first 
reveals to man the possibility of such a madness. And 
then that madness is so efficacious that it even makes it 
possible for the willing man to imitate it. 
We know that according to Kierkegaard the leap of 
faith is a gift and yet man makes it freely. Man receives 
the gift through the incarnation. There Jesus shows him 
the possibility of the double movement leap. But there 
must be more to the gift than the showing of the possibility. 
What that other characteristi-c of the gift is, and how it is 
rooted in the incarnation, is part of our problem. The other 
part is to reconcile such a gift with man's effort and free-
dom. So far we know that man makes the first movement of 
the leap by his own efforts. Here we see his freedom at 
work. But, how is this first free movement of the leap 
related to the incarnation? 
Kierkegaard explains this by saying that: 
"The decisive mark of christian suffering is the 
fact that it is voluntary and that it is the 
possibility of offence for the sufferer. We 
read of the apostles that they forsook all to 
follow Christ. So it was voluntary. 1112 
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'J:his forsaking all refers to the asQeticism which makes the 
first movement of the leap possible. With his own efforts 
one enters the stage of infinite resi~nation. By doing 
this he freely imitates Jesus. In this movement of the leap 
he imitates Jesus in His infinity and eternity. By ascet-
icism he unites himself with the God of the incarnate Jesus • 
. 
But, now he is not united with the man of the incarnate God. 
For this movement back to the earth grace is necessary. 
So far we have seen one aspect of man's freedom. 
He freely makes the first movement of the leap by imitating 
Jesus and any other Holy man who has made that movement. 
But, now we must see another aspect of his freedom. For, 
in this state of infinite resignation he can receive the 
grace to return to the earth and reject it. He is free to 
make the second movement of the.leap or not. He can see 
Jesus becoming incarnate and. be offended or he can see 1 t 
and believe. In this moment of belief, in this second 
movement of. the leap, there is a special grace and there is 
a special freedom. What are they and how are they related 
to the incarnation? 
That special grace is not only the example of Jesus 
in the incarnation whereby he shows us the possibility of 
makin~ the second movement of the leap. That grace must 
" also include some power that helps_ us to actualize that 
possibility. That power i~ derived from the i_ncarnation. 
What is it? 
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Kierkegaard clarifies the e.fficacious power of that 
grace by relat1n?; it to humility and indirect commu.nication. 
'.Cne-incarnation is an act of humility. Jesus actualized the 
possibility of the double movement leap. 
"That reality is even more terrible than possibility ••• 
It is a strange sort of dialectic: That He who 
almightily ••• binds Himself, and does it so almightily 
that He actually feels Himself bound ... 13 
Jesus even had to die. Such was His humility. But at the 
same time this mystery of the bound God indirectly communi-
cates something to man. It communicates to man whatever 
man freely chooses to see in it. Because God presented 
Himself as a riddle man is free to believe. The incarnation 
is an invitation to man beckoning him to make the double 
movement leap. The invitational power of its riddle is the 
v , 
efficacious aspect of the grace that comes from the 
·incarnation. 
Because this grace is invitational, it not only 
allows the individual to be free in his second movement 
of the leap, it even calls forth that freedom. Man becomes 
free as an individual the moment he responds to the invita-
t1on. 
Thus it is that the incarnation is the first instance 
of the double movement leap and it is the source of grace 
' that makes that leap possible for all indii.riduals. Jesus 
felt the limitations of His body as did the Duke of 
Gloucester. So does every christian who follows Him. But 
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these linitations are accepted in faith for that ~s the 
very meaning of the return to earth in the second movement 
of the leap. One even finds joy in the earth and in his 
body. He feels the contradiction as did the Duke. But 
instead of being scandalized by it he experiences the 
resurrection of the body, He dies to his body in the first 
movement but then recovers it as glorified but still temporal 
in the second movement. 
' 
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CHAPTER IX 
{ -·- .. 
THE T~!PORAL STRUC1.1UH3:S OF THE LEAP 
The painting which might most adequately plunge us 
into a fruitful meditation upon the temporal structures of 
the leap is that of the four fathers who are killing their 
ohildren.1 In this painting, Kierkegaard seeks to clarify 
the special nature of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. In 
.order to do this, he contrasts the Abraham-Isaac case with 
the cases of Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Jephtha and his 
daughter, and Brutus and his son. Kierkegaard wants to 
show that by his act Abraham suspended the ethical, but by 
their acts the other fathers acted in accordance with 
ethical demands. Thus, the other three would be understood 
and praised by others, whereas Abraham could not be under-
stood and, hence, could only be blamed. The other three 
are tragic heroes. But Abraham is something else. 
The special value of this painting for our consider-
ation of time lies in its complexity. Here we see in 
contrast a Greek, a Hebrew, a Roman and then Kierkegaard's 
peculiar Hebrew model whom he uses as a paradigm case of 
Christian faith, Abrah~. It is valuable to take the most 
complex -of Kierkegaard• s paintin&; when considering time for 
it is primarily in terms of time that Kierkegaard makes all 
of his key distinctlcns. Kant and Hegel had prolonged 
meditations upon time. In our day, Heidegger, Husserl, 
Bergson, and Sartre, not to mention almost all other 
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serious philosophers, have continued to grapple with time 
just as did Aristotle and Augustine. In short, time is 
one of the central philosophical issues and I would not be 
surprised· if, of all philosophers, Kierkegaard has not 
dealt with this issue most constantly, most comprehensively, 
and most deeply. What is his notion of time insofar as it 
.has a bearing upon the structures of the leap? 
.- In order to answer this question \<1e shall consider 
four of Kierkegaard's ideas: the relation of the temporal 
dimensions to the eternal, repetition, the moment, and 
contemporaneity. ThiR will give us an opportunity, first 
of all, to see how Kierkegaard distinguishes all of the 
various stages in terms of time. Then, once these distinct-
ions are clarified, we shall be able to consider the temporal 
flow or dynamics of the leap. In other words, we shall 
examine the elements of the leap and the dynamics of the 
leap in terms of time. We shall consider Kierkegaard's 
notion of time in its dimensions, duration, and succession 
and thereby discover the ground in terms of which he makes 
his basic distinctions,. 
- The primary distinction which Kierkegaard makes 
throughout all of his authorship ls that between the Greek 
world view, the world view of Christendom, and the world 
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view of Christianity •. Thus, he is continually contr.asting 
the recollection theory of' Socrates, the mediation theory 
,. 
Qf Hegel, and his own theory of repetition~ But, in this 
-i.- -~ -. ,, 
painting of' the four fathers and their children, Kierkegaard 
even hints at two other world views, namely, the Roman and 
the Jewish. Let us begin to unravel the complexities of 
his theory of time by considering how he makes these 
distinctions. 
It is in The Concept of Dread that Kierkegaard con-
cerns himself the most with the distinction and relation 
between these world views. Here he firmly dlst1ngu1shes 
fotir world views: paganism, Judaism, Christianity, and 
paganism within Christianity. The Greeks, the Romans, and, 
as he mentions, the Oriental theories of fate 2 all belong 
to paganism. Perhaps we can best get into the temporal 
distinctions between these world views by considering a 
statement Kierkegaard. makes about paganism within 
Christianity. He writes: 
"The life of Christian paganism is neither guilty 
nor not guilty. Strictly speaking, it makes no 
distinction between present, past, future, eternal, 
Its life and history go on like the writing in 
those old days when people used no marks of punctua-
" tion but crabbedly traced on the paper one word, 
one sentence, after another."3 
In this synthesis of the both-and which turns out to· be a 
neither-nor, one loses both the significance of the temp-
oral dimensions and the eternal duration. All he has is 
a meaningless succession which Kierkegaard. calls spirit-
lessness, From this it is evident that the nature of a 
people is ·related to their view of time. 
Paganism proper, that is., all the world views which 
are not influenced by the Semitic world view, as Kierkegaard. 
so often and in so many ways shows, is an eternalism. The 
·dimensions of time have no ultimate importance of their own. 
They are only manifestations of the eternal. From this it 
follows that there are, in reality, no individuals. They, 
too, are only instances of the world soul. History in such 
a context does not emphasize the creative genius of 
.individuals but demonstrates· rather the great pattern of 
the rise and fall of the eternal circle. Ethics, as 
Kierkegaard argues, is, in such a context, an improper 
ethics, Strictly speaking, there is no sin or individual 
guilt because there is no individual freedom, There is 
only an aesthetic criterion by which one can judge human 
action. Hence, between Agamemnon and Brutus there is no 
essential difference. They both kill their children within 
the context of eternalism. Both of them are aesthetes and 
are beyond the pale of guilt. Kierkegaard. says that they 
are both ethical by which he means that their actions are 
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reasonable and do not conflict with the universal order. 
Their actions have a telos that fits in with the aesthetic 
<. 
~riteria of their world view. They are ethical but in an 
imp_roper sense as Kierkegaard would argue in The Concept 
4 
of Dread, If one wants to make a distinction.between 
Aisamemnon and Brutus, he might do it in terms of the past 
and the future. A~ame~non killed Iphigenia beca~se of a 
future hope. If he would kill her, then favourable winds 
would come and he could sail against the enemy. Brutus 
killed his son because his son had broken the law and 
Bru~us w~s an execut-Or of the law. Thus, with the vision 
of youth, Agamemnon looked to the future and with the 
apollonian dream of old age, Brutus looked to the past. 
Even though these men both operated within the context of 
aesthetic eternalism, they were still improperly ethical 
and thus had some relation to the dimensions of time. 
Judaism is the complete opposite of pagan eternalism. 
It is a pure temporalism. Hence, while Hellenism uses the 
lighter expressions of: fate, luck, misfortune; Judaism 
always refers to guilt. Judaism has the monotheistic God 
of Proviuence but not the pantheistic gods of fate. For 
Judaism, God, man, and nature are distinct. Nature and man 
are completely temporal. Classical Judaism has no thought 
' of an ~fter life. It lives only for the earth. Immortal-
ity has no individual reference in the context of Judaism. 
It means, rather, that the race will last forever and even 
that the promise will be fulfilled. Escha~ology has a 
·-
~cial reference but not an individual reference in Judaism. 
As long as Israel, as the race, through her king, is loyal 
to the covenant, God is pleased. But, if the race should 
forsake the covenant, and the covenant was always a racial 
phenomenon, then God would be angry. If the people 
remembered what God had done for them in the past and if 
they remembered what He would do for them in the future, 
that is, fulfill the promise, then they would please God 
in ~he present. The present was meaningful in their context 
when weighted with the temporal past and future. For the 
Jews, the present could have meaning without the eternal 
of the pagans. The present would lose meaning only when 
separated from its historical context of the covenant. 
Thus, Jephtha would kill his daughter within an ethical 
context. He would kill her in the context of the covenant 
because God demanded her in sacrifice that the race might 
live. Through her death, the fulfillment of the promise 
could be promoted. 
Christianity is a synthesis of both paganism and 
Judaism. It paradoxically combines both an eternalism and 
a temporalism. The present moment has meaning for the 
' Christian because of both an eternal and an historical 
context. He does not make one subservient to the other. 
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Unlike the Greek he protects the absolute significance of. 
~he temporal moment. He does not sacrifice it to fate and 
n·ecessity. Unlike the Jew, he thinks that the promise has 
to do with eternal salvation or damnation for the individ-
ual person. Thus, the emphasis is placed upon individual 
freedom and guilt for the Christian. As we have seen, 6 
his very God concept is the ground of this eternal-temporal 
paradox. Jesus Christ is for him the Son of the monotheis-
tic God. But, He is also the mystical vine in whom each 
individual branch is united. He is the head of the mysti-
cal Body wherein all members are united even with the 
Father. In Christianity, there is a paradoxical balance 
of both community and individuality. This equal respect 
for both the aesthetic and the ethical never became explicit 
in Greek fatalism or in Jewish racism. 
Thus, there are four major world views distinguished 
by their temporal structures. Hellenism is an eternal1sm. 
Eternal duration is so emphasized that the temporal aimen-
sions are seen as but aspects of it and, hence, history and 
temporal succession are not so important because they are 
but fleeting moments. Judaism is a temporalism. There is 
no eternal duration but, rather, the present dimension 
receives meaning when it is weighted with mindfulness of 
the di~ensions of the past and future. Thus, historical 
succession is the very key of meaning. '!1he race must always 
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in its covenant ceremonies and relig~aus r~tual recall its 
unique past and future, that it might prosper in time. 
Christianity seeks to give the present meaning both by a 
remembrance of the temporal dimensions and by a truly 
eternal quest. Thus, in ideal it is conscious of temporal 
succession and eternal duration in such a way that it does 
not reduce one to the other. In the double movement leap, 
it seeks to combine both in the dimension of the present. 
Christendom, on the other hand, lives in a meaning-
. less present. It does not weight i~ present with the fated 
meaning of eternity as did the Greek. It does not have the 
racial solidarity of the old covenant that constantly 
recalls the past and seeks the promise. It is unwilling to 
risk weighting its present with an individual eternity that 
is won in the temporal moment. · Thus: 
"If now one will compare this view (call it Christian 
or what you will) with the Greek view, I believe that 
more has been won than has been lost. True, there 
has indeed been lost something of that melancholy 
erotic Heiterkeit, but there has also been gained a 
spiritual quality unknown to Hellenism. The only 
men who truly lose are the many who go on living 
continually as i~ it were 6,ooo years ago sin came 
into the world, as if it were a curiosity which did 
not concern them. For they do not win the Greek 
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Hei terkei t, which is precisely a thin?;. which. cannot 
be won, but only lose it, nor do they.win the eternal 
meed of sp1r1t."7 
Of course, these same temporal distinctions apply 
not only to the great cultural phenomenons of Greece, Rome, 
Israel, modern Eurcpe and the individual Christian. They 
apply also to all the stages on life's way and to the 
pseudonyms wbo represent them. Thus, longing as dream, 
seeking, and desire are all moments of aesthetic eternal1sm. 
They are distinct only in an improper ethical and temporal 
sense, insofar as the young girl might represent the bar-
barian fascination with the present. The seeking youth or 
Greek longs for his vision in the future. The Roman has 
the attitude of the conservative law maker always looking 
to the lesson of the past. Kierkegaard does not develop 
with any sustained effort or pseudonym the position of 
Judaism. But, he does portray the position of ethical 
weakness or Christendom in the persons of the ladies' 
tailor and the seducers. Finally, there is the pagan 
saint, Victor Eremita, who has gone beyond the contradictions 
of the immediate aesthetic to t.he pure eternalism of infinite 
resignation. Thus, we see that Kierkegaard makes his 
important distinctions by means of the temporal dimensions, 
" 
succession and duration. But what does he mean by past, 
present, future , history, and eternity? 
l~ 7 
Kierkegaard is continually making obser:ations about 
time throughout all of his writing. But perhaps some of 
n1s·most sustained meditation upon the dimensions of time 
and their relation to duration appears in the E~ifying 
Discourses, of his aesthetic period. 8 In his discourse 
entitled The Exnectation of Faith, he writes about the man 
of expectation. This man is preoccupied with the future. 
But perhaps it is not good to be preoccupied with the 
future. Perhaps by so doing, one does not fully live in 
·the present. But, if one were only occupied with·the present 
and had no concern for the past or future, he would live 
like the animals. So in what sense should one be concerned 
for the future and in what sense should he not be concerned?9 
Kierkegaard•s answer is that one must first conquer the 
.future and then he can become sound and strong in the 
present. 
But, what does he mean by the future and by fighting 
with the future? By the future he means oneself and all the 
possibilities that one can see. For this reason the future 
is the one enemy that a man cannot conquer by himself. 
For the future is himself in his imagination and one is 
always stronger than himself. He can always see difficult-
ies that leave him deftenseless. But, it is through this 
fight with the future that one comes to know himself. 
Without this struggle one ls left ignorant of his own 
possibilities and creative energies and weaknesses. ·But, 
the future is not so entirely dangerous for it is not so 
entirely new. We have had some experience of it. It is 
made up out of the past. But, how do we go to battle with 
the infinite possibilities of the future even though they 
are formed only from the elements of the past?10 
Kierkegaard writes that the sailor in a storm does 
not struggle by looking at the countless crashing waves. 
Instead, he looks up at a fixed star and so charters his 
·course through changing multiplicity. Thus, does a man 
:fi.ght w1 th the future. He lets the eternal be his guide. 
For the eternal is the ground of the future. Then he 
conquers the future through faith. For faith is the eternal 
power in man.1.1 Kierkegaard makes this idea concrete only 
in his later discourses where he treats faith in detail. 
Thus, in The Gospel of Our Sufferings12 we see how the 
battle is won. One can look to the future and see countless 
possible sufferings. He can become swallowed up in dread 
and fall into despair. But, if he has faith he can see 
that every suffering is a good and, thus, he can live in 
the present with joy. So does he conquer the future and 
return strong to the present. 
Thus, we see ,rthat the temporal dimensions are 
structures of the self. The future is the self in one's 
possibilities and the past is the self in one's experience. 
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one• s possi bill ties depend upon expert ~n.c~ bu,t °'ecome 
infinite through the imagination. This 1nf1nity indicates 
ttie eternal which ls the ground of the future. The eternal 
is, thus, the ground of the self and. yet it is at the same 
time the fixed star that is beyond ·the self. When relying 
on it, one can overcome the future self and be strong in 
the present. Such are the temporal structures of the leap. 
One collects himself or the temporal dimensions by concen-
trating upon the eternal which he finds in his struggle 
with possibility. This is the first movement of the leap. 
But then he returns strong to the present. This is the 
second movement. 
In his edifying discourse entitled Man's Need of God 
Constitutes His Highest Perfection, 13 Kierkegaard clarifies 
these relations between the dimensions of time and the 
eternal duration even more. Here is described the struggle 
and the reconciliation of what he calls the first self and 
the deeper self. The first self has its eye on the changing 
manifold of earth and 1t desires one changing thing after 
another. The deeper self has its eye on eternal stability 
and it points out to the first self the unsatisfactory pre-
cariousness of earth. And so they go to battle. The first 
self can win only by forgetting the deeper self and plunging 
" into the din of change. For the deeper self is surely right 
and no sophism can overcome it. 14 The deeper self is surely 
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right for lt ca.n even point to new possib111t1es. r't will 
not forget experience, as the first self must, if it is to 
live securely in the earth. AF soon as the first self is 
about to choose a finite and temporal reality in order to 
satisfy itself, the deeper self points out that chances are 
this will never wholly satisfy. Thus, the first self, if it 
is honest, is brought to a standstill. If the first self 
will not abandon its passion for satisfaction nor become 
forgetful of past experience as it lusts after some future 
.temporality, then it must submit. 15 
If the first self submits, then the two selves can 
become reconciled. The deeper self will say that now the 
first self can have what it wants. But, before this happens, 
the first self must reach the point wherein it no longer 
infinitely wants the finite. - Thus, the leap of infinite 
resignation is made. This is the first condition necessary 
for self knowledge.16 But, in order that a man might fully 
know himself "greater dangers must be met and new co11flicts 
must be won ... l7 It is in this new collision after the first 
movement of the leap that one comes to see his helplessness 
and need of God. So it is that he comes to the second move-
ment of the leap. But, here Kierkegaard goes no further 
for it is only in the cPUrely religious writings that he 
develops this movement of the leap. 
In the book Sickness Unto Death, we saw that man was 
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a relationship, related to himself and to God. 1'hat is, 
1n his ideal form he is aesthetic, ethical· and religious 
all at once. Faith or the double movement leap is this 
perfectly balanced synthesis. Now we have seen this balance 
even more concretely in terms of time. The relations which 
a man is are temporal relations. The ideal man lives in 
the present after he has conquered the future. The future 
is constructed out of the past and is grounded in the 
eternal. Thus, man can be a synthesis of the temporal 
·dimensions and eternal duration. It is in terms of these 
possible temporal combinations that Kierkegaard makes his 
distinctions between the various aesthetic stages ·and the 
ethical and the religious. But now we must ask how 
succession fits into this. We have clarified Kierkegaard's 
.thoughts on the meaning of the dimensions and their relation 
to duration but we have not paid attention to the flow of 
time. This brings us to Kierkegaard's thought on repetition, 
the moment, and contemporaneity. 
Repetition is the term by which Kierkegaard expresses 
movement in the realm of spirit, At its highest level and 
at the only level where it is fully possible, repetition 
is individual freedom. As a result "repetition is the 
interest of metaphysics, and at the same time the interest 
upon which metaphysics founders, 111 9 The metaphysics which 
does not assume freedom founders upon freedom for it cannot 
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deduce the existence of freedom. Freedom ls a me-vem·e.nt 
of passion and, thus, if metaphysics seeks- to be dis-
interested and objective, it must be deprived of the very 
matter which it seeks to analyze. Kierkegaard thinks that 
repetition will become the key concept of modern philosophy. 
He thinks that up to his time, Leibnitz was the only philo-
sopher who had glimpsed its meaning. This insight he 
manifests in his idea that in the monad "the present is 
pregnant with the future. 112° Kierkegaard thinks that 
·repetition is for his philosophy what recollection was for 
Plato and mediation was for Hegel. Repetition refers to 
the temporal structures of freedom and since the metaphysics 
of his day could not approach such passionate matters, 
Kierkegaard sought to clarify them psychologically. 
Repetition is not possible at the mere aesthetic 
level. Kierkegaard shows this by Constantine's trip to 
Berlin. The aesthete went there to see if he could repeat 
some of the earlier experiences of his previous trip. But 
he found that he could not. The full repetition of external 
affairs is impossible. One is not free to have all that he 
will of temporal things. He does not have complete control 
over them. So Constantine retired to his home with its 
"monotonous and uniform order. 1121 He found that with firm-
ness of purpose one could anesthetize oneself and attain 
uniformity. But, this ethical attempt at repetition also 
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falls, for monotonous uniformity is not freedom. This 
repetition of shrewdness is a mere forgetfulness of one's 
pa:·ssion. By such observations Constantine became convinced 
that there is no repetition. But then, through the 
experiences of the young man, he is brought to a change 
of mind. 
The young man falls in love and he experiences the 
first movement of the leap. Through erotic inspiration, 
he becomes a poet. The power of the muse gives him a new 
creative freedom. The first movement of the leap gives him 
the freedom that the Greek attained in recollection. And 
yet, this is not an individual freedom. It is a power that 
takes hold of the poet and looses his lips. The poet 
becomes one with being and with the divine and in his unity 
receives the creative energy ·of the world source. There is 
the freed.om of pantheism and the young man first attained 
this. 
But, in his infinite resignation, the young man 
became melancholy and sympathetic. Because he would not 
marry the girl, existence mocked him and he began to feel 
guilty. Thus, he approaches the second movement of the leap 
and repetition. 
"The problem whicl'\ baffles him is neither more nor 
less· than repetition. He is quite justified in 
not seeking light upon this problem either from 
., 
~ -~ ·- -
modern philosophy or from the Greek; for the GJ".eeks 
perform the opposite movement, and in_ this case a 
Greek would prefer to recollect, unless his con-
science were to frighten him, and modern philosophy 
makes no movement generally it only makes a. fuss, 
and what movement it makes is always within 
immanence, whereas repetition is always a trans-
22 
cendence." 
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The young man makes this move from immanence to transcend-
ence with the help of Job. With Job he discovers the 
transcendent God and his own individuality. He discovers 
the transcendent freedom that is possible within this con-
text which enables him alone to bring something new into 
existence. 
The, young man discovers three moments in Job's 
transition·to s~lf knowledge. At the beginning of his 
trial, Job rested in the bliss of infinite resignation. 
I 
He could utter these patient words: "The Lord gave, the 
Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of· the Lord. 1123 
But then, as the trial proceeded, guilt was pressed upon 
Job. However, he rebelled against this notion and against 
God's seemingly unjust ways. He cried out: "O' that a man 
might go to law with God, like a son of man with his 
24 ' fellow." Finally, the third great moment, that of the 
thunderstonn, arrived. Job repented and: 
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"The Lord and Job under~tand one a?:other, they are 
reconc11ed,,,Job is blessed and has received every-
thing double, This is what is called a repetition," 25 
So 1t is with the young man. He maltes the first 
movement and attains the bliss of erotic inspiration. In 
his love he overflows with poetic rhapsody, But then comes 
his period of lament, Finally, when he repents, he receives 
a new and individual freedom. He discovers the God who is 
transcendent. He has rebelled against this transcendent 
-God and he repents this rebellion. Thus, within the context 
of.monotheism a new source of creative freedom is found, 
It comes not from the muse which is a sign of one's union 
with the divine. This new freedom comes from within one's 
self as an individual. Of course, the insight that one has 
this freedom must be received as a gift in the thunderstorm. 
But it is this very gift whereby one comes to repent that 
enables one to be free. Thus, in the double movement leap 
one has two creative sources of freedom, The aesthetic 
freedom has its roots in the context of pantheism and the 
immanent God, The ethical freedom is rooted in monotheism 
and the transcendent God, Repetition is the paradoxical 
double movement whereby one, through the absurd, has these 
contradictory freedom~ together. Thus, through repetition 
all things are renewed or doubled, The aesthetic and the 
ethical are not only in collision and thus only half 
satisfying. They are reconciled and thus wholly satisfying 
or doubled. 
But notice, Kierkegaard calls this moment of the 
thunderstorm a repetition. That ls, it has the nature of 
a dynamic continuation. It keeps repeating. It is not 
merely a moment that takes place and then lasts with an 
eternal duration. No, repetition signifies not only eternal 
duration but also temporal succession. It is both aesthetic 
and ethical. In repetition the present is pregnant with 
the future. One knows through faith that he can continue 
to have the freedom of inspiration's muse if he only wills 
it. Yes, the child of the future ls a child of the will. 
One does not simply see in the moment of the thunderstorm 
that suffering is a good and thereby rejoice without effort 
.forever in this suffering. No, one must will at every 
moment to remain in this insight. One must continually 
exercise his new found individual freedom or he will lose 
it at once. Sin is precisely the forfeiting of this freedom 
and one is always free to sin, yes, even tempted by dread's 
heavy burden to sin. So, repetition or freedom in both its 
aspects at once is possible because of the double movement 
leap. But the leap ls always a leaping. Faith comes in 
the moment or the instant of the thunderstorm but: 
-
"The martyrdom of faith (crucifixion of the under-
standing} is not martyrdom of the instant but 
precisely the martyrdom of endurance."26 
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So, in order to more fully understand this tempora,l . 
succession of the enduring instant, wherein the temporal 
dtmensions and eternal duration interplay with one another, 
~ -~ ._ .. 
we must now take another look at Kierkegaard's concept of 
the moment. 
Kierkegaard analyzes the s·tructures of the histori-
cal moment in the Interlude of his Philosophical Fragments. 27 
There he asks himself about the nature of coming into exist-
ence. How must an event be if it is truly to come to exist 
out of nothing? That is, how can the new leap on to the 
scene as a result of creative freedom? Only such an event 
is the historical event. If succession is to be truly 
different from duration, then· there must be something new, 
not just an alteration of the old. What makes this 
possible? 
If there were only the eternal there would be no 
true coming into existence. For the eternal is the necessary 
and the necessary must remain as i_t is. The necessary has 
no true possibility. If there is to be possibility, there 
must arise something other than the necessary or the 
eternal. Any coming into existence must take place freely 
28 
and not necessarily. 
But, anything that comes into existence is histori-
' cal for it has come into existence. The historical refers 
to a past event. It means that something has become actual. 
Something that has come into existence may reduplicate or 
come into existence a second time. This points to the free 
.. 
dialectic of history. In order for something to become 
historical, it must at present have this possibility in 
the future. 29 Thus, in order that there be something that 
has a past, there must have been a present that was preg-
nant with the future. Succession always implies an inter-
wovenness of the three dimensions. Thus, any historical 
event has the characteristic of possibility and it retains 
. that characteristic always. Hence, it is just as impossible 
to.know with certainty the historical event as it is to 
know a future event. The historical can never be known 
with logical necessity. Also, it cannot be known with any 
immediate experience because of its quality of possibility 
and pastness. Thus, if one is to kiiow the historical he 
has to make a leap of belief in it. He can look at the 
evidence but this alone will never give him any absolute 
certitude. The certitude about historical events comes 
not from evidence but from belief. 
But, concerning the historical event whereby the 
eternal God became an historical man, there is even the 
greater problem of the·· paradox. Only the faith that is 
given by the gift of the incarnation and accepted in the 
' 
consciousness of oneself as a sinner is sufficient to allow 
recognition of this event. Thus, there are two kinds of 
------------------------------·-----·· ---- -------
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historical event whicn necessitate two kinds of belief if 
they are to be recognized.JO But, both kinds of event must 
continue to be believed in if they are to continue to be 
recognized. For even when they are believed in they still 
remain only possible for that is always the nature of ·an 
historical event. However, if one is to continue to 
believe in the God-man, he will have to continue.to resolve 
to believe. Ir he resolves once and· then does not continue 
to resolve, he falls into Christendom and loses the passion 
of his faith. In order to remain in the repetition of the 
double movement leap, the incarnation must continually re-
duplicate itself in the believer. He must continue to 
experience the simultaneity of eternal duration and temporal 
succession. One freely comes to believe in this paradox 
at the moment he begins to repent. But, he must continue 
to repent or his faith vanishes and the freedom which he 
gains the instant he sees himself as a sinner also vanishes. 
So if he is no longer conscious of his sinfulness, he 1s no 
longer free. 
But this brings us to Kierkegaard's concept of con-
temporaneity. In this notion he shows how a person continues 
to keep himself in the presence of the incarnate God, that 
is, in the presence ~ the eternal duration which is at the 
same tfme a temporal succession. 
As we have seen31 faith can arise only in people 
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who are as contemporary with Christ as were the pe0ple of 
his own day. These people could be scandaiized by Him 
·-
l?-~cause of the lofty-lowly paradox. But, rather than be 
scandalized by the empirical evidence, they leaped beyond 
the evidence and believed that he was the God-man. They 
were able to be scandalized by the evidence and yet to 
leap beyond the evidence because of this contemporaneity 
with Christ in His incarnation. What is this contempora-
neity? 
Kierkegaard begins to explain contemporaneity by 
contrasting it with poetry and with history.32 When one 
is related to something only poetically, it is not actual 
or real for him. It is only imaginary and possible. The 
historical, however, really occurred. It went beyond the 
mere possibility of poetry and became actual. ·But, as 
past the historical is not now actual. It lacks the deter-
minant of reality - the for thee. It was for somebody else 
in another age. Only when one is with something in th~ 
present is it actual or real for him. Kierkegaard calls 
this real presence contemporaneity. Poetry is the relation 
one has to possibility. History is the relation one has to 
the actuality of the past. Contemporaneity is the relation 
one has to the actuality for himself in the present. 
' 
. But, there are two kinds of contemporaneity - For: 
" ••• every man can be contemporary only with the 
age in which he lives - and then with one thing 
more: with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's 
life on earth, sacred history, ~tands for itself 
alone outside hlstory."33 
Because there are two kinds of history, it turns out that 
there are t·wo kinds of contemporaneity. For sacred histcry, 
which one knows through faith, has the kind of reality which 
the present has, that is, reality for thee. Christ was the 
eternal duration become succession. And this mystery can 
be present in every age. One can experience the eternal 
duration in the first movement of the leap, But one cannot 
experience the eternal duration as temporal succession 
except through faith, So, now our more refined question 
is - what is the contemporaneity of faith? How does the 
incarnation of Christ become more than a poetic or histori-
cal event for one? How does the contemporaneity of the 
absolute event differ even from the contemporaneity of the 
ordinary event? 
So far we have seen that the grace of the incarna-
tion malrns it possible for one to believe in the incarnation. 
This happens in the moment when one becomes conscious of 
himself as a sinner and this faith endures as long as one's 
' 
repentance endures, Repentanc~ is brought about by the 
double voice of conscience coming both out of the past and 
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out of the future. When one 1s still and listens to· this 
voice, he imitates Christ in His obedience· to the Father. 
He wills only one thing, the good. 3y imitating Christ 
in His incarnation, the believer becomes contemporaneous 
with Christ. It is in this willing of the goo~ which one 
learns to do as he sees how he has failed to will the good, 
that one believes. This is the paradox of the believer 
whereby he becomes contemporaneous with the God-man. This 
is contemporaneity. This is the moment. This is repetition. 
· This is the double movement leap. 
When one achieves that eternal insight that all is 
good for him, even suffering, and when he wills only this 
good, then he ls contemporaneous with the Incarnate God. 
He takes joy from each moment of time. He wills the good 
.in each moment of time. He suffers in each moment of time. 
And this is possible because of the eternal insight that he 
has in each moment of time. The aesthetic is willed. One 
knows that it cannot totally satisfy. One suffers thereby. 
But one can take joy in the aesthetic anyway. The aesthetic 
is renewed through faith. Faith encourages one to take joy 
even in the painful possibilities of poetry. The ethical 
is willed. One fully lives in time. One can even submit to 
the suffering of bore41.om. But he can do this with genuine 
joy. For he can see it as a good. Faith turns the humdrum 
succession of time into an eternal good. Faith renews and 
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doubles both the aesthetic and the ethical. It transforms 
the non-reality of poetry and history into-a contemporary 
reality for the believer. Even what is lacking in both 
the aesthetic and the ethical is now, through faith, seen 
as a good. - Thus, the eternal duration and temporal 
succession so flow together in faith that the past and the 
future are joined in fullness to the present. The present 
so extends out in faith that it encompasses all of the 
past and all of the future and gives them its own present 
reality. Such are the temporal structures of the leap • 
• 
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C!:APTER X 
THE STYLE STRUCTURES CF Y'-l:E LEAP 
It is the painting of Fau~t1 which best suggests 
to us what we choose to call the style structures of the 
leap. Here we see the great aesthetic doubter who in his 
doubt ls silent. And yet the ethical commands him to speak 
his secret. Through sympathy he reflects into himself and 
then becomes a poet, through sympathy he speaks but he 
speaks not of his doubt nor of his love. What is the 
meaning of this strange poetic speaking which still keeps 
secrets? Why does Kierkegaard write of the poet: 
"For the poet purchases the power of words, the 
power of uttering all the dread secrets of others, 
at the price of a little secret he is unable to 
utter ••• and a poet is not an apostle,,he casts 
out devils only by the power of the devil. 112 
Yes, what are these strange thoughts which Kierkegaard has 
about the doubting poet? And, even more strange, why did 
Kierkegaard himself speak like this poet throughout all of 
his life? In telling us about Faust, Kierkegaard is tell-
ing us very much about' himself. What is the great secret 
of his style? Why did he have such a secret? How did he 
tell it even so hiddenly? 
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In answering these questions we shall first · 
c;l.arify the great pattern of Kierkegaard's.style. Then we 
· ..• 
shall. seek to further understand the meaning and purpose 
of his indirect communication. Finally, we shall treat 
specifically the meaning and purpose of the pseudonyms. 
In this way we shall come to see that even in his style 
this great artist constantly manifested the structures of 
the double movement leap. Then in terms of this pattern of· 
the leap we shall ferret out the secret of the poet, who 
.was more than a poet, and therefore told us his secret. 
A~ one becomes accustomed to seeing the pattern of 
the collision and the double movement leap, he can see how 
the authorship ls a manifestation of this pattern in its 
very style. First, the entire authorship shows forth the 
pattern. Secondly, each book individually puts the pattern 
into our grasp. Let us first notice the entire authorship. 
The authorship is divided into three parts. There 
is in the beginning the purely aesthetic part. Then there 
is the middle part which we might look upon as that which 
primarily represents religiousness A or the first movement 
of the leap. Finally, there is the last part which 
explicates in detail religiousness B or the second movement 
of the leap. 
' 
- The purely aesthetic part of the authorship 
includes {l) Either/Or, (2) Fear and Trembling, (3) Repeti-
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!!.2.2.• and. (4) c-taqoes on Life's ,,ray.· The ryredomtnant idea 
running through these books is that of the collifiion. All 
of these books are written under the sign of the Either/Or. 
That sign of the two opposin~ pillars, which never meet 
and that apoear to always be contrary one to another, 
already appears before us in the first volume of Either/Or. 
The young man sees himself as a pure aesthete and is com-
pletely opposed to the ethical. But already in the second 
volume some hint of a reconciliation is given. Judge 
William sees the ethical as fulfilling the aesthetic. As 
Kierkegaard writes in the introduction to The Concept of 
Dread, Fear and Tremblin~ is a portrayal of a series of 
collisions. But already in Fear and Trernblin~ the collision 
is shown as culminating in the religious. Repetition is the 
companion volume to Fear and Trembling and shows one 
collision in detail. Still the main point is the same. 
Repetition is impossible in either the aesthetic or ethical 
but becomes possible in the religious. The very mood of the 
first three volumes is one of collision and confusion. One 
is strongly convinced of the either/or as he begins 
Either/or. But the second volume dissipates his conviction. 
At first he may not even focus on the collision as the main 
theme of Fear and Trembling and Repetition but with help 
• from the note in The Concept of Dread he does this. Once 
again he feels the tension of the either/or out it is a 
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tension that pushes him to the religious. And strangely 
enough even that religious bristles with collision and 
tension. These three early books seem to promise some 
secret to be unlocked in the future, but of themselves they 
leave one in the end only with many unanswerable questions. 
Stages on Life's lvav at first seems that 1 t will 
clearly separate the stages and set up a clear collision. 
But again we are carried into the same whirlpool of confus-
ion. The ethical seems to include the aesthetic but at the 
same time the ethical seems to be the religious. At first 
there seem to be two opposing pillars. But as one looks 
more carefully it seems that they merge. And then it seems 
that the original pillars A and ~ turn out to be pillar C 
or the religious. 
The style of the middle works of the authorship 
primarily mirrors religiousness A or the first movement of 
the leap. Here Kierkegaard writes in a technical philoso-
phical way about the paradox which overcomes the collision. 
This philosophical technique is a purified form of aesthetic 
expression. It is a style perfectly suitable to an 
expression of the paradox. It can lay bare the paradox of 
dread out of which arises the leap. It can analyze the 
three fold paradox il\ relation to Socrates and the leap. 
It can· clarify the difference between the paradox of 
Abraham and that of Socrates. The clear philosophical style 
188 
goes beyond the confusion of the style of the merely· 
aesthetic. But it does not yet reach the straightforward-
ness th~t ari~es in the purely religious writings. 
· In the last phase of his authorship, Kierkegaard 
uses a style of direct communication in order to say what 
the religion of Jesus means. He no longer hides anything 
but he tries to spell out in detail the full both-and of 
the double movement leap. He directly shows the meaning of 
sin and faith and the scand~l and suffering. 
So there is a mirrored image of the collision and 
the double movement leap in the ground plan of Kierkegaard's 
authorship. But, one also sees this image in each work 
individually. There is a progressive expression of the 
collision and the synthesis by way of the leap in each work 
as one moves through the authorship. Each book is a pro-
gressively clearer presentation of the whole authorship. 
The communication becomes more direct as one advances from 
book to book. But what is the significance of this move-
ment from indirect to direct communication in Kierkegaard's 
style? Why does he begin by deceiving his reader with the 
hiding of a great secret? Why in his expression is 
Kierkegaard as mysterious as Faust? 
The meaning a~d purpose of Kierkegaard's move from 
indirect toward direct communication is to be found in his 
theory of education. He wanted to understand himself. He 
wanted to understand Jesus Christ. He wanted to understand 
the movement of history. He wanted others- to do the same. 
This was his fundamental drive. He searched for a style 
that would best fit this purpose. After coming to some 
degree of self-understanding in the Regina experience, he 
was inspired to write for others. He describes his theory 
of education primarily as one of deceiving people into the 
truth.3 He thought that men were separated from the truth 
by a veil of illusion and his technique of indirect communi-
. cation was the only way of helping them out of this illusion. 
For the truth's sake he wanted to deceive men into the truth. 
From the vantage point of his Regina experience 
Kierkegaard saw the mere aesthetic as illusory. He saw the 
mere ethical as illusory. He saw the collision between the 
aesthetic and the ethical as ·illusory. It was the first 
movement of the leap that revealed the illusion of the 
previous stages and even began to reveal its own illusion. 
He saw that his age was especially afflicted with such an 
illusion. He pointed out how the demoralization of the 
modern state, especially through the press and the spirit 
of anonymity, contributed to this illusion. He knew how he 
got beyond the illusion. 4 He knew that he moved along by 
experiencing the contfadictions of the various stages. 
Hence, he wrote and lived so as to involve men more deeply 
in the aesthetic that they might see the deception of the 
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aesthetic. He wrote as the most aesthetic of aesthetes so 
~hat he might bring men beyond the aesthet~c. A~ he puts 
1.t,_he began by accepting the other man's illusion as good 
money.5 
Kierke~ard's theory of education and hence his use 
of indirect communication is rooted in hi~ psychological 
and theological understanding. Primarily he wants men to 
see Jesus Christ as making the double movement leap and he 
wants men to imitate Jesus in that leap. But, as he thinks 
of himself as trying to help men see a complex difficulty 
arises before his mind's eye. The leap of Jesus is 
shrouded in the mystery of scandal. The attention of men 
is clouded. Kierkegaard knows that he is trying to reach a 
supernatural goal by a natural means. He is trying ,to bring 
men to faith but he knows th~t they can come to faith only 
by their own efforts and by the grace of God. Their own 
asceticism is necessary for the first movement and God's 
grace is necessary for the second movement. What does he 
have to do with the whole process? 
As he ponders his task as an educator, and to him 
that only means educatin~ a man to become individual,6 he 
sees his role as that of the witness. He comes to see the 
crowd as the untruth.7 He thinks that only the individual 
' 
who becomes a witness.to the truth can deliver another 
individual from the crowd. To be a witness is to be a 
martyr. In his psychological and theological in~i~ht he 
b_eca:me convinced that all an educator can do is compel 
-· 
another to take notice. 
"Compelling people to take notice and to judge is 
the characteristic of genuine martyrdom. A genuine 
martyr never used his· might but strove by the aid 
of impotence. "8 
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His.style of indirect communication was a method of impotence. 
It was based in his insight that his own might or direct 
. communication was powerless. 
Thus, Kierkegaard's very style is rooted in his 
concept of himself as a witness. He knew that he could 
only teach by learning. He wrote in great sincerity: "I am 
not a teacher, only a fellow student."9 Even his style 
indicates the constant "becoming" structure of the leaping. 
His indirect communication is a product of his belief in 
the existential. As one comes to understand his style he 
feels the passionate inwardness of Kierkegaard's expression. 
What pathos there is in those words we have seen before: 
"The thought goes very far back in my recollection 
that in every generation there are two or three 
who are sacrificed for the others, are led by 
frightful sufferings to discover what redounds 
' 
to the good of others. So it was that in my 
melancholy I understood myself as singled out 
for such a fate."10 
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Just as ?aust broke his silence out of sympathy, so did 
· ~ierke.csaard. Kierkegaard too had his doubts even about his 
._, 
ability to com~unicate. But he, too, became a poet even 
that he might deceive men beyond poetry. When he became a 
poet he also experienced his religious awakening11 and, 
thus, he did not desi~t from using poetry to bring others 
to poetry even that they might become religious •. The 
religious subsumes the aesthetic and thus the aesthetic is 
not absolutely contradictory to the religious. Thus, 
.Kierkegaard can use the aesthetic in bringing men to the 
religious. The double movement leap which unites the 
ethical and the aesthetic can even unite the poetic and the 
crowd. When that happens the individual arises. So it is 
that indirect communication is grounded in the leap and 
constantly mirrors forth the leap. But can we understand 
all this more concretely? 
It is through Kierkegaard's use of the pseudonyms 
that he stylistically attempts to deceive the crowd into 
the truth. An understanding of the role of Kierkegaard's 
pseudonyms would help us see just how he was able to 
communicate indirectly. Very simply, the point is, he was 
always a religious author even when he was writing as a 
mere aesthete or as a philosopher. His first task was to go 
' 
to the crowd and meet them in their own position. ·rhus, he 
would express the values of the aesthetic in the most 
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beautiful way he knew how. He would express the poetic 
arid philosophic ways as if they were suf'fi9ient in them-
,_, 
s.elves. But, all the while he knew they were not. That is 
why he never signed his own name to those writings. They 
were part of his world view and each pseudonym represented 
a strand of his own consciousness. But, they were all 
partial and inadequate views. By using the name of the 
pseudonyms he pointed to their insufficiency. Because he 
was deceiving the crowd out of an illusion he had to use 
falsities. But he did not want to claim these falsities 
as_ .. the truth and therefore he expressed them under the sign 
of the pseudonym. He always believed in the both-and of 
the double movement leap. But in order to convince others 
of this he thought he had to begin with the either/or of 
the collision. Thus, his early literature was written under 
the double sign of the either/or and the pseudonym. The 
pseudonym was a smile to the side by which Kierkegaard 
said, some day you will see that I deceived you but then 
you will remember this smile and realize that I was only 
seeking to deceive you into the truth. By the pseudonyms 
Kierkegaard disowned his own deceit even while he deceived. 
Before looking at this technique of the pseudonyms 
more closely, we should mention two other aspects of his 
" 
revealing concealing style. Just as he deceived with the 
either/or but took it back with the pseudonyms, so he al~:;o 
deceived with the image of himself which he presented to 
the crowd and took 1t back ·with the Edifyih~ Discourses. 
nUr1ng his merely aesthetic period he showed himself to 
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the people of Copenhagen as a mere aesthete. He convinced 
them that he lacked any seriousness.12 Even in his personal 
existence he deceived others that he stood with the cro·wd. 
And his technique worked. Especially The Diary of a 
Seducer became popular. And yet, at the same time he 
published an Edifyin~ Discourse with each aesthetic work 
·in order to show the religious which the aesthetic work 
needed. Nobody appreciated his religious works. 13 He also 
deceived with his personal life but revealed his real intent 
with his discourses. 
In keeping with the three parts of his authorship 
.Kierkegaard uses three sets of pseudonyms. The pseudonyms 
of the collision period include Judge William and the 
aesthetic characters.· Judge William is the author of the 
'purely ethical writin~s. But they are purely ethical only 
in appearance. For he attempts to include the aesthetic 
within his ethical perspective and he is always religious. 
The two main aesthetic characters are the young and Victor 
Eremita. Victor represents the aesthetic religious or the 
first movement of the aeap. As has been earlier pointed out 
the young man is revealed at three stages of his development. 
We see the young man as he views the aesthetic possibilities 
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aYid eventually follows that of Victor. It is in 
3enet1tion that the young man becomes Vict?r• 
A~ one considers these pseudonyms of the collision 
period, one can see them as masks whereby Kierkegaard can 
deceive and yet go beyond the deceit. But, one is also 
aware of another dimension which they possess. They allow 
Kierkegaard to speak of his personal life without being so 
obvious so as to offend his reader or Regina. Through the 
pseudonyms he can explore all of his feelings with detach-
ment. Perhaps it is precisely the spirit of detachment 
which the mask of Constantine Constantus is capable of 
evoking. It is right here, in the depths of the relation 
between the pseudonym as a device of religious education 
and the pseudonym as a mask of the intimately personal, 
that Kierkegaard reveals his_secret. It was necessary for 
Kierkegaard to communicate the collision indirectly, for 
the collision was so dialectical that in reality it was far 
more than the collision. In Kierkegaard's great experience 
of 1838, he became at once a poet and a religious man. 
That was for him the moment of repetition which united the 
dimensions of time with one another and with eternity. 
Thus, in his one experience there was the collision and 
the first movement of the leap and even a premonition of 
" the second movement of the leap. Kierkegaard experienced 
all the moments at once and he wanted to bring others to 
this experience even by writing about it. But, in order to 
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w-rite about this he had to spatiali~e, as it were, that 
l'rhich was one moment. Thus, in bringing his insight to 
langua~e he had to breal{ 1 t into parts, whereas in reality 
it was not broken into parts. In order to whisper of the 
unity of the collision and the lea~, he used indirect 
communication and the pseudonyms. In order to speak of 
them he had to break them asunder. But, he still needed a 
stylistic technique to point to their unity. Thus, his 
peculiar style. 
In the middle period of his authorship Kierkegaard 
spoke through Vigilius Haufniensis and Johannes Climacus. 
This writing which mirrors forth the first movement of the 
leap has less of incompleteness in it than the period of 
the collision. Thus, the pseudonyms are not separated so 
.far from Kierkegaard. Johannes the Seducer in his Diary 
is three steps removed from Kierkegaard himself. Between 
Kierkegaard and that Diary there stands Johannes the 
writer, and the young man and Victor the editor. But, 
Kierkegaard is only removed from the contents of The Concent 
of Dread by its philosophical abstractness. Thus, 
Vigilius, the watchman of Copenhagen, is only a thinly 
diaphonous mask over Kierkegaard himself, Johannes 
Climacus is the leapet:" who knows of the first movement of 
the leap and its difference from the second movement even 
in their philosophical distinction. He has spelled out 
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the differences between religiousness A and religiousness B. 
l{e is removed from the real Kierkegaard to~ the degree that 
._,_ 
speculation is not yet full praxis. 
Finally, in the third stage of his authorship 
Kierkegaard abandons indirect communication but still uses 
the pseudonum of anti-climacus. Anti-climacus is against 
the mere leap beyond the earth and shows the necessity of 
coming back to the earth. Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym 
here for a reason exactly opposite to the reason he used 
pseudonyms in the earlier stages. In the first and second 
parts of the authorship he understood more than he wrote 
and hence used a pseudonym. In the third part he does not 
understand all that he writes but believes it. So again he 
feels the need to use a pseudonym. 
Through his pseudonyms Kierkegaard speaks indirectly 
and thus, like Faust, reveals even by concealing. He does 
this in conscious imitation who indirectly communicated to 
men the lesson of the double movement leap through His , 
Incarnation. He does it as the teacher that he might be 
effective and that he too might continue to learn. His 
style exhibits the unity and development of his primary 
thought, It constantly portrays the collision and the leap. 
For that reason all o~ his thought can even be seen in the 
ten pi~tures we have selected from Fear and Trembling. 
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CONCLUSION 
My method of argumentation has been quite straight-
forward. I have sought to show the equivalence of the 
existential and the religious in Kierkegaard. In order to 
accomplish this I have argued that they are both equivalent 
to the leap and therefore to each other. My whole effort 
has been to clarify the meaning of the leap so that in 
terms of it the religious and the existential can be 
correctly interpreted. But, while doing this I have 
suggested even more. I have been in effect saying that the 
leap is the central issue in Kierkegaard's thought. From 
this suggestion a problem arises, the answer to which will 
form a suitable conclusion to this ·thesis. The problem is 
this: what is the relation between Kierkegaard's goal and 
method and my goal and method? 
Kierkegaard's goal is primarily to make the leap 
and to persuade others to make it. Clarification of the 
leap is only a means toward his goal, whereas for me it is 
the primary goal. Because of his goal his method will 
include much more within it than philosophical analysis. 
As we have seen he will make his appeal through such 
' techniques as the pseudonyms, his Edifying Discourses, and 
even his way of life. His techniques of indirect communica-
tion include much more than critical reflection and a 
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dialectical analysis. With this complexity of his method in 
mind we might pick out just his dialecticai analysis and 
··~· 
make explicit how that proceeds. Then we can relate our 
method of argumentation to this aspect of his method. 
As one looks at the authorship he sees that 
Kierkegaard's argument has three moments. There is the 
aesthetic moment, the philosophic moment and the religious 
moment. All three of these are part of the same dialecti-
cal argument so there is still a philosophic issue in the 
aesthetic and religious moments. Kierkegaard's way of 
philosophizing is to reduce several different philosophies 
to form basic possibilities and then to relate those basic 
philosophies within an hierarchy. In these ways he shows 
how-one philosophy is more consistent and adequate than the 
others. He repeats the pattern of this basic argument 
through the three moments of his authorship. 
In the aesthetic moment of his argument he treats 
what we might call the stage and love structures of the 
leap. Here he clarifies the basic terminology of his 
philosophy and shows how it is pertinent to the human 
situation. He shows the collision between the aesthetic 
and ethical and then shows how one gets beyond this collision 
by the synthesis of the double movement leap. At the same 
time he-shows how this collision is one between aesthetic 
love or eros and ethical love or marriage. This collision 
is gone beyond by erotic inspiration and neighbourly love. 
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In the ph1Iosoph!ea1 moment of his authorship he 
clarifies the dialectical structures of the leap. In this 
section he shows the superiority of his own dialectic by 
contrasting it with the dialectics of Socrates and Hegel. 
His basic argument is that his existential dialectic which 
assumes sin as a reality is a more consistent and adequate 
dialectic than the other two. The criterion by which he 
establishes his hierarchy of dialectics is the existential. 
His dialectic is existential in the fullest sense. 
In the religious moment there is a further treatment 
of the temporal structures of the leap. The aesthetic and 
the ethical are related to the eternal and the temporal. 
Kierkegaard. shows how faith recognizes the values of both 
the eternal and the temporal and unites them in a perfect 
synthesis. Faith or religio~sness B is shown as the highest 
existential possibility because it alone has respect for 
both the eternal and the temporal. 
In my argument I have made more specific the four 
basic structures of the leap. Thus, in the aesthetic 
moment I treat the stage, love and experiential structures. 
I divide Kierkegaard's analysis of the dialectical structure 
into an analysis of the sin, reason and existential 
structure. I further divide his considerations of time 
• 
into a -treatment of faith, the incarnation and his style. 
My argument makes explicit the repeated pattern of his 
thought so as to show the equivalence of the leap, the 
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religious, and the existential. In this way I clarify his 
philosophical argument which shows the superiority of 
religiousness B by showing that it is the way of life that 
is the most completely existential • 
• 
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APPENDIX A 
In order to show how my thesis compares and 
contrasts with some of the interpretations of Kierkegaard, 
I shall now comment on five other authors. I will approach 
each author with the four issues which I have treated in 
the Conclusi,on. I do not think that such a detailed con-
sideration ls necessary for every writer in my biblio-
graphy. The five men I have chosen know and represent 
the ·standard interpretation of Kierkegaard. I consider it 
valuable to comment upon at least their ideas in order to 
pinpoint what is new and what is old in my interpretation. 
' 
- .... 
James Collins 
Stage Structures of the Leap 
Collins understands the stage structures of 
Kierkegaard's thought as the funda.me.ntal skeleton of his 
entire authorship.1 However, one of the chief problems 
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which Collins has throughoµt his· book is to harmonize his 
interpretation of the stages with his interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's entire thought development. For the sake of 
getting into this problem, which Collins has, of making 
Kierkegaard consistent, we might consider the issue which 
Collins labels "Christian Humanism."2 
Collins thinks that Kierkegaard was ambivalent con-
ceniing retention of aesthetic or human values once the 
leap to religiousness B had been made. He thinks that 
Kierkegaard wavered sometimes thinking that such values 
could be retained and sometimes thinking that they must be 
abandoned. But Collins goes even a bit further and seems 
to think that Kierkegaard cannot be a "humanist". He writes: 
"Yet when the aesthetic life is no longer admitted 
to be absolute, there still remains the task for 
Christians of renewing the face of the entire earth 
and hence of reckoning in a positive way with 
humanistic values ... 3 
Collins thinks that Kierkegaard: 
• 
" ••• lacked full confidence in the power of the super-
natural order to transform natural abilities and 
perfections, with~ut compromising its own transcend-
ental character." 
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The basic reason why Collins thinks that Kierkegaard 
~as this problem of being a humanist arise$ from the inter-
Rreta tion which Collins has of the stages and their relation-
ships. Even though Collins is careful to point out that one 
does not pass only from the aesthetic to the ethical to 
religiousness A and to religiousness B in just that rigid 
order, and even though Collins thinks that religiousness A 
can contain the ethical and the aesthetic and that the 
ethical can contain the aesthetic, Collins still doubts 
that the leap to religiousness B permits the survival of 
the previous stage. 
At this point we must ask Collins how he would con-
ceive of the leap. He does speak of a leap from the 
aesthetic to the ethical.5 He indicates that the transition 
from one stage to the other is the leap. But he does not 
make any analysis of the leap. If he did, would not he 
have to say that the full existential leap is that double 
movement leap which we have described? 
If Collins would agree to this, would not he have 
to say that Kierkegaard's notion of dialectics is closer 
to Hegel's than he admits? Collins' point concerning 
Hegel's dialectic and Kierkegaard's humanism is that 
Kierkegaard finds it hard to be a humanist because he cannot 
' 
admit a_ synthesis in his dialectic as does Hege1. 6 However, 
Kierkegaard is still different enough from Hegel in that 
205 
his dialectic is existential whereas Hegel's is ideal. If 
our thesis is correct, then Kierkegaard does have his own 
kind of existential synthesis. It is this synthesis of 
the double movement leap which enables Kierkegaard to found 
his •Christian Humanism." Kierkegaard does not lack a 
foundation for explaining how the Christian can renew the 
face of the earth. 
Collins supports one of the key tenets of our 
thesis, that the ethical alone is an existential impossi-
.bility. At the same time he points out the fundamental 
opposition between the aesthetic and the religious. 
"His own experience, rather than any theoretical 
requirements, convinced Kierkegaard that man's 
real predicament is to be placed between a 
thoroughly esthetic way of living and a thoroughly 
religious one. No permanent footing can be main-
tained on a purely ethical basis, and in this 
respect Kierkegaard stands opposed to all efforts 
to make morality self-sufficient. Ethical principles 
are intrinsically ordained to the religious outlook, 
and a secular morality is either unaware of its 
religious significance or only an esthetic discourse 
about being moral."7 
I agree entirely with this very important and well 
expressed interpretation of Collins. It goes to show the 
existential impossibility of the merely ethical. But does 
Collins have to stress the fundamental opposition of the 
aesthetic and religious to such a point that they cannot 
be reconciled? " Does not Kierkegaard's notion of the double 
movement leap as he develops it from Fear and Trembling 
show how he can reconcile the two extremes? 
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Love Structures of the Leap 
• .. · In his book on Kierkegaard, Collins takes very 
little interest in love. His treatment of Regina8 is 
quite unique. Collins does not indicate that Regina had 
anything to do with Kierkegaard's religious development. 
Collins does think that Kierkegaard's relation to his 
father was very influential in his religious development. 
But in keeping with his interpretation of the fundamental 
opposition between the aesthetic and the religious, Collins 
.does not relate Kierkegaard's erotic love to his religious 
love. 
If Collins would consider Kierkegaard's experience 
of, and thought about, the erotic, I wonder if he would not 
have to reconsider his treatment of the leap and its stage 
structures. Would Collins agree with the following explana-
tion of the dialectical relation between the aesthetic and 
the religious? There are different kinds of aesthetes, 
i.e., Johannes the Seducer and Victor Eremita. Between 
Johannes and Victor there are both likenesses and differen-
ces. Together they both live in immediacy; they live for 
the eternalized moment. But they are as different as 
Lysias and Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, By loving a 
woman, Johannes just steals bait from the gods. But Victor 
becomes·a poet or a genius or, yes, even a saint. That is 
itl One can leap from one level of the aesthetic, that of 
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Johannes, to another level, that of Vietor. This is the 
leap of infinite resignation that brings a·man to 
religiousness A. Is not this the experience that 
Kierkegaard had through his love for Regina? Was she not 
the occasion by which he became a religious aesthete? 
Through her he experienced the magnificence of the immanent 
God. But that was not yet faith in the transcendent aspect 
of God. However, Kierkegaard made the second part of the 
leap by returning to the earth, which would be the ethical 
.part of the leap, by becoming ready to marry. Johannes de 
Silentio could not have such faith and even if Kierkegaard 
could not, though I think he did, he saw the idea as being 
this double movement. The erotic was the occasion for the 
grace and once the grace came it could preserve the 
.inspiration of the erotic; it could continue to make the 
eternal existentially real. If Collins would agree with 
such an interpretation then could he not overcome the 
difficulty of determining whether Kierkegaard can be a 
humanist or not? 
Dialectic Structures of the Leap 
If Collins is really serious about the fundamental 
importance of the stage structures throughout the whole of 
' Kierkegaard's thought, then I do not see how he can main-
tain his interpretation of the stage and the leap. Collins 
writes: 
"Around this three-fold division, Kierkegaard 
organizes the entire argument which runs through 
the esthetic works. His later philosophical and 
religious studies suppose that this original 
analysis of central human motives is a sound one, 
which can9be applied even outside the aesthetic context." 
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This I see as another true and admirable statement. 
But then Collins makes his interpretation of the stage, so 
that Kierkegaard has difficulty being a humanist. Finally, 
throughout much of his book, especially that dealing with 
the religious phase of Kierkegaard, Collins shows the 
.humanism of Kierkegaard. Now there is an inconsistency 
here. Why should Kierkegaard, when he becomes most 
religious in his writing, become most humanistic if there 
is to be some conflict between his Christianity and his 
humanism? One explanation would be that Kierkegaard had 
two contradictory phases: the first wherein the stage 
structures did not permit a humanism and the second wherein 
they did. Another explanation would be that Kierkegaard 
just dropped his stage structure format. Collins would 
not want to accept either of these explanations. Therefore, 
if he admits the humanism of Kierkegaard's religious phase, 
I do not see how he can maintain his interpretation of the 
stage structures of the leap. But he does admit the 
humanism of the religious writing of Kierkegaard as I will 
' 
now show.· 
In his treatment of the existential Collins has long 
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passages that are in perfect agreement with our thes~s. 10 
He shows how religiousness B contains much within it of 
r~11g1ousness A. In other words, one does not leap beyond 
the third stage when going to the fourth. Collins points 
out how: 
" ••• in the Christian economy, all things are made 
new, above all, man himself, who becomes nova 
oreatura. The individual no longer seeks to exchange 
his finitude for a merger with the absolute, but 
gains a new sense of the worth and human value of 
creatureliness. Time is not to be fled, and neither 
is it merely to be endured strongly but without hope 
of fulfillment. The eternal is now found to be 
immanent in the temporal order, in such a way as to 
give time si~nificance in itself and for eternal 
happiness." 
This is what I would call a perfect statement of 
the dialectical structures of the leap as I see it. But 
notice this very statement of Collins contradicts what he 
wrote earlier when discussing the stages as such. 
How could Collins doubt the humanism of Kierkegaard 
if he woUld agree that such an idea as this is dominant 
throughout the whole of the Kierkegaardian authorship? 
How could he doubt that such an idea is dominant if he saw 
the meaning and central place of the leap? For the leap 
is just as significant as are the stages. Without a 
correct notion of the leap one does not understand the 
stages. 
' Collins even relates this synthesis to the instant 
but apparently does not see the equivalence of the instant 
and· the leap. He writes: 
"This act occurs in the Instant, as kind of 
synthesis of time and eternity, in which the 
believer is rendered contemporaneous with 
Christ. 1112 · 
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If Collins would relate the eternal to the aesthetic 
and the ethical to the temporal as Kierkegaard does 1n 
Stages and the Postscript, then would not he have a very 
hard time maintaining that there can be no synthesis of 
the aesthete within the religious? 
In his chapter on The Nature of the Human Individual, 
.Collins again shows much evidence in Kierkegaard's thought 
th~t.he would find hard to reconcile with the idea that 
Kierkegaard was lacking in "humanism." Collins points out 
Kierkegaard's great concern for political and social criti-
cism. He shows Kierkegaard was as much caught up in 
"humanism" as were Nietzsche, Marx and Feuerbach. When he 
discusses "Humanism" and Christianity at the end of that 
section he writes: 
"Thus the age in which we live poses an inescapable 
either/or. Either one must be loyal to man and the 
earth, as Nietzsche counseled, in such a way that 
one is a traitor to God, or one must learn to love 
God above all things earthly and human and thus to 
love men and the earth the better in Him. 
Kierkegaard's hope was that the inhumane conse-
quences of following the first alternative will 
dispose us to choose the other path, so as to build 
up a Christian humanity, a fellowship of individuals 
united by faith and charity in Christ. 1113 
' 
-Notice the meaning of the either/or and of the 
synthesis in this passage. Here Collins unites what he 
211 
earlier called the aesthetic within the religious and yet 
still has a meaningful either/or which is based on the 
absoluteness of the aesthetic. 
Temporal Structures of the Leap 
In the above, we see that it is in love of Christ 
that we come to love our brothers and the earth. We know 
that it is in love and faith that the eternal and temporal 
are united. But for some strange reason Collins will not 
take up this theme of love seriously just as previously he 
would not take up erotic and married love even though they 
were of paramount importance for Kierkegaard. If he would 
consider the leap of love, would not the central place of 
the leap in Kierkegaard's thought clarify itself for him 
and overcome his problem of humanism? 
At the beginning of his chapter Becoming a Christian 
in Christendom Collins writes: 
"The desired synthesis of moral and esthetic 
interests is not to be made, however, on any 
basis furnished by one or the other outlook."14 
He writes this as if he is now convinced that 
there can be such a synthesis even though at the beginning 
of his book he would have denied such a possibility. He 
would have said it was Hegelian and not Kierkegaardian. 
' He emphasizes the importance of becoming'contemporaneous 
with Christ. For this is the way the synthesis is to be 
made. He has mentioned Kierkegaard's treatment of the 
I-Thou relationship. And finally Collins comes to that 
all important notion of the Love of God. But what does 
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he do? In one and one-half pages he passes it by. He does 
not show how the eternal and the temporal are linked in the 
leap of love. He does not discuss the difference and the 
possible relations between poetic and Christian love. If 
he would I wonder what he would say about our thesis. 
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Walter Lowrie 
Stage Structures of the Leap 
Lowrie refers to himself as a biographer and not as 
a philosopher. He is an excellent historian and I greatly 
appreciate not only his translations but also his way of 
interpreting Kierkegaard's life. He knows the facts and he 
assembles them meaningfully. In the following considera-
tion of his interpretation of the leap I shall be concerned 
with two points - how would my interpretation of the leap 
serve him in clarifying his biographical data and how well 
is my interpretation supported by his data? Putting this 
in another way I will ask - how does Kierkegaard's funda-
mental philosophical insight aid us in interpreting his 
life and works and is this insight confirmed by the 
biographer-historian? In short, I am suggesting that Lowrie 
is and must be a philosopher in his biographical and histor-
ical interpretation and I will now inquire into what happens 
to that interpretation when one emphasizes the philosophical 
over the historical and the biographical. I will compare 
and contrast his interpretation with mine and mine with his. 
Lowrie cites texts wherein Kierkegaard refers to the 
leap. But Lowrie does not think it is his task to analyze 
• philosophically such concepts as the leap. However, if 
Lowrie did make a careful study of the stage structures of 
the leap, I wonder if he could lay out his biography of 
Kierkegaard in the way that he did. For example, Lowrie 
~efers to the time from June 4, 1836 to 10;30 a.m. on 
M~y_l9, 1838 as the ethical stage of Kierkegaard's life. 
Lowrie writes: 
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"!tis out of deference for s.K.'s own nomenclature, 
his sharp distinction of the three stages, that I 
have adopted this title (The Ethical Stage) to 
describe the present chapter •••• Where else could 
we look for the ethical .stage? S. K. instructs us 
that it lies between the aesthetical and the 
religious - therefore this must be the peace. And 
what have we a right to expect of S.K. in his 
ethical stage? Surely no more than that he was 
trying to be good. It must be. confessed that this 
conclusion has more truth than evidence on its side, 15 so far as the testimony of the Journal is concerned." 
At this point we see Lowrie letting his theory of 
the stages guide him as to how to interpret Kierkegaard's 
life. But ls his theory of the stages right? Perhaps the 
difficulty which Lowrie feels arises from a wrong notion 
of the stages. Lowrie indicates that it is hard to find 
such a stage. He sees there is not much evidence for it. 
Maybe there ls as little truth in his conclusion as there 
is evidence for it. 
our thesis has been that the collision of the 
aesthetic and ethical is dialectically related to the 
double movement leap. We have never thought that one is 
first in an aesthetic stage and then an ethical stage and 
finally a religious stuge. We have never thought that the 
leap is a transition first from the aesthetic to the ethical 
stage and then from the ethical to the religious stage. 
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Lowrie would seem to support this ordinary view. 
·-
We have begun our argument with what Kierkegaard 
says about the leap in The Concept of Dread. There we have 
seen the leap as a transition from pagan innocence to 
Christian guilt. We have maintained that this is the same 
leap that Kierkegaard describes in Fear and Trembling and 
his other works. We have argued that this is a description 
of his own religious experience. In light of this we would 
argue that the ethical is not an existential possibility. 
The aesthetic stage and the religious stage are livable 
but the ethical is not. One is either an ethical aesthete 
or an ethical religious man and there is no middle ground. 
This we have shown is the point of Kierkegaard's threefold 
distinction of the ethical in The Concept of Dread whereby 
.he shows the first kind of proper ethics to be impossible. 
Lowrie suggests in his statement that the ethical 
is that stage wherein a man tries to be· good. But I do not 
think this is at all an adequate notion of what Kierkegaard 
would mean by the ethical. First of all, Kierkegaard 
connects the ethical with marriage, and, of course, 
Kierkegaard never married. He was always an ethical 
exception. Always, also in the Postscript Kierkegaard 
describes ethics as a ~uccessful striving. But what Lowrie 
describes as Kierkegaard's ethical period is not a success-
ful striving. Kierkegaard strives to be good but is not 
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good. Mere striving is not the ethical. The ethical man 
is good. 
~~- · In non-Christian religion there is no proper ethics. 
But within the Christian world there can be two kinds of 
ethics. That ethics which is sublated within Christianity. 
Proper ethics of the second kind which is founded on dog-
matics or faith is true ethics. But then there is the 
ethics of Christendom •. Theoretically this thinks it can 
rest on metaphysics and practically it is the mere follow-
. ing of the universal order. It is not an existential 
possibility. That is, the many who are in this ethical 
order are lacking in existence. Now Kierkegaard was living 
in the Christian world. Therefore, Lowrie is seeking to 
find within his life a period when he wholeheartedly 
followed the ethical patterns of Christendom. No wonder 
that such a period is hard to find. 
In Kierkegaard's very literature there is not first 
an aesthetic period and then an ethical period and then the 
philosophical and finally the religious. No there is first 
an aesthetic/ethical period. The young man and Judge 
William right from the start meet in collision. So it was 
in Kierkegaard's life and so it is in his theory. 
' Love Structures of the Leap 
I greatly admire Lowrie's fine treatment of 
Kierkegaard's relation with Regina. With great patience 
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Lowrie shows hims.elf to be a careful detective in ferreting 
out the nuances of Kierkegaard's religious-experience. I 
-· 
agree with Lowrie completely that his real conversion 
resulted from his experience with Regina. Lowrie is care-
ful to distinguish the unspeakable joy aspect of his con-
16 
version from "the fact" of that conversion as such •. 
However, if we approach Kierkegaard's broken 
engagement from the notion of the double movement leap, I 
wonder if we will not get a slightly different interpreta-
tion than Lowrie's. He suggests that Kierkegaard did not 
marry for religious reasons. The main aspect of that 
reason was that Kierkegaard. saw himself as a penitent 
because of his past sins.17 I agree that Kierkegaard. did 
see himself as a penitent and did not want to infect Regina 
with his and his family's guilt. But wasn't the central 
reason for the rupture the divine counter order? And did 
not this have to do with the erotic inspiration whereby 
Kierkegaard became a religious poet? Lowrie goes all 
around this idea and gives many pertinent quotations. But 
he does not zero in on it. He does not come right out and 
see this as the first movement of the leap - that movement 
of infinite resignation. He quotes the long passage with 
delight concerning the Knight of Infinite Resignation and 
' 
the Kn1ght of Faith~8 But he does not interpret the Regina 
experience in terms of this. He points out how Abraham is 
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to Isaac and s.K. is to Regina.19 If Lowrie would settle 
))_is mind on this central notion, wou.ld he not see even 
~hat here we have a distinction of the ethical phase? The 
man of the earth from whom the Knight of Faith cannot be 
distinguished is that ethical man for whom there.are no 
existential possibilities. 
At his moment of erotic inspiration I think 
Kierkegaard became fully an aesthete - he was an inspired 
poet. He became religious at least in the sense of 
religiousness A. And he now became ethical. Previously 
as a.lower level aesthete he wanted to be good. But now 
he could be. He is now beyond the collision so as to be 
both aesthetic and ethical. But that is so only because he 
has leaped into the infinite. Now he must make the movement 
whereby he becomes back to the earth. 
Dialectic Structures of the Leap 
Lowrie is also good even to the point of being 
inspirational in his handling of Kierkegaard's distinction 
between religiousness A and religiousness B. By means of 
this distinction he clearly shows the difference between 
Christian faith and all other religions. He shows how one 
must first have religiousness A before he can have 
religiousness B. Lowr\e puts the paradox nicely: 
" ••• it (Christianity) is the only religion which the 
hope of an eternal blessedness upon something histori-
cal, which moreover by its very nature cannot be 
historical, and so must become so by virtue of the 
absurd ... 20 
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Lowrie does an excellent job of commentary on Kier.kegaard 's 
idea: 
"to comport oneself at the same time absolutely with 
regard to the absolute Telos and relatively with 
regard to the relative."21 
He shows in his commentary how Kierkegaard hereby 
repudiates the protestant ethics which stresses the secular 
calling. 
All that Lowrie has written about the differences 
and relation between religiousness A and B I see as a con-
firmation of my thesis. The first movement of the leap is 
religiousness A and the second movement is religiousness B. 
When these movements are made together religiousness A is 
the sublated aesthetic and religiousness B is the sublated 
ethical. Here we see the both-and or the fullness of the 
existential. 
Again, I wonder what would have happened to Lowrie's 
interpretation if he would have stressed the centrality of 
the leap, In stressing the absoluteness of the Divine 
which the man of religiousness A discovers, Lowrie shows 
how Kierkegaard repudiates protestant ethics. For, 
protestant ethics does not stress the necessity of 
asceticism. It does not make such a firm distinction 
between the good and the holy. But if Lowrie would have 
' remembe~ed throughout the role of religiousness A, I wonder 
if he might have interpreted Kierkegaard's relation to 
mysticism in a slightly different way, 22 Kierkegaard 
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definitely says he is not a myst1e. Kierkegaaro, EiS towr1e 
points out, often does criticize mysticism-. But could not 
everything that Lowrie here w,ri tes about mysticism be 
clarified by seeing mysticism as religiousness A? 
Kierkegaard. would not want to say that the Christian ideal 
was just to become a Knight of Infinite Resignation. He 
would not want to say that he was just a mystic even though 
Johannes de Silentio might. But he could say that mysti-
cism was the first part of the leap. I think that 
. Kierkegaard was a sublated mystic and that he would have to 
defend the rights of the mystic. Religiousness A means 
mysticism. That is, it is union of God and man. But that 
ls not to say that Kierkegaard ever thought he was just a 
mystic. He was definitely no mystic in the popular sense 
of mysticism. But he did experience the absolute as 
immanent. Lowrie could admit that and be true to Kierke-
gaard. He does not have to go so far as to write: 
"If it is allowable to bestow the name mystic upon 
a man who did not stress the immanence of God but 
rather the transcendence, etc ••• then I raise no 23 objection if any one prefers to call s.K. a mystic." 
I think Kierkegaard did experience God as immanent. 
In fact I think Kierkegaard says a man has to, if he wants 
to become a Christian. That is, religiousness A is necessary • 
• Lowrie is too good a historian not to know that there 
is something wrong with his interpretation. He writes: 
"But on the other hand he approached mysticism almos~ 
as closely as one could without becoming a mystic."2..., 
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Why doesn't Lowrie just get it ove:r w1tn? Why 
qoesn• t he just acrm1 t Kierkegaard was a mystic even if 
I{ierkegaard says he wasn't and then agree with Kierkegaard 
by saying that he was not just a mystic, just as he would 
say Kierkegaard was not just a man of religiousness A? 
Temporal Structures of the Leap 
Lowrie points out how important the theme of time 
is in Kierkegaard's thought. In fact, Lowrie thinks that 
Kier·kegaard more than anyone else has brought the attention 
·or contemporary man to the theme of time. Lowrie takes up 
the theme of the instant and relates it to the leap. 25 But 
he does not feel that it is his task to make a detailed 
analysis of the temporal structures of the leap. In fact he 
does not consider The Works of L0 ve_ carefully at all. He 
mentions that Kierkegaard emphasizes works and not faith 
alone. But he does not show how Kierkegaard conceives of 
Christian love as the synthesis of time and eternity. 
Lowrie even refers to Buber's I-Thou as if he isn't aware 
of Kierkegaard's usage of this in Works of Love. 
If one is aware of faith as a double movement leap 
whereby through love one lives both in the eternal and the 
temporal, I wonder if he would not have to interpret 
Kierkegaard's religiouh experience of 1848 with more 
dialectical finesse than does Lowrie. It seems to me that 
wh~t Lowrie refers to as the 18)8 experience is the first 
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movement of the leap and the 1848 experience is the second 
~ovement of the leap. 
-~- _ Lowrie shows very clearly how the second religious 
experience has to do with faith in God who helps us in the 
temporal situation. That experience had to do with God 
forgetting as well as forgiving Kierkegaard's sins. 
Lowr1e's summary of some excellent quotations which he 
cites from Kierkegaard on this relation between God helping 
us in time and his forgetting our sin is: 
"Not only had he failed as yet to appropriate the 
thought that God can forget as well as forgive, but 
(in close connection with this) he was incredulous 
of the power of God to6help him temporally when he saved him eternally."2 
Lowrie shows how the experience of 1848 was a movement 
beyond this incredulity. 
But when one thinks of this experience in relation 
to the leap, a very strange sort of problem arises. 
Kierkegaard knew of this aspect of the religious experience 
way before 1848. Already in Fear and Trembling he describes 
the double movement leap and he knows that if he would have 
had faith he would have married Regina. In fact, as Lowrie 
is keen to see, Kierkegaard did consider the double movement 
at that time for himself. Kierkegaard. refers to his sin and 
his melancholy over it as a leak in his boat in which he 
' 
floated-over the 70,000 fathoms and as a thorn in his flesh. 
Thus Lowrie writes: 
"The earlier occasion wnen he 'bh.ougbt Qf 'repairing 
the leak' and drawing out the thorn was when he was 
engaged to Regina .;. and at that time he concluded 
that it was hopeless."27 
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Now I am not at all sure that Kierkegaard concluded 
that it was hopeless. The question. is - what is the 
relation between his experiencing the second movement of 
the leap and his knowing about it? Did he first experience 
it and then realize its possibility in thought? Or did he 
first see its possibility in thought and then experience? 
Lowrie ls aware of the dialectical problem here to a degree. 
He shows how the "metamorphosis of 1848" as he calls it was 
led up to by certain presentiments of 1847 and how it was 
fully experienced on in 1S49. He points out how it has to 
do with the whole problem of direct and indirect communica-
tion. But isn't it more complicated than Lowrie admits? 
Wouldn't Kierkegaard have found it possible to marry Regina 
if she would not have become engaged to Schlegel? Or at 
least was he not ready to accept the earth as early as 
1844? Surely he knew of the double movement leap all along. 
I would think he came to know of it through experience. In 
the Works of Love he shows in great detail how divine love 
breaks into time. All I suggest is that in seeking to 
understand the metamorphosis Lowrie has to push the dialec-
tics back at least th~ee years beyond 1847. Kierkegaard's 
notion of the double movement leap demands this. 
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Lo.ttis ~pre 
Stage Structures of the Leap 
I agree almost entirely with Dupre's superb handling 
of Kierkegaard's dialectic. He is extremely exact in 
pointing out how the aesthetic28 and the ethica129 are 
"sublated in that term's t-wofold meaning of being 
suspended and of being preserved, on a higher level."30 
He makes explicit the relation between the exist-
ential and the religious and shows that they have to do 
with the synthesis of the ethical and aesthetic • 
. "The spirit first becomes real on the religious level. 
.. Previously, the synthesis of the finite and the 
infinite (in which, as we saw, the essence of the 
spirit consists) was not yet accomplished, since 
the choice of myself on the ethical level was 
limited to the finite (though on the background 
of the infinite). Therefore, only the religious 
man exists in the full sense o_f the word, that is, 
as synthesis of the temporal and eternity."31 
He argues that the religious must contain the 
aesthetic.32 But when I look carefully at Dupre's interpre-
tation of the leap a discrepancy arises. I can best bring 
this out by focusing on Dupre's interpretation of the 
relation between religiousness A and religiousness B. He 
writes: 
"As was pointed out in the second chapter, Kierkegaard 
regards the instant not as an element peculiar to 
Christianity, bu~ as a central element in every type 
of religion. The religious life on a sheerly natural 
ba·sis, the so-called religiousness A, culminates in 
the consciousness of guilt before God. In this 
affirmation of oneself before God, natural religion 
arrives at an instant in which eternity touches 
existence in time, but without penetrating it. By a 
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free admission or his guilt man aff·irms his intrinsic 
relation with God and thus brings something absolute 
into his existence. For this leap inzo the absolute 
no direct intervention of God is required. The 
instant of ~el1giousness A has nothing to do with 
Grace: t1me and eternity remain irreconcilably 
opposed."33 · 
I do not.think Dupre can rightly say that Kierke-
gaard thinks that the man of natural religion has a conscious-
ness of guilt before God. In fact, Kierkegaard in the 
Concept of Dread, as Dupre well knows, argues that by 
making the qualitative leap one becomes a sinner. Dupre 
knows of: 
. "the existence of despair on thn aesthetic stage, 
where there is no actual sin."J 
Of course, Dupre connects religiousness A and the 
aesthetic. But as he works his way through this he gets 
into some difficulties. That he is not in harmony with 
Kierkegaard further manifests itself when he writes: 
"the transition from innocence to guilt occurs in 
the fall into sin itself, and at that moment man 
is no longer free."35 
Kierkegaard thinks that freedom comes only to the 
man who is conscious of his sin and therefore is a sinner. 
All this suggests that there is a level of the 
Kierkegaardian dialectic which Dupre has not yet penetrated. 
Even though Dupre affirms the dialectical balance of sinful-
ness and faith in genef'al, I do not think he follows the 
concrete thought of K1erkegaard on this matter exactly. I 
do agree with Dupre that religiousness A is attained without 
226 
grace properly speaking, But is Dupre justified in · 
predicating the instant of religiousness A? I think not, 
He is more right in his statement above when he writes: 
"eternity touches existence in time, but without penetrat-
ing it." For paganism there is, strictly speaking, as 
Dupre will affirm,36 no true temporal succession. So 
eternity cannot touch time, There is no time as ·there is 
no freedom. All this comes in the instant when one leaps 
into faith and fades into sin. 
Because of his difficulties with this issue Dupre 
follows others in setting up a false problem which he does 
not adequately solve. Completely contrary to his notion 
that there is sin in natural religion he writes: 
"We have already mentioned the existence of despair 
on the aesthetic stage, where there is no actual sin. 
But there is more. On the one hand, Kierkegaard 
asserts that despair is a sickness which, outside 
Christendom, is universal ••• on the other hand, 
Kierkegaard has defined sin as despair before God. 
But since only a Christian has a correct concept of 
God, it seems that sin, in the true sense of the 
word, can exist only in Christianity. And this con-
clusion has been affirmed by Kierkegaard himself. 
Then how can sin and despair ever coincide, if the 
one exists only within, and the other only outside 
of, Christianity?"J7 
One of the strange confusions that Dupre makes 
throughout his book and further examines is this taking of 
Christendom and Chris1tlanity as equal. Ir he wants to say 
there is no despair in Christianity all right, But 
definitely he cannot say there is no despair in Christendom. 
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The difference between Christendom and Christianity is 
qespair. So it is precisely in Christendom that one can 
,_., 
s_ee how despair and sin can coincide. But that is not all. 
Man is always becoming. Even the man of faith is on the 
way; he is leaping. Consequently, even he recognizes him-
self as sinful even though faith and sin are opposites. 
And insofar as he recognizes himself as sinful he sees that 
he is moving out of despair. The point is: the man of 
faith or the man of Christianity is being saved from sin 
and despair. But for the Christian they coincide exactly. 
He is moving beyond both. 
So Dupre is ambiguous on the place of sin in 
religiousness A. He says it is other but then shows that 
it cannot be. Finally he does not clearly distinguish 
Christendom and Christianity or one aspect of religiousness 
A and religiousness B and thereby generates a false problem 
that "potentiality" language does not adequately deal with 
for there is no such problem. 
Love Structures of the Leap 
The implications of this confusion can be seen when 
we examine his theory concerning Kierkegaard's own relig-
ious experience. Dupre does not make explicit that 
Kierkegaard's theory or the leap explains his own exper-
ience, but Dupre does speculate on Kierkegaard's experience. 
Dupre's approach is first of all to point out the 
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psychological deformities of Kierkegaara.•s personality and 
then he shows hows 
"these psychological weaknesses acquired a new 
meaning from religion."38 
This continues to be a very interesting attempt at 
dialectical explanation on Dupre's part, but again I con-
tinue to think it just misses. I will now continue to 
show in terms of Kierkegaard's experience why I think Dupre 
misunderstands religiousness A and therefore the relation 
between religiousness A and rel~giousness B. Dupre writes: 
"The rupture with Regina had been inspired not by 
· purely religious motives, but by psychic impotence. 
However, it led him to a deeper religious conscious-
ness and thus earned a functional role in the whole 
of his vocation. ttJ"J 
Dupre is just wrong when he thinks that the rupture 
was not inspired by purely religious motives. Of course, 
as we have shown, there were several kinds of motives. 
Some were connected with psychic quirks but some of them 
were purely religious. The whole issue of the "divine 
counter order" in the Stages, I would say, is purely 
religious. The suggestion by the young man in Repetition 
about being inspired to religion by his muse is, I think, 
autobiographical. Victor Eremita's speech in the Stages 
points out the purely religious motives leading up to a 
' ruptur~ •. The reason I am so sure of this is because I 
interpret Kierkegaard's experience in light of his theory 
of the double movement leap. It is this rupture that leads 
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to the first movement of 1nfinite resignation. Kierkegaard 
always praised celibacy because it had this power of 
revealing the God of love to man. True it only brings a 
man to religiousness A but that is a necessary aspect of 
religion if the synthesis means anything. 
Since Du.pre does not see how celibacy is connected 
with this religiousness A we might wonder how he ·conceives 
of this rupture as having a salutory effect in Kierkegaard's 
life. Dupre is thinking of .what he writes concerning the 
rupture and authentic religion • 
... . "Kierkegaard, too, had abandoned all earthly desires, 
in the person of Regina, and had thereby reached a 
religious threshold. But, as he put it, he never 
became a Knight of Faith like Abraham, because he 
merely arrives at the point of renouncing the mundane, 
without ever fully achieving the new reality of faith. 
'Had I had faith; he wrote in his diary, I should 
have remained with Regina'".Ll-0 
"I believe that this insight in Fear and Trembling 
opened the way for Kierkegaard to true religion. All 
that precedes it was so greatly deformed by his 
abnormal upbringing and warped psychology that it 
appears to be a disguised projection of 4subconscious 
drives rather than authentic religion." 1 · 
Dupre thinks that religiousness B, that i'S, its 
faith aspect as distinct from the religiousness A that is 
contained within it is authentic religion. He reduces the 
resignation of religiousness A to the results of a warped 
psychology. I think ~upre is excellent in pointing out 
how Kierkegaard came to religiousness B. I, too, see Fear 
and Trembling together with Repetition as the first state-
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ment of authentic religion in Kierkegaard. But I am· sure 
Kierkegaard would be highly d1.s·pleased with. Dupre's 
reduction of natural religion and its relation to celibacy 
to warped psychology. In fact this is not even good 
dialectics. Religiousness B will transform religiousness A 
but religiousness B would not have been without religious-
ness A. It is not justified to reduce infinite resigna-
tion to mere lunacy. 
Dialectic Structures of the Leap 
His confusion concerning the role of religiousness 
A enables Dupre to make some highly suspicious statements 
when he analyzes Kierkegaard's psychic feelings for 
Christianity. Dupre wonders how Kierkegaard kept his faith 
and writes: 
"Kierkegaard's attitude toward Christianity 
oscillated constantly between attraction and 
aversion. This aversion was at the basis of the 
ferocious attac~ of his last years against the 
Danish Church." 2 
Such a remark as this fails to take account of 
Kierkegaard's distinction between Christendom and Christ-
ianity which, of course, Dupre is so well aware of. 
Kierkegaard did not oscillate constantly between attraction 
and aversion toward Christianity. He had an aversion for 
• Christendom and he attacked the Danish Church because of 
that. 
Kierkegaard saw the necessity of celibacy which is 
2.31 
an aspect of religiousness A. And he has an aversion for 
Ghristendom. These two notions are relat'ea. Christendom 
is a complacent ethical watering down of Christianity. It 
has precisely left out the natural experience of God which 
can come through such means as celibacy. It has· not made 
the first movement of the leap. Dupre understands how the 
second movement is a faith in God such that one can accept 
the temporal. However, he consistently misunderstands the 
role of religiousness A. As a result he does not fully 
. understand religiousness B because, of course, that is not 
po~sible without religiousness A. Religiousness B without 
religiousness A easily becomes mere Christendom. This is 
why Dupre so often sees Christianity and Christendom as 
equal. 
I have mentioned that I do not think Dupre has pene-
trated into Kierkegaard's dialectic as far as he might. 
Dupre has a chapter on the Dialectic of Sin and one on the 
Dialectic of' Faith. He knows that they are related. 
Consciousness of sin is necessary for faith. But he does 
not tie them together as tightly as would Kierkegaard. 
Dupre speaks of the leap into sin. 43 He speaks of the leap 
of faith. 44 But he never analyzes these two leap~ to find 
out if they are the Sfme or different. If he did I think 
he would be forced to see the double movement nature of the 
leap. Then I think he would have to clarify his notion of 
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religiousness A. This would help him to understand more 
.. 
accurately the role of celibacy in Kierkegaard's thought 
and.experience and that in turn would force upon him a 
clearer distinction between Christendom and Christianity. 
Temporal Structures of the Leap 
Dupre very nicely points out that for Kierkegaard 
the incarnation is the supreme revelation of God~s love. 45 
When the eternal freely becomes temporal, love manifests 
itself. In his chapter on the Imitation of Christ, Dupre 
clarifies how man must realize this synthesis within him-
self to be existentially full. A breakdown in this synthe-
sis is despair. . Dupre even follows Kierkegaard in his 
analysis of true love insofar as it differs from earthly 
love. In his section on the Works of Faith Dupre shows 
·the kind of ethics that Christianity demands in order not 
to be hypocritical. Dupre points out how Kierkegaard hereby 
went beyond "Luther's incapacity to grasp two notions 
dialectically."46 I think Dupre•s theory concerning the 
development of Kierkegaard's ethics is interesting. But 
what I think would be most helpful would be a relating of 
Kierkegaard's notion of Christian love and his notion of 
Christian faith. This, of course, could be done in terms 
of the temporal struc~ure of the leap. 
Love manifests itself as the synthesis of the 
eternal and the temporal. This synthesis is the very 
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synthesis of the leap of faith. Kierkegaard from his 
beginning had this basic notion and hence I mistrust any 
speculation about some radical development concerning his 
ethical theory. I see him as only making explicit what 
his notion of the double movement leap permitted all along. 
With this in mind I would even add that Christian love not 
only makes an active Christian ethic possible but it allows 
the aesthetic and erotic love to be sublated too. 
Kierkegaard. deals with this at great length in Works of 
Love. Again, I think Dupre may have missed it because of 
not seeing the full implication of that great synthesis of 
the leap. 
' 
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. ' 
Eduard Geismar 
Stap;e Structures of the Leap 
Ge1smar sees the theory of the stages as arising· 
out of Kierkegaard's reflection upon his own experience. 
One of the interesting ideas that Geismar has, concerning 
these stages, is that concepts have different meanings 
within each of the stage contexts. In his analysis of 
Repetition, Geismar concentrates on showing what repetition 
means first in the aesthetic context. He shows how it is 
longed for but cannot be attained. In the ethical context 
Ge1smar sees repetition as; related to monotony. In the 
religious context repetition is seen as possible. Geismar 
sees this repetition as a restoration of the moral integrity 
which the young poet lost when his .beloved became a muse 
·and he had to become an ethical exception by not marrying 
her. 47 Geismar sees this problem of religious rebirth or 
repetition as the most important problem in any man's life 
and he thinks thats 
"Each individual book in the Kierkegaardian 
literature is devoted to some single phase of a 
life problem. Taken together all these many books 
point to the central question for which Christianity 
offers a solution. This solution consists in nothing 
less than the restoration of each man's pristine 
moral integrity through the forgiveness of sins ... 48 
' I, too, think with Geismar that this is the central 
problem for it is nothing less than the problem of the leap. 
Of· course, Kierkegaard not only has the problem of showing 
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what forgiveness means and how one attains it in the· 
i:eligious context, he even has the problem_ of showing that 
· .. 
a_e.sthetic and religious contexts are so different that the 
aesthete will not even know of sin. ·The interesting aspect 
of Geismar•s insight is that the leap is a transition from 
one context to another. What is longed for such as repeti-
tion in the aesthetic context is allowed in the religious 
context and. is not the mere monotony of the existentially 
sterile ethical context. Geismar does not at this point 
make explicit the notion that the religious contains the 
best. of the aesthetic but he does imply it. 
When he discusses the relation between religiousness 
A and religiousness B he becomes quite excited in arguing 
against the Barthian school and others. The latter form 
contains the prior. The point at issue has to do with 
resignation, suffering, and guilt which Geismar thinks are 
the chief characteristics of the religious. Many German 
commentators try to say that the man of religiousness B 
leaves these behind when he makes the leap. At this point 
Geismar calls upon the oft quoted statement of Professor 
Hirsch who wrote: 
"The manner in which the Postscript is usually 
understood in Germany is roughly as follows:" 
Here we have a description of the ethical and 
religious life de!voted solely to the purpose of 
keeping it entirely distinct from the Christian 
religious life, and from faith in the paradox. 
This view could properly be awarded first prize 
in a competition to see who could say the most 
stupid thing about Kierkegaard."49 
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This is an extremely important point in my thesis. 
It has to do with the possibility of th& exigtent1al at 
:....·. 
the,merely ethical level. The men whom Geismar and Hirsch 
are criticizing come at the issue from the other side and 
say that Christianity gets beyond the existential by leaping 
beyond resignation, suffering, and guilt. This interpreta-
tion of Kierkegaard is totally perverse. Kierkegaard's 
point is that religiousness B contains this aspect of 
religiousness A. And notice it is religiousness A. It is 
not the mere ethical, as Kierkegaard always maintained the 
mere ethical is not even an existential possibility. 
Geismar is very strong in his emphasis on the_ 
importance of the ethical decision if one is to make the 
leap. He stresses Kierkegaard's notion: 
"In the msment of decision, the eternal is the 
future ... :;, 
In this moment of decision the eternal enters the temporal. 
Geismar clearly sees this moment as the leap which contains 
the elements of resignation, suffering, and guilt. 
"The moment of decision faces the future with its 
uncertainty; once made, the decision alters the 
personality. After the decision he is no
5
t the 
same man as he was before the decision ... 1 
.. By a leap we reach the absolute maximum of 
subjectivity in the Christian consciousness of 
sin, with it~ imperative need for a new point of 
departure.".5 
"The way to Christianity goes through a decision, a 
crucial decision in the temporal moment; faith is 
an existential leap."5.3 
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The chief point to be noted in this interpretation 
of Geismar's is that man's ef'fort has much-to do with the 
leap. Geismar does stress grace also, but here he is 
showing what man must do for that grace to become effective. 
He must become resigned. That is, religiousness A is the 
ordinary pathway toward religiousness B. Religiousness B 
not only contains religiousness A, but religiousness A 
prepares the way for religiousness B. 
With Geismar's general treatment of the stage 
.structures of the leap I have no quarrel. But as he 
expresses his understanding of Kierkegaard's own life, I 
do not feel so much at ease with him. 
Love Structures of the Leap 
Geismar is uneasy with Kierkegaard's attitude 
·toward celibacy, and yet he praises Keirkegaard's notion 
of resignation, suffering, and guilt. It seems to me that 
Geismar does not like resignation, suffering, and guilt in 
the concrete but only at an aesthetic distance. Of course, 
what Kierkegaard says about marriage toward the end of his 
life is a special problem and I will take it up as such. 
But Ge1smar writes: 
"His diaries from the last three years are full of 
comments on5~exu~l matters which to my mind are revolting. " 
"We cannot fail to see a lack of respect for work 
and for marriage, as this respect interpenetrates 
the Lutheran doctrine. And I for my part cannot 
help believing that this disrespect has some 
relation to the attitude he assumes toward·. woman 
1n the earlier writings 1 erotic emotion. l!i.thout 
sexuality, sexuality as something mean."55 
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Geismar in his pious Lutheran way does.not seem to 
see any value in celibacy. It does· not connect 1n his 
mind with the resignation, guilt, and suffering that are 
necessary for the leap, He tries very hard to figure 
Kierkegaard out and comes up with three kinds of answer. 
The first has to do with psychic d1agnosis.56 He 
thinks that Kierkegaard was a special kind of manic- · 
depressive who in writing could express either side of his 
person no matter what state he was then in. Also 
Kierkegaard remained like a youth all his life and separated 
eros from sex, praising the one and belittling the other. 
Because of this double problem he entered a manic state 
when he saw the beauty of eros and then had to break the 
engagement when he went into the depressive state and 
emphasized the ugliness of the sexual. This sort of stuff 
makes Kierkegaard. look like a mere robot. I do not deny 
that there is something to it, but what is necessary to 
make it interesting is a phenomenology of the family whereby 
we could see this tendency growing up in Kierkegaard's 
relation to his parents and in the relation between them 
' and their parents. Kierkegaard tried this a bit. 
Next, Geismar points out how Kierkegaard was 
inspired by his love for Regina in both a poetic and 
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religious way. Geismar writes: 
i "The tragic love affair set fr~e in h1.l'll simultaneously;7 the poetic afflatus and the religious determination.") 
Now if Geismar considered what he quoted from· 
Repetition about the young man who could not marry his 
muse,58 might he not have to change his thought a bit? 
Perhaps it was not the tragedy of the love that was his 
muse, but rather, because Regina was his muse his love 
became tragic. 
In his third observation Geismar even hits on this 
· idea: 
· "Luther sets up marriage and the rearing of childre.n 
as religion of the highest kind. Kierkegaard's . 
objection is drawn from the effect of woman upon 
man's idealism. Every man begins his life with a 
certain amount of idealism but then he gets 
married, and his Juliet deprives him of the lost 
child of idealism, on the pretext that he has no 
right to risk the welfare of his wife and children. 
Here we have the root of Kierkegaard's zeal for 
discreditiug the family interest in connection with 
religion. ")lj 
The reality that Geismar misses is that Regina 
'· 
heightens his idealism even to the point that he becomes 
a poet and saint as Victor Eremita put it, and the young 
man in Repetition experienced it. 
Kierkegaard valued celibacy because he saw it as 
connected with the resignation, suffering, and guilt that 
brings a man to religibusness A. But as Johannes de 
-Silentio put it, the real Christian ideal is to make the 
double leap and after discovering the God of love to c.ome 
.. 
240 
back to the earth through faith in marriage. Kierkegaard 
was not really opposed to marriage as ~ttch9 He was just 
opposed to ideas like those of Luther and Geismar that 
marriage is religion of the highest kind. Erotic.love and 
married love can be made compatible with and through 
Christian love, but they are not Christian love. 
Dialectic Structures of the Leap 
Now that we have focused on this discrepancy between 
Geismar and Kierkegaard, let us watch carefully what happens 
as Geismar approaches the dialectical structures of the 
leap. True to his good general direction he zeros right 
in on the essentials: 
"Man is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. 
From this it follows that the central problem of a 
human life is to express this .synthesis adequately 
and truly. Man lives in time. But everything 
temporal has its ultimate ground in the eternal, 
and on the other hand has in the eternal its 
ultimate goal. To exist means to express the 
eternal in time, to translate the eternal content 
of the human self into a living reality in time. 
What do we see when we thus confront our task? 
When an existing individual is oriented in this 
manner, the eternal is for him not the eternal pure 
and simple, but wears the aspect of futurity and 
reveals itself as something that comes to be. In 60 the moment of decision, the eternal is the future." 
This description of the dialectical synthesis is 
accurate as far as it goes. But notice carefully how far 
' it goest It only goes so far as to emphasize how the 
eternal comes into time in the dimension of the future. 
Kierkegaard made this emphasis in the Edifying Discourses. 
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But that is only the synthesis of natural religion. · And 
i.t is not even a true synthesis. The future- reveals the 
.. 
eternal. It 1s not joined with the eternal. Always when 
he is concerned with the Christian synthesis Kierkegaard 
emphasizes how the eternal is connected with the. dimension 
of the present. If a man has faith he is reborn. He does 
not merely discover the eternal in the future. Abraham 
would not hope in the future that another son would come 
to him as he thought he would kill Isaac. No, he so 
believed in the face of the absurd that even if a son never 
came. somehow God's promise would be fulfilled. This was 
real for him right now. 
I wonder if Geismar is not missing the part that 
infinite resignation has to play in Kierkegaard's leap? 
Two discrepancies are now evident: he does not appreciate 
Kierkegaard's view of celibacy and he does not put the 
emphasis on the present dimension when the temporal and 
eternal are synthesized. But by infinite resignation one 
does face the ultimate scandal of the problem of evil. No 
temporal dimension contains the eternal, not even the 
future. He is opened to the eternal as such. 
Kierkegaard is not trying to say that the synthesis 
takes place between the future and the eternal but as one 
' fights-himself in the indefinite future he discovers him-
self as eternal. Geismar is right when he says "the 
eternal is the future." But that is not the synthesis he 
242 
, 
thinks he is talking about. It is not Kierkegaard's 
synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.· Geismar seems 
to make two errors concerning infinite resignation. On the 
one hand he does not appreciate its severity - he does not 
appreciate celibacy. On the other hand he over extends it 
and thinks one is a Christian by it. He does not see how 
one gets beyond it by something quite different, ·namely, 
:faith. 
In order to check this discrepancy further we shall 
-now examine how Geismar treats Christian love. For as we 
have· revealed that is the activity wherein synthesis really • 
takes place. That is where we can see most clearly the 
temporal dimension of the leap. 
Temporal Structures of the Leap 
Geismar gives a beautiful tribute to Kierkegaard 
for his expression of ideas in Works of Love. Geismar tells 
us how he first came to understand from these works what is 
meant by the words "God is love." Geismar stresses the 
eternal nature of love and talks about how it abides. But 
he does not show how the works of love are the meeting place 
of time and eternity in that special Christian synthesis. 
He does not stress the works or the temporal side. He does 
' talk ab?ut the ~ fide problem of Lutheranism and says 
that Kierkegaard is making a new stress on works. But 
Geismar does not show how these works are related to Grace. 
Z4J 
, 
He seems to think that Kierkegaard does not stress Grace as 
much as did Luther because of his historical situation. 
Btlt.Kierkegaard's entire thought is about Grace even though 
he does not always explicitly say it. He shows how certain 
acts can be the occasion for Grace, and he shows· how other 
acts flow from Grace. That is, he shows how some temporal 
acts prepare the way for more discovery of the eternal and 
then how man can continue to act because of that eternal 
vision and with that vision in time. 
Geismar sees man's decision as the event wherein 
the eternal and the temporal merge. But that is the event 
wherein the eternal is discovered. And besides, that kind 
of a merger is not a synthesis. He does not see the acts 
of love as the event where time and eternity meet in the 
.present. A decision is necessary for this synthesis, but 
so is God's Grace - the Grace which enables man to receive 
a second time the temporal. 
' 
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·Reidar Thomte 
Stage Structures of the Leao 
In Thomte's book there are two levels of interpre-
tation: that of selection and that of interrelational 
explication. I think that Thomte does an admirable job 
of selection. He goes through Kierkegaard's works and 
summarizes key aspects so that he can show what Kierkegaard 
means by the religious. Most of Thomte's work consists in 
this kind ·of sele<?tion and summary. However, at times he 
does begin to interrelate certain notions of Kierkegaard's 
so··as to explain them in terms of each other. In this 
activity he reveals his understanding of Kierkegaard and 
makes more clear why he chooses to select the passage he 
does for summarization. I feel that his understanding is 
·highly accurate. I say this because I agree very much with 
the kird of interrelational explication that he does. I 
only wish that he would do more of it. And I think if· he 
did more of it some of the minor contradictions which now 
reveal themselves in his interpretation would be eradicated. 
To my mind the two best examples of interrelational 
explication in his book have to do with his interpretation 
of three of the Et1ifying Discourses and with the notion of 
' "the second immediacy." Concerning the first Thomte writes: 
"Three of the discourses deal with what Kierkegaard 
in his philosophical writings terms the infinite 
double movement, i.e., the renunciation of the world 
(resignatiog), and the regaining of ~t (the movement 
of faith)." 1 
Thomte goes on to interpret each of these discourses 
in terms of the double movement leap, 62 and in so doing 
throws light on the leap as well as the discourse. When 
Thomte explicates faith as immediacy after reflection he 
writes: 
"By the term immediacy after reflection he means 
exactly what he formerly had called "repetition," 
namely the restoratig~ of the personality to its 
pristine integrity." 
Following this suggestion one can relate what Thomte 
writes in his summary of RePetition64 to what he is saying 
about faith. 
If Thomte would have extended this method of expli-
cation he could have interrelated all of Kierkegaard's 
thought on the religious as it is centered in the notion 
of the leap. If he would really grapple with the problems 
that present themselves such as what is the relation between 
the leap as the double movement, as the fall into sin, as 
the solution to the Socratic knowledge paradox, as the 
synthesis of time and eternity in the work of love, then he 
would force himself to come up with an idea of the stages 
and their relations which would weed out the contradictions 
in his present interpretation. His book gives an excellent 
summary of Kierkegaard's books that deal with the stages. 
He does a good job in trying to find a criterion around 
which the hierarchy of the stages is structured, namely, 
that of existence. 65 He shows how the religious is the 
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fullness of the existential and thereby the highest stage. 
But he has problems concerning the stage structures of the 
leap that his lack of interpretation does not enable him to 
solve. For exam~le, there is the notion of the ethical 
stage. At times Thomte sees the ethical as a real existen-
tial stage prior to religion A. Thus he writes: 
" ••• for there are actually two transitions; first, 
from the ethical to religion A, g~en from religion A 
to the paradoxical religiosity." 
Then at times Thomte does not treat the ethical as 
a stage separate from religion A. Thus, 
."How does Kierkegaard's theory of communication relate 
itself to the philosophy of the stages? 
1. When life is viewed aesthetically the relationship 
between teacher and pupil is entirely relative. 
2. When life is viewed ethico-religiously (within 
the category of religion A) each person is regarded 
according to his nature as equally adapted for 
eternity ani essentially related to the eternal. 
The teacher steps aside and is· merely "on occasion." 
3. When life is viewej from the standpoint of 
paradoxical religion or the specifically Christian 
religion, man is not by nature essentially related 
to eternity for sin has intervened."67 
From this it can be seen that insofar as Thomte 
merely uses the method of selection and summary, he is at 
the mercy of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms and his developing 
authorship. He cannot get inside of Kierkegaard's thoughts. 
Unless Thomte does not get an interpretative base by build-
ing up Kierkegaard's central thought, he will not have an 
' 
explicit criterion for interpreting the meaning of the 
stages, etc. As a result he cannot show what something 
within the ethical means and how the apparent contradictions 
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are to be understood. 
·-Love Structures of the Leap 
Thomte concerns himself little with Kierkegaard's 
life or with relating Kierkegaard's thought to his biography. 
Thomte does consider Kierkegaard's religious experience 
twice, 68 and each time it has to do with the experience of 
1848. Not once does Thomte consider the religious signifi-
cance of Regina. However, that in itself is not so bad 
because Thomte does not at all take up the biographical 
aspect of Kierkegaard's thought. I doubt the wisdom of 
such an approach as I would in the case of Socrates or 
Augustine. But when I consider Thomte's approach to the 
love structures of the leap even apart from the biographical 
issue, I find them wanting. It seems that Thomte must 
·relate the love structure to the leap in order to explicate 
satisfactorily the religious. But he does not. 
He does select passages which treat of eros and 
marriage. How could he help it when dealing with 
Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings? But he does not seem to 
see the significance of what he is quoting insofar as it 
is related to the religious. For example, he will summarize 
the thought of Victor Eremita in Stages69 but when he gets 
all done he will writ~: 
"The erotic relationship per se is of minor importance. 
Essentially it is used for orientation in the religious 
sphere ... 7o 
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But Thomte does not really say what he means by 
orients ti on and he does not show why that ts of' min.or 
importance. If one looks at Thomte's thought on eros care-
fully some peculiarities are to be found. When he is 
treating Works of Love he will write· about Kierkegaard, 
contrasting Christian love with friendship.71 But he does 
not say a word about the contrast with eros even-though 
that is obviously at least as important as friendship in 
Kierkegaard's contrast. Also he will talk about marriage 
as being possible within Christian love, but he does. not 
at all consider how eros is compatible with neighbourly 
love though I think Kierkegaard's writings are more con-
cerned about that. 
Thomte does not seem to see the significance of 
eros for religion. He does not reveal the religious signi-
ficance of the Regina affair. In his preface he does 
express a debt of gratitude to Geismar. Perhaps he follows 
Geismar in his interpretation of eros without even going so 
far as to see the idealizing power of eros as did Geismar. 
In short, Thomte only makes selections concerning 
the love structures of the leap but does not reveal his 
understanding of them. 
Dialectic Structures 6f the Leap 
Thomte shows a fine appreciation of Kierkegaard's 
dialectical balance. He stresses the double movement leap 
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and sees the significance of the distinction between· 
religion A and B. In fact he thinks that one of Kierke-
gaard's most important contributions is to distinguish 
Christianity from natural religion. He sees the role of 
sin in the transition and treats the leap in Kierkegaard's 
Concept of Dread. All of this is, I think, excellent. 
But my basic criticism is that he does not carry this 
approach far enough and thereby falls into some contra-
dictions. 
He seems hazy on the ways the stages are synthesized. 
He writes: 
"In Kierkegaad's presentation there is a definite and 
sharp breach in the continuity of the three stages. 
No man can live in two spheres at the same time. I~ 
a person's life is transported from the aesthetic 
sphere to the ethical sphere the aesthetic part of 
his nature is not destroyed bu~ dethroned, i.e., it 
is under ethical domination."/ 
How meaningfully can one relate the notion of a 
definite and sharp breach with the notion of dethronement? 
This is a key distinction on relationship and one needs to 
look carefully at the double movement leap in all of its 
application such as repetition, the eros marriage relation-
ship, and the sin faith relation in order to explicate it. 
Thomte is on the way toward this but halts too soon. 
For this reasqn even his distinction concerning 
somethtng as vital as the existential becomes blurred. 
He distinguishes four kinds of pathos: aesthetic, existen-
tial, ethical and religious. What is existeritial pathos 
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apart from either aesthetic or religious pathos? It· is bad 
enough to speak of ethical pathos as if that were distinct 
f_rom either the aesthetic or the religious. But to dis-
tinguish the .existential from them is really meaningless. 
A good understanding of the existential in terms.of the 
double movement leap would keep Thomte out of this kind of 
problem. 
Thomte follows Geismar in his treatment of the 
religious as resignation, guilt, and suffering. 73 He does 
this in terms of the conflict between earth and eternity. 
Bur as with Geismar one might agree with his general state-
ments but disagree in concrete application. One oddity that 
does appear even in his general treatment is seen in this 
statement. 
"Only when the individual is related to an eternal 
happiness by the most decisive existential pathos 4 can there be a question of becoming a Christian."? 
From what precedes I do think that Thomte links the 
most decisive existential pathos with religion A that then 
enables one to move to religion B. But the greatest pathos 
comes from the paradox of both A and B at the same time. 
Temporal Structures of the Leap 
Thomte is well aware of the temporal structures of 
the leap and thus wilt write: 
"The relationship of the stages may also be des-
cribed in terms of their relationship to time."75 
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But when he gets into the detail of interpreting 
these structures he seems to say little that is very clari-
fying. Thus he writes: 
"Religion A emphasizes time still more by presenting 
the task of a decisive tr~nsformation of the person-
ality to occur in time."7o · 
What is important temporally in religion A is the 
breakthrough into the eternal. One needs to relate this 
to the aesthetic time structures for religion. A is within 
the aesthetic context. Thomte's analysis never penetrates 
this far because he will not relate the different aspect 
of.,Kierkegaard's religious thought to that extent. 
When making a temporal contrast between Greek and 
Christian religiosity, Thomte does point out the tendency 
of recollection toward the past. But he stresses that 
.Christianity stresses the future. 77 This is a false 
emphasis. For the particular dimension of Christianity is 
the present as can be seen in Repetition where Kierkegaard 
also contrasts Repetition with mediation which has a future 
orientation. 
Of course, Thomte does follow Kierkegaard's texts 
so well that contrary to this false interpretation he does 
stress faith as contemporaneity.78 In his analysis of 
Works of Love Thomte u.ses a diagram from Geismar79 and 
shows how love has to do with the absolute relation to the 
absolute and the relative relation to the relative. This 
is fine. But Thomte doesn't bring out all their implica-
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tions. He does not fully link the Works of Love with the 
ikltation of Christ and the leap. 80 
As I have mentioned Thomte attempts to retain 
marriage within Christianity81 but he does not always have 
this good dialectical sense. Thus he will stress that: 
"The human religiosity is the religiosity of 
lmmanence."82 
Which is true? But then he goes on to write: 
"The Christian religiosity or the paradoxiQal 
religiosity is altogether transcendental."~) 
That is patently false. Why is it paradoxical if 
it is not that it is a combination of the immanent and. the 
transcendental or the eternal and the temporal? Why does 
. Kierkegaard always stress the absolute necessity of 
religion A if it is not to be· included dialectically within 
religion B? 
In the final analysis, I do not think Thomte fully 
' 
sees the meaning of religion A. This is indicated in his 
lack of insight into eros and mysticism. I think he is 
quite good in his selection and summary and is on the track 
of a comprehensive and penetrating interpretation of the 
leap as central to Kierkegaard's notion of religion. But 
he does not fully foll~w this out and as a result gets 
-
caught in some contradiction. 
APPENDIX B 
Upon completin&; his authorship Kierkegaard spent 
the last years of his life preparing for and writing his 
Attack Upon Christendom. Durin~ this last period of his 
life his expression is completely lacking in dialectical 
balance. In fact, there are very many passages in the 
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Journal of his last years and in the Attack that completely 
. contradict the authorship as we have interpreted it in our 
th~sis. These passages center around the topic of marriage 
and the main idea can be seen in the following samples: 
(1) "The sexual is the culmination of human egoism. 
Hence from a merely human standpoint, both the woman 
and the man regard their life as lost and a failure 
if they do not marry. Only the married man is a 
proper citizen in this world; the celibate is a· 
stranger (and this is .iust what Christianity wants 
the Christian to be)."1 
(2) "In Protestantism there is no beating about the 
bush in this regard; here it is simply taught that 
marria~e is what is well-pleasing to God, and I see 
the day coming when it will be discovered by learned 
theology that the God of the Christians is not called 
Jehovah or Adonai, and is not even neuter gender, but 
is a woman called Maggie Matchmakert"2 
(3) "O infinite majesty, even if you were not love, 
even if you were cold in your infinite majesty I 
could not cease to love you, I need something 
majestic to love •••• There was and there is a need 
of majesty in my,soul, of a majesty I can never tire 
of worshipping. In the world I found nothing, no, 
r·found no more majesty than there is beard on a 
youn~ girl's cheek - even less than that, for I 
found it ridiculous."3 
(l~) "As for myself, I cannot boast that I at once 
understood everythin~ as I did later; if I had.not 
once for all been wrecked on sonethin.~ special, I 
too should have ·been married." · 
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"Something quite special held me back, and now after 
a long time I see that what was special to me is what 
Christianity calls the general, the normal: I see 
that Christianity holds by a man's single state and 
rather makes marria(!:e the special case." 
"So here again a Providence has been with me. And in 
truth. For how should a man, born and brought up in 
this Danish-Protestant eudaimonism, have any eye for 
what is.Christian, unless a Providence helped him by 
first letting him experience constantly, in special 
conflicts, what Christianity is in a formal sense?"4 
(5) "In God's Word the single state is recommended. 
'But•, says.man, 'that sort of worship doesn't suit 
.me, and I am certainly not an ungodly man either. 
Such an important step as marriage (which, be it 
noted, God advises against, and thinks that not taking 
this "important step: is the important thing" I 
surely ought not to take without assuring myself of 
God's blessing.' (Bravo!) That ls what this man of 
God, the Priest is for; he blesses this important step 
'the importance of which consists in not doing it', 
and so it is well pleasing to ·God - and I have my will, 
and my will becomes worship, and the Priest has his 
will, he has ten dollars, not earned in the humble 
way of brushing people's clothes or serving beer or 
brandy at the bar; no, he was employed in God's 
service, and to earn ten dollars in that way is ••• 
divine worship." (Bravissimo! )5 
These passages are typical throughout the last 
phase of Kierkegaard's writing. They are also very important. 
For if they were taken in themselves they could easily give 
one a distorted view of Kierkegaard's basic philosophy. In 
fact, they often are read outside of the basic context and 
' 
radically misinterpreted. Thus, Dupre, for example, sees 
Kierkegaard in his later years as becoming bitter against 
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sex and contradicting the balanced theolo~y of his e~rlier 
writings. So in interpreting them we must-first ask: 
what is their basic philosophic meaning? Then we can ask 
how they fit with Kierkegaard's thought as a whole. 
Very briefly Kierkegaard argues that Christianity 
like any of the deeper views of life6 demands chastity 
and celibacy. This is so because sexual expression promotes. 
egoism while abstinence reveals the majesty of God. 
Christendom actually promotes egoism and hides the majesty 
·of God in its blessing of marriage. 
In our thesis we have argued that Christianity for 
Kierkegaard is a perfectly balanced synthesis of the 
aesthetic and the ethical. This means that he appreciates 
the aesthetic values of first love and marriage and finds 
room for them within Christianity. We have seen his great 
tribute to marriage in the second part of Either/Or and in 
the second part of Stages on Life's Way. In Works of Love, 
Training in Christianity, and Purity of Heart he praises 
marriage and sanctions it within Christianity. We have 
argued that even erotic love can be important as the 
occasion whereby one reaches religiousness A as was the 
case with the young man in Repetition and Victor Eremita 
in Stages on Life's Wjty. So if Kierkegaard were to be 
understood in the last phase of his life as being opposed 
to erotic and married love, then he would be contradicting 
r 
' r 
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the central philosophy of his authorship ur I would have 
g~avely misinterpreted that philosophy of the authorship. 
~U,t_the matter is not that serious for if one understands 
what he ls doing in the last phase of his life, one sees 
that it ls perfectly consistent with his authorship. 
Kierkegaard has always argued that religiousness A 
is an absolute prerequisite of religiousness B. .That is, 
one must make the first movement of the leap before he can 
ever make the second movement. This means that before one 
can ever become a Christian he must first pass through the 
rigid asceticism which leads to infinite resignation. 
Chastity and celibacy are very important means toward this 
end. In the characters of Victor Eremita and the young man 
of Renetition, Kierkegaard has shown the importance of 
chastity. His own experience with Regina, insofar as that 
experience was one of distance from her, revealed to him 
the majesty of God. He has always argued for the necessity 
of celibacy and at least chastity for a period of time ,for 
any Christian. 
But here in the last phase of his career he seems 
to stop at religiousness A and to disregard religiousness B. 
If that were the case he would be stopping at natural 
religion and disregarding that which is specifically 
' Christian. In terms of his basic philosophy as we have 
spelled it out in our thesis, Kierkegaard would be abandon-
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in0 Christianity or the second movement of the leap if he 
were really serious about the contradiction between 
'llarriage and Christianity. So what is he doing? Surely 
he is not saying that Christianity equals somethine; li~e 
Tibetan Buddhism, is he? 
The point of Kierkegaard's last phase is that he 
is attacking Christendom. And what is Christendom? It is 
precisely a false image of Christianity that is false 
because it has not made the first movement of the leap. 
So in his attack he puts his whole emphasis upon showing 
the necessity of the first movement of the leap which is 
very intimately bound up with chastity and celibacy. In 
his attack he uses the style of satire ••• he exaggerates and 
pays no attention to dialectical balance because of his 
.Purpose. He wants to attack ·Christendom only. He has 
already shown how true Christianity is a balance of the 
aesthetic and ethical. Now he puts that question of 
balance aside for the moment and with singleness of mind 
shows one essential characteristic of Christianity that 
his age has forgotten, namely, religiousness A. Actually 
Christianity or religiousness B is impossible in his age. 
But that Christianity is a combination of religiousness A 
and the ethical. In ~is age Christianity was reduced to 
Christendom or the mere ethical. Therefore, in this 
connection, we need to reclaim religiousness A that 
r 
r 
Christianity might be correct. That ls why he stresses 
q~l1bacy. It is an asnect of religiousness 3. 
As Lowrie has so well uointed out, Kierkegaard was 
well aware that he was setting aside balance for the sake 
of the attack. Lowrie writes: 
"It is certain, however, that this 'thoroughly 
polemicalized' youn~ man had a natural bent for 
satire, He kneT·~ also that satire necessarily 
involves exaggeration, For this reason he held 
completely in check his rare dialectical ability to 
see both sides. In the Instant this very dialecti-
cal man was no longer dialectical. 11 7 
In a fine passage from the Journal which Lowrie 
quot19s, Kierkegaard explains his tactics. 
"If the absolute is to be introduced - and this age 
excels to the most dreadful degree in taking up 
everything characteristically 'to a certain degree' -
prudence requires one not to do what commonly one 
would preferably desire to do, both for one's own 
sake and for the sake of others, before making the 
decisive attack, that is, to go to the rulers and 
say it to them, in order to see if possibly they 
mi.ght not yield a little, No, one cannot do this 
because - well, the misfortune is precisely this, 
that one cannot be sure, however strongly one might 
express oneself, that they would not take it up 
'to a certain degree•, .and so one would have bungled 
one's task of introducing the absolute, No, like 
the spring of the wild beast, or like the swift blow 
of the bird of prey, so it is the absolute must be 
introduced especially in theRface of this character-
less 'to a certain degree'." 
Kierkegaard attacks Christendom as a mighty eagle 
dropping out of the ·sl{y on 1 ts prey. But he attacks that 
he might heal. As he'realized in the Thunderstorm of 
Reoetition and in Fear and Trembling when he discovered the 
distinction between the Knight of Infinite Resignation and 
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t r the. Kni~ht of Faith, marriage is possible through faith 
o~ce one makes the first movement of the leap through 
chastity and discovers the majesty of God. Then he can 
marry and still preserve that sen~e of majesty. Kierkegaard 
would not deny that in his last years. He just shm,rs that 
marriage alone is not at all religious. If one has not 
been chaste to the point that it religiously pays off in 
the first movement of the leap, then one is not yet ready 
for marriage. Christendom is not yet ready for marriage. 
Once it discovers the ascetic, then it can consider 
marriage with that. 
' 
r 
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